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I. Introduction
1.1 Initial remarks
Around 1985 Ferrocarriles Argentinos, the Argentinean national railway company, counted
roughly 100.000 employees, forwarded a~early average of 22 billion transport units~, and
was loosing approximately S2 m. each day`. A decade later, and after deregulation, the whole
system transported twice as much with less than a third of the employees and subsidy.
These accomplishments were a consequence of the introduction of new strategies, production
processes and internal policies. To an extent that is difficult to gauge, they have also been a
consequence of a turnaround of the attitudes of those employees that kept their jobs and
continued to work for the new operators.
This study illustrates this turnaround showing how the organisational culture of Ferrocarriles
Argentinos (FA), an Argentinean state-owned-enterprise (SOE), was transformed as a
consequence of the company's partitioning and subsequent transfer into private hands. The
case provides a good example of how a weak and dysfunctional culture was reoriented
towards an emphasis on customers, cost-reduction and efficiency.
The focus on the cultural aspects of such a transformation were deemed worth of closer
scrutiny because of a manifest gap in the literature about privatisations. It was noteworthy that
while the bulk of the literature on privatisation focused on the strategic, financial or
macroeconomical consequences of deregulation, little attention had been given to the "soft"
variables involved in those processes. An exception to this trend constituted a handfu] of
management-related publications, particularly those linking privatisations with opportunities
for entrepreneurship and intrapreneurship (cf. Kent, 1987; Backmann, 1983). Scientific
contributions that analysed the aforementioned processes from a cultural perspective began to
appear after the fall of the "Iron curtain" in Central Europe, but even then rather scarcely (cf.
Baburoglu and Gocer, 1991; Weif3 and Wiest, 1990).
The disregard of this particular aspect is surprising, because since 1980 neoliberal policies
were implemented worldwide and during that same time, the concept of organisational culture
has been the "hottest topic" (Alvesson and Berg, 1992) within the field of organisational
theory. In addition, it is astounding because on the basis of existing material and already
conducted research, it was plausible to infer that the change in ownership and market
conditions that follow a privatisation would seriously affect the culture and hence the results
of any deregulated firm. The change in organisational culture may even be hypothesised to be
one of the main mechanisms for improvement after deregulation.
The privatisation of any SOE or agency radically alters the firm's market situation, the legal
framework in which it is embedded and, partícularly, its financial relationship with the
govemment. As mentioned above, on the basis of the existing knowledge it was possible to
assume that cultural changes would take place and to estimate their direction.
And precisely that was the central aim of this study: to measure quantitatively the orientation
and magnitude of the cultural shifts that took place after privatisation. In other words, the
~
main objective was to uncover the shifts taking place in the job-related attitudes, beliefs and
values hold by those employees that remained within the organisation. Admittedly, these were
not too many: only about a fifth of Ferrocarriles Argentinos' original workforce was still
working for the new, private companies. The situation in other areas and countries did not
differ radically.
These facts notwithstanding, the lessons gained from this study could reap potential benefits
of practical as well as academic nature. Among the first one might mention the fact that the
study provides an interesting example for the management of ongoing as well as future
privatisation processes. The insights gained through this study could also find application
within organisations that, though belonging to the private sector, have been heavily regulated
and are trying to get rid of the pernicious cultural by-products of this regulation. On the other
hand, the lessons presented here shed additional light on the cultural dynamics of turbulent
organisational environments and on the "public-private" debate.
Public units that have went through a deregulatory process operate in a new market, see their
legal framework radically altered, have to fight for customers and to generate their own
resources. Such changes affect the way a company operates and obviously also affect the
culture an organisation has. These cultural shifts could be explained, in principle, by the more
common frameworks of cultural transformation. Nevertheless, the nature and depth of the
changes experienced by any company that faced privatisation and by this SOE in particular
raise the question about the appropriateness of such approaches.
Common approaches (and their respective instruments) might be appropriate as a quick
diagnostic tool, but ill suited for the longitudinal design needed in this study. Moreover, such
approaches have been heavily criticised for their speedy but shallow results and their lack of a
verifiable justification of the dimensions employed (cf Neuberger, 1987: 52). In order to fully
grasp the magnitude and direction of the cultural changes taking place, more refined
instruments ~~ere needed.
In addition, the quantitative approach had to be underpinned and complemented by concepts
derived from the scientific debate about the so-called "publicness puzzle" (Bozeman, 1990).
Broadly speaking, this debate centres around the differences and similarities between public
and private organisations and the consequences they bear on the character and management of
the former.
For those who see little or no difference between "public" and "private" organisations (and
their cultures), the transfonnations triggered by deregulation might only imply an incremental
shift. For those who see public and private organisations as different phenomena the change is
of a more radical nature and requires the use of a more comprehensive approach.
1.2 The "Publicness3 puzzle":
Public vs. Private Administration
This obviously brings into the forum the long-standing and more general debate about the
differences between public and private administration. Many scholars point out that the main
traits of public and private administration are of disparate nature, and that similarities only
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occur on ancillary issues. More recent streams of thought emphasise the blurring of both
sectors and propose -based on the decreasing distinctiveness- generic (i.e., common)
approaches. In short: are private and public administration "fundamentally alike in all
unimportant respects", as Wallace Sayre (Allison, 1983: 72) once concluded? Or are there, as
postulated by Bozeman (1985), no significant differences between public and private
administration, and hence some organisations govemmental, but all organisations -given the
increasing degrees of political interference that affects them- basically public?
There are cogent signs of convergence between both types oforganisations, particularly in the
more developed part of the world. But if private and public administration are the same, as
some authors suggest, why are then some societies fighting to get businesses out of the public
realm and into private hands? As Rainey (1989: 230) asks: "If we cannot distinguish between
some reasonable categorisation of public and private management, why do nations throughout
the world struggle with difficult choices between political controls and market-based
controls? Could they simply choose either to nationalise everything or to privatise everything,
because it would make no real difference?". Moreover, and taking into account the
experiences of those countries that opted for the latter alternative, how can the enormous
differences in productivity and efficiency that take place after privatisation be explained?
The aim of this introductory chapter is to point out the factors that determine the specificity of
organisations belonging to the public sector. After that we will detect the factors that not only
determine the public sector's specificity but also influence in a direct manner an
organisation's culture. This sub-group of factors have a double function, they define a unit's
degree of publicness and its culture. Hence, if one (or more) of these "dual" factors is
removed or its relative weight shifted, changes in the organisational culture can be plausibly
expected. And, needless to add, most deregulatory processes at micro level imply the removal
of exactly those traits that define a unit's publicness.
In the quest for these dual factors we will draw heavily from the points of consensus about the
public - private differences summarised by Rainey, Backoff and Levine (1976) and updated
by Rainey (1989). Following their classification of these points and the respective attributes
they will be presented according to their origin: environmental, transactional (i.e.,
organisation - environment transactions) and organisational.
1.2.1 Environmental factors:
market, legal constraints, and poiitical influences
A number of external factors contribute to the degree of publicness of an organisation. Of
foremost relevance among these external or environmental factors is the market (respectively
its absence). Most public units lack an economic market; many others (as e.g., the SOEs and
other hybrids), though operating within a economic market, also rely on appropriations from
the central government or oversight bodies. These appropriations are frequently not related to
market mechanisms but follow politically or bureaucratically generated policies (e.g.,
incrementalism). The reduced market exposure results in lower allocation efficiency, and in
less incentive to reduce costs, to operate efficiently and to perform effectively.
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A second environmental factor that impedes the effective management of a public unit are the
myriad of norms, rules and regulations that limit their flexibility. Judicial, legislative and
oversight bodies produce directives that public organisations must accept. The observed
greater tendency to the proliferation of formal specifications and controls, and the countless
sources of such fonnal influence restrict public managers' autonomy and impede an efficient
administration.
Finally, the actions followed by any public organisation are heavily influenced by political
considerations. In public units, the search for economic rationality is frequently drowned by
the manipulative attempts or direct interventions made by legislators, union representatives or
interest groups. As the degree of publicness increases, so does the need to be responsive to
such requests by means of negotiation and bargaining. Under such circumstances, economic
reasoning is of only secondary relevance. In other words: in order to survive, public units are
in greater need to gain the support of their constituencies, a necessity that frequently leads to
inefficient behaviours.
1.2.2 Transactional factors:
coerciveness, scope of impact, public scrutiny, public expectations
The factors discussed here reflect the nature of the links that bind a public organisation with
its environment and some key entities within the latter. Of foremost relevance among these
transac[ional factors is the monopolistic, or unavoidable (hence "coercivè') nature of many
government activities. The recent incursion of private operators into wide domains of
previously public territory - as the case here under scrutiny - indicates that in most cases the
monopolic character of a given market was defined politically. However, in the coercive
nature of these "markets" rested the fundamental justification for the constitutional checks
and balances and extensive formal control mechanisms (Rainey et al., 1976: 238).
Also politically defined is the wider scope of impact and greater variety of concerns that
public organisations have. Beyond its more central mandate for instance, the Argentinean
railway company pursued a number of goals dictated by geopolitical ("Civilisation Agent") or
educational ("School of the Nation") reasons. A third transactional factor that allows to
discriminate between both fields is found in the greater public scrutiny of public officials and
their actions. So-called "sunshine" laws force public officials to conduct business in the open.
In addition, mechanisms of accountability and oversight make even issues of marginal
ímportance subject to review by outsiders. Reflecting on his experience in both sectors,
Blumenthal (1983) described decisional processes within the public sphere as "fishbowl
management".
Finally, ownership also distinguishes private from public organisations. The latter belong to
everybody, and citizens therefore have rights and expectations they do not have in relation to
private enterprises (Wamsley and Zald, 1973). Other scholars perceive that citizens expect




goals, authority and leadership practices, decision processes, individual traits,
incentives and incentive structures
The distinctive traits of goals, roles, authority, structure, incentives, and individual attitudes
can be derived to some extent from the above-mentioned environmental and transactional
factors. However, the nature of intemal processes clearly helps to identify the degree of
publicness. Even more important for the purposes of this study is the fact that many intemal
arrangements have direct consequences for an organisation's culture.
The most frequently cited distinction between private and public organisations refers to their
goals. There is wide agreement that the public environment is characterised by greater goal
ambiguity, multiplicity and conflict. Goals are frequently defined in broad, even vague terms;
as a consequence it is difficult to specify and quantify performance measures. In addition,
they are more debatable and value-laden. Public environments are also characterised by
greater goal multiplicity and diversity. Finally, there is a greater tendency of goals to be
conflicting, to involve more "trade-offs", partly as a consequence of conflicting demands of
diverse constituencies and political leaders.
The limited authority of public administrators contrasts with the latitude and flexibility of
most private managers. The former have weaker power bases, less decision-making authority,
less autonomy and less flexibility due to complex legal and institutional arrangements (e.g.,
purchasing and procurement systems, civil service personnel systems, etc.). The limited
authority is aggravated by high turnover rates - particularly among those functionaries that
have been politically appointed. A number of studies point out that higher-level public
managers show greater reluctance to delegate and a tendency to establish more levels of
review and approval.
Compared to their colleagues in the private sector, public managers and employees perceive
greater administrative constraints on the administration of extrinsic incentives such as pay and
promotion. As the degree ofpublicness increases, so does the difficulty with which incentives
can be devised that will alter performance. The private sector can use material incentives
more effectively, tying performance to financial rewards. In many cases, a close link between
pay and performance is not even allowed within the public sector. On the other hand, a
number of studies indicate that public personnel has different work-related values, such as a
lower valuation of monetary incentives and higher levels of public service motivation
(Lawler, 1971). Other authors found that public sector employees often prefer job security,
important tasks, or power and recognition over financial rewards (Banfield, 1977). Finally,
various scholars detected that public organisations and employees are cautious and non-
innovative, and that public units tend to be less efficient in providing services than their
private counterparts. These findings can partly be explained by the greater goa] ambiguity in
the public sector: vague goals are translated into vague performance expectations.
There is, in summary, much evidence indicating that these environmental, transactional and
organisational distinctions allow to discriminate between both types of organisations. There is
obviously a wide spectrum of units that, though belonging to the public sector, are
characterised by low degrees of publicness. This is the case of many "hybrids" (Emmert and
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Crow, 1988) such as public-private joint ventures, government-sponsored enterprises, etc. As
a matter of fact, many of these units were created as means to cut through the bureaucratic
restrictions and constraints faced by those organisations with high degrees of publicness. Such
policies have been followed by most countries, developed or not, for the last forty years. Once
the agencies pertaining to the central govemment demonstrated their inability to reach their
specific goals, new units were created that were endowed with wider decisional (and,
particularly, financial) latitude. In general, they were exempted from burdensome legal
restrictions such as, e.g., [he aforementioned civil service personnel systems, or the
purchasing systems. However, sooner rather than later these newly created units also adopted
or were burdened by a web of legal norms and procedures, making a new set of public units
with even wider latitude necessary. This process has often been depicted through an onion
diagram, in which every new layer represents a new set of units (Felcman and Krieger, 1987:
313).
Leaving aside those hybrids, there are large sectors within the public sector with high degrees
of publicness, particularly in countries of the less developed world. Precisely the existence of
large areas in which the degrees of publicness are high justify the treatment of Public
Administration as a separate field. They also provide the rationale for the development of
related disciplines as, e.g., Strategic Public Management (Nutt and Backoff, 1992; Bryson,
1988) or Public Management (Peny and Kraemer, 1983; Golembiewski, 1987).
1.3 The "Publicness puzzle":
Public vs. Private Organisational Cultures
Numerous scholars and practitioners havc addressed the comparative issue. Their main
findings, summarised in the preceding paragraphs, clearly indicate that the significance of the
public - private comparison should be taken into consideration, since it explains both the
differences and the specific characteristics in a meaningful way. Starting from this premise, it
seems of relevance to analyse closer some evidence with regard to the differences between
public and private organisational cultures. However, it is necessary to acknowledge that
studies about the culture of public units -at least when compared to the amount of research
done in this particular field in the private realm- are rather scarce. In addition, some findings
are of an impressionistic nature, based more on an author's personal experience than on
systematic comparative measurements.
A good starting point to briefly review the cultural traits of public organisations can be found
in the book that to a large extent triggered the growth of interest in organisational culture. In
"In Search of excellence", Peters and Waterman distilled eight characteristic features of the
culture of excelling American corporations4. Leaving aside some questions about the meaning
and significance of these criteria as guides to organisational action, "it is rather clear" - as
mentioned by Metcalfe and Richards (1990: 53) -"that the values underlying the eight
criteria are not much in evidence in the traditional civil service culture".
A second book that prompted interest into cultural matters was Deal and Kennedy's
"Corporate cultures". In this case, however, concrete references about the cultural identity of
public units can be found. In Deal and Kennedy's taxonomy, public organisations are located
in the "low risk, slow feedback corner"; as a consequence of the latter two traits, employees
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of such units tend to "focus on how the do something, not what they do" and "tend to develop
a`cover your ass' mentality" (1982: 119). In particular the lack of feedback generates
"protectiveness and caution" and the tendency to "carry out procedures as they are written
down without asking whether they make sense in the real world" (1982: 119). In such
organisations, following these authors, "Rituals centre on work patterns and procedures"
(1992: 120).
In a similar vein, Handy (1981) associated public organisations with a"role culture".
Employees embedded in such a culture expect tasks and responsibilities to be clearly
demarcated; career and salary to be regularised and detemlined by explicit niles and
regulations. The organisational structures within such an environment follow a hierarchical
model. In summary, Handy's role culture corresponds to the prevalent stereotype of public
unit, the bureaucratic machine.
Another description of public cultures has been compiled by Metcalfe and Richards, who
assume that -at least during the eighties- governments had "administrative cultures which
give a high priority to procedural conformity rather than management cultures which give a
high priority to achieving results" (1987: 72). Other examples of such dichotomic pairs cited
by these authors are: "a culture of subservience vs. a culture of responsibility; a culture of
continuity vs. a culture of innovation; a culture of propriety regardless of costs vs. a culture of
cost consciousness; a culture of stability vs. a culture of progressive improvement" (1987:
72).
Though Metcalf and Richards claimed to "indicate the general direction of cultural change
now being sought", much still has to be done. In a more recent benchmark study of best
practices in the American service industry, Roth et al. (1997) located public bureaucracies
(represented in their sample by local govemment units) in the "low practice, low
performance" quadrant and identified them as "laggards". In all but one of the 18 best
practices and results studied, the public sector still lags behind the private service firms.
As demonstrated by the previous examples, the units pertaining to the public sector and their
culture are generally characterised as bureaucratic or normative. Whenever double-entry
taxonomies are employed, public organisations are to be found in the quadrant diagonally
opposite to the one where the so-called "excelling" companies are located. In summary, and
on the basis of a majority of the literature reviewed, more often than not public units seem to
epitomise just "negative" organisational traits.
On the basis of these findings, three issues emerge. First, the collected evidence strongly
suggests that there is some kind of specific public culture and that this differentiation should
not be prematurely dismissed. Secondly, though the public units are characterised as
"laggards" or fall into the "minus - minus" quadrant, it should be noted that to follow
notmative patters of behaviour should not be considered an error in itself (see e.g., Metcalf
and Richards, 1987: 83; Hofstede 1991: 199). Moreover, not to follow bureaucratic guidelines
could be even harmful in specific environments as e.g., electrical utilities or production areas
within the pharmaceutical industry. Finally, the general consensus about the exis[ence of a
specific public culture, as well as its nature, forces to look for the reasons behind the latter. In
other words, it is necessary to understand what causes the public units to foster specific
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cultural traits - and what it takes to remove or reorient them in as far as they are
counterproductive.
1.4 Public Organisational Cultures:
Influencing factors
A useful approach to uncover the sources of such traits lies in the analysis of the
aforementioned dual factors and the consequences they bear on public organisations (see
Table 1-1). This analysis has to be complemented by a review of those other factors that,
though defining the public character of an organisation, do not influence its culture. Finally,
there are a considerable number of factors that do not define the public or private character of
a given unit, but that do influence its culture. Starting with the dual factors, in this section
some common assertions about the culture ofpublic units
will be analysed in order to evidence the development of bureaucratic or dysfunctional
practices.
It has often been observed, for example, that the culture of public units adheres more to
procedural conformity than to perfonnance. But how can a perforniance-oriented culture be
induced when goals are vague, when there is no "bottom line" that could serve as a rod to
measure success? Precisely these are the conditions confronted by public administrators and
managers, conditions that in addition are compounded by the demands of diverse
constituencies and the manipulation by relevant stakeholders (Nutt and Backoff, 1992: 44).
As a result, goals are both vague and conflicting, and the organisational requirements and
priorities difficult to decipher (ibid, 1992: 45). Equally difficult is, as a consequence, the
introduction and administration of performance-related incentives and hence the fostering of a
performance-oriented culture. To "operate efficiently", an approach used in public
environments as a substitute for the (unavailable) bottom line, may lead to unacceptable
decisions. "Efficiency in public libraries" following Nutt and Backoff's example, "would
entice the library management to keep the books shelved, cut hours, and limit services". The
aforementioned goal ambiguity has other pemicious consequences, since it makes
performance expectations difficult to specify (Dahl and Lindblom, 1953). As a result, it may
be difficult to recognise success, to identify and reward key contributors, or to detect and
correct failures (Nutt and Backoff, 1992: 47).
Performance expectations within the public realm are not only vague and conflicting, but also
changing. Such changes are frequent given the high tumover rates among managers, a
consequence of both the political character of some appointments and periodic electoral
shifts. In any case, "expectations are in constant flux, which makes it easy to rationalise
inaction"; in addition, the periodic interruption caused by changing upper levels "lead to
cautiousness, inflexibility, and low rates of innovation" (Nutt and Backoff, 1992: 47; Rainey
et al., 1976: 241).
As evidenced above, the sources of such bureaucratic cultural traits are diverse and tend to
mutually reinforce themselves. Much has been written and proclaimed about the alleged
disregard of public employees for the customer and his or her needs. However, there are some
clear public-private differences which have to be taken into account here. The link between
public units and their publics is not always that of a supplier to a customer. Govemment units
s
Table 1
Public - Private differences and their organisational consequences
Factor Public Sector Private Sector Consequences for public
or anisations
Environmental factors
Market Absence of economic Consumption pattems Reduced market exposure
markets; reliance on define market. leads to less incentive to
govemment cost reduction, operating
appropriations. efficiency, and effective
performance; to a lower
allocational efficiency




Legal constraints Elaborate and intensive Autonomy and flexibility More constraints on
normative constraints due limited only by law and domains ofoperation and
to oversight by legislative internal arrangements. on procedures; less
and executive branch, by managerial autonomy;
agencies and courts. proliferation of norms;
many extemal sources of
formal control, authority
and influence.
Political influences Greater diversity and Political influence Appropriations or
intensity of extemal indirect, handled as authorisations often
influences on decisions. exceptions. dependent on political
Greater need for support backing. Less managerial
from constituencies autonom .
Transactional factors
Coerciveness Consumption and Consumption voluntary Monopolistic powers
financing of activities and payment based on exclude market
often mandato . use. mechanisms see above .
Scope of impact Broader scope of concern, Narrow concerns with Difficulry in measunng
impact and greater reduced societal impact. goals and performance
symbolic significance criteria; inefficiencies
("public interest" as valid caused by "trade-offs"
criteria). against, e.g., social
equity, due process, or
fairness.
Public scrutiny Greater public scrutiny of Can sequester ideas or Difficulty in pursuing
public officials and their innovations. developmental activities.
actions; "fishbowl
mana ement".
Public expectations Citizens act as owners Ownership vested in Inefficiencies caused by
and impose expectations stockholders whose "trade-offs" against, e.g.,
regarding faimess, interests are interpreted social equity, due process,
responsiveness, honesty using financial indicators. or faimess.
and accountabili .
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Public - Private differences and their organisational consequences (cont.)
Factor Public Sector Private Sector Consequences for public
or anisations
Organisational factors
Goals Greater goal ambiguity, Goals clear and agreed Difficulty in measuring
multiplicity, and conflict upon; efficiency goals and performance
(goals more vague, value- dominant concem. criteria; inefficiencies
laden, or debatable; less caused by "trade-offs"
tangible; in constant against, e.g., social
flux). Equity dominant equity, due process, or
concern. fairness.
Authority and Elaborate institutional Less institutional and Managers have less
leadership practíces constraints (e.g., civil external constraints; decision-making
service personnel, or management largely autonomy and flexibility;
purchasing and independent of outside weaker authority over
procurement systems); influences; lower subordinates and lower
more extemal political tumovec levels; managers show
alliances and influence; greater reluctance to
more frequent turnover of delegate, a tendency [o
leaders due to elections establish more levels of
and political review, and to make
appointments greater use of formal
regulations to control
lower levels.
Decision processes More likely to be subject Less external Deferments; delays;
to interventions by involvement. interruptions.
external authorities and
interest rou s.
Individual traits Lower valuation of Higher valuation of Lower levels of work
monetary incentives; job pecuniary incentives. satisfaction and
security, power and organisational
recognition highly commitment.
valued; higher levels of
ublic service motivation.
Incentives and Greater constraints on Ample freedom to devise Difficulties in devising
incentive structures administration of incentive systems. incentives for effective
extrinsic incentives (pay, and efficient perfor-
promotion); weak relation mance; low morale.
between perfotmance and
extrinsic rewards.
Note: adapted and revised from Rainey, Backoff and Levine, 1976; Rainey, 1989; Nutt and Backoff, 1992
deal, among others, with suppliers, inmates, taxpayers and recipients ofbenefits; closeness (as
suggested by Peters and Waterman) may not invariably be a desirable characteristic of these
relationships. On the other hand, public units face severe constraints when trying to motivate
their workforce. To some extent, these difficulties might be rooted in the particular (national)
merit system. They might also stem from the difficulty to link rewards, individual
contribution and perfotmance measurement, due in part to the aforementioned conflicting and
il]-defined goals. Finally, many scholars (e.g., Banfield, 1977; Lawler, 1971) found that
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public sector employees value job security and power or recognition over monetary rewards.
Such rewards are difficult to dispense, particularly over time.
Most of the factors listed in Table 1 allow to derive in a similar way the consequences they
have on the culture of public units. The relevance of these factors for this study resides in the
fact that once the structural conditions have been removed or altered, e.g., through a
deregulatory process, equivalent shifts may be expected in the culture of the now "less-
public" organisation. Nevertheless, not all of the factors that define the public character of an
organisation also influence its culture. The unavoidable character of certain government
activities is cited as a basic distinction between public and private organisations: members of
a given society neither can avoid to finance these activities nor to consume them, and the state
has unique sanctions and the powers to enforce them. A prime factor that allows to define the
degree of publicness of an organisation is the degree ofcoerciveness of its activity. However,
it should be noted that the coercive character does not imply the absence of market
mechanisms: schooling is coercive, but parents may opt among different public institutions
(e.g., through voucher systems). Coerciveness should thus not be equalled with monopolistic
powers. Hence, in spite of being a central feature of certain public units, the coercive
character of their activities does not necessarily influence their culture.
It goes without saying that the culture of any unit is not exclusively influenced by the factors
listed above. There is a large number of other forces that influence the culture of an
organisation, but that are unrelated to the degree of publicness. The kind of task, the
technology employed, some aspects of national culture, the size of an organisation: all these
elements mould the culture of a certain unit, but do not define its public (or private) character.
The fact that specific tasks and technologies or a large size lead to bureaucratic cultural
practices has frequently been observed. Also common, particularly in the less developed
countries, is the tendency of government, its agencies or enterprises to employ outdated and
inefficient technologies or to grow out of proportion. In spite of their close association with
bureaucratic outgrowth, these culture influencing factors are not (public) seetor specific.
Public and private providers of public services (e.g., utilities) that use similar technologies
may not differ substantially either in their performance or from a cultural point of view (see,
e.g., Rainey, 1989: 245; Atkinson and Halverson, 1986). In other words, specific cultural
features in these cases cannot be linked to the public nature of the organisation since they are
actually dependent on other factors as for example the kind of task involved or the specific
technology used.
Research question, methodology 8c data
As indicated above, specific elements define both the public character and the culture of any
given organisation. As a consequence of its transfer into private management, the relative
weight of such "dual" factors diminishes, and alterations in the culture of the privatised
organisation can be expected. The central aim of this study was to detect these changes and
reveal their underlying dynamics. Moreover, our interest was focused on what specific aspects
of the established cultural order were modified, to what an extent, and into what direction.
To trace these shifts a longitudinal research design was employed, enhanced by the survey of
a control unit. This research design thus encompassed an ex-ante measurement at the (still)
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public enterprise and its comparison with an analogous survey performed roughly a year after
its privatisation. In order to be able to detect a profound cultural cleavage, it was necessary to
study a case in which the likelihood of dissimilarities between the conditions before and after
privatisation was high. A set of stringent criteria regarding property conditions, age, market
position, and size of the SOE resulted in the selection of the Argentinean national railway
company as study object. Diverse other reasons determined the selection of those two
companies (out of the twelve in which the original SOE was partitioned) in which the ex-post
measurement was performed.
Data about the cultural reality at each of the companies involved was obtained by means of
stimulated as well as non-stimulated research strategies. Conceming the former, over 25
interviews and an equal number of feedback sessions were conducted. In addition, a paper and
pencil questionnaire was administered at the three companies, obtaining an average of 170
useful questionnaires per unit. With regard to the latter research strategies, the analysis of
documents provided by the companies and external sources was complemented by month-
long stays at each unit. Quantitative data was analysed by various procedures at the level of
subgroups within each unit as well as between organisations, and enhanced by material gained
through qualitative means. The information elaborated forwarded interesting evidence
conceming significant shifts in a number of critical issues and underlined the distinctiveness
ofpublic and private organisational cultures.
1.6 Summary 8c overview
In summary, in spite of the convergence between both fields and the significant reduction of
the activities in which the state is active, there still are considerable areas characterised by
large degrees of publicness. Evidence collected in these areas indicate that the more general
public - private distinction is still valid, and that the equivalent cultural distinction could help
to better understand the nature of state and govemment - related organisations. The
specificity of public organisational cultures has been evidenced by various studies, of
impressionistic as well as scholarly nature. The implicit use among the latter of the so-called
"dual" factors strongly suggest to evaluate their development during deregulatory processes.
In the following chapters these factors will be traced in order to highlight the transformations
suffered by the culture of a former public unit after its conversion into a private company.
Continuing with the purpose of this introductory chapter, the following ihree chapters will
describe the main concepts and the methodology used in this study. After illustrating the
swinging attitudes towards public ownership by way of the Argentinean railway policies,
chapter 2 describes the aims, perspectives and practical alternatives of any privatisation effort.
The third chapter tries to delineate a definition of the "organisational culture" concept and to
circumscribe its boundaries vis-à-vis other related fields within (organisational) theory and
practice. In its second part, this third chapter elucidates other culture-related concepts of
crucial relevance in the process here under scrutiny. On the basis of the accumulated scientific
knowledge and practical evidence, chapter 4 starts formulating the postulated hypothesis. In
its second part, and closing this first module of theoretical nature, the research design is
briefly discussed.
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The central part of this study is composed of the next four chapters, each devoted to one of
the companies that belonged (or made up, in the case of Ferrocarriles Argentinos) the
Argentinean national railway system. After a thorough description of the particular
institutional developments, each chapter observes how these developments forged a set of
specific cultural practices. Starting in chronological order, chapter 5 offers a detailed account
of FA's history and debacle. The following chapter is dedicated to Ferrocarriles
Metropolitanos (FeMeSA), an organisation of transient character intended to serve as a bridge
between a dissoh~ing FA and the start of the new, deregulated companies. In spite of the
ephemeral character of the unit studied, this 6`h chapter is of relevance not only because the
ex-ante survey was conducted at FeMeSA, but also as a consequence of the fact that profound
alterations took place at that time that resulted in a state of cultural anomia. Chapter 7
describes the process of cultural reconstruction of Trenes de Buenos Aires (TBA), the
metropolitan passenger operator. The final chapter of this second module centres around the
analogous process at Nuevo Central Argentino (NCA), the cargo carrier that served as a
control unit.
The previous four chapters to a certain extent display the cultural dynamics of the overall
process. This notwithstanding, chapter 9 further elaborates on the observed general trends in
the (re-) creation of cultural elements among former FA employees and their new colleagues.
Simultaneously each of the previously postulated hypotheses is analysed in order to determine
its validity. Finally, chapter 10 summarises the main findings and their implications for the
companies involved. In addition, a number of issues of relevance for both scientist and
practitioners are discussed. The chapter ends with pointing out a number of research questions
that on the basis of the work here presented seem to be worth pursuing.
~ Transport Unit [TU] is a combined indicator of Passenger - Kilumetres and Tonnes - Kilometres.
Z All dollar amounts are U.S. dollars, unless otherwise specified. A billion is a thousand million.
' The definition of "publicness" used here has been adopted from Bozeman (1987: xi) and refers "to the degree
to which the organisation is affected by political authority".
' These features are: 1) Managing ambiguity and paradox; 2) a bias for action; 3) closeness to the customer; 4)
encouraging autonomy and entrepreneurship; 5) productivity through people; 6) hands-on commitment to




The debate upon where to draw the line between the public and private sectors of the economy
has a long tradition. Little more than 200 years ago Adam Smith propounded the idea that the
market system was actually better than the planning and command system at co-ordinating the
individual decisions and thus enhancing efficiency. Private property, according to Smith,
fosters productivity and efficiency. "In every great monarchy in Europe the sale of the crown
lands would produce a very large sum of money, which, if applied to the payment of the
public debts, would deliver from mortgage a much greater revenue than any which those lands
have ever afforded to the crown... When the crown lands had become private property, they
would, in the course of a few years, become well improved and well cultivated" (Smith, 1776:
824).
In certain areas, e.g. the custody of internal and extemal security, the administration of the
judicial system, there seems to exist an agreement between the advocates of both the liberal
and the interventionist positions'. In these areas the private sector is not expected to perform
an adequate role and the State is asked to take care of them. On all other areas, on the
contrary, disagreement prevails. The engagement of the state in entrepreneurial activities has a
long tradition: broadly defined, public enterprises have always existed. However, the bulk of
their story is recent (Harberger, 1987: 5).
The construction and exploitation ofrailway systems were among the first economic activities
to move from private into public hands. By the first world war there were significant public
sector holdings in this sector in France, Germany, and Italy and, in Latin America, in Brazil
and Argentina. There also have been, nevertheless, and from 1850 on, alterations in ownership
in the opposite direction, i.e. from public to private administration. To a certain extent, the
history of railways in general, and of the Argentinean system in particular, are paradigmatic
concerning the aforementioned debate. In the following section, a brief review of the
Argentinean railway history will serve as an example of the political arguments and practical
needs that induced the changes in ownership.
2.2 Public or private?
Some economic, political and pragmatic arguments
In 1857 the Buenos Aires government (at that time separated from the Argentinean
Confederation) allowed the formation of a society that was interested in the construction and
exploitation of a railway line. The decree allowed the govemment to purchase the shares it
considered necessary but -following liberal principles- never more than one third of the total
emission. By the time the locomotives had to be ordered, the society had not been able to sell
all shares, making it ask for a permission to use horses instead of steam. The problem was
solved by the purchase of the residual shares (roughly 40 0~0) by the government. Thus even
before its inauguration in 1857, the private enterprise was transformed into a mixed one.
Needless to say, similar circumstances have, at other points in time, induced the engagement
of the public sector in entrepreneurial activities: the shortness or shyness of above all local
capital forced government to broaden its range of activities.
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During its first years of operation, the railway incurred substantial deficits. As an example of
what later became one of the main sources of growth of the public sector in Latin America as
well as in other regions, the govemment rescued the failing society from bankruptcy. As a
consequence, only six years after inauguration, the first railway line completed its shift into
public hands.
As noted by many scholars (Cuccorese, 1984; Roccatagliata, 1987), the railway system was
developed without the government having previously defined a clear railway policy. Thus the
level of public participation oscillated according to the economic perspective and political
stance of the power holders. Until 1885, and particularly under the presidencies of Avellaneda
and Roca, public and private investment and administration in the sector coexisted.
In August 1886 Juárez Celman assumed the presidency. Two years earlier, Herbert Spencer
affirmed the superior validity of the individual rights and voiced his opposition to public
intervention (Spencer, 1884). Given the relevance of the railways at that time, his book is full
of direct and concrete references to that mean of transport. Juarez Celman and his minister E.
Wilde openly declared their admiration for Spencer. They acted accordingly: many public
works and railway lines (e.g. Fercocarril Andino, Ferrocarril Oeste) were transferred to the
private sector.
Máximo Paz, govemor of the Buenos Aires province, shared Juarez Celman's views. In his
Message to the Legislature (January 5, 1889) he declared that the state should not be a
transport entrepreneur. As an exception, it intervenes in areas the private sector is not
interested in. According to Paz, public railway administration has "hindered progress, has
suffocated important advancement initiatives and constituted a constant source of
complaints..." (Cuccorese, 1984: 92). In 1890, the provincial lines (roughly a fifth of the
whole system) were sold to private investors. As in previous privatisations, the revenues were
used to ease the government's financial burden. Similar reasons are currently forcing the sell
of SOE's: "... in many developing countries privatisation was a means of dealing with foreign
debts (cornparable to the budgetary deficits that Westem governments face) and to attract new
foreign capital." (Van Dijk and Schulte Nordholt, 1994: 8).
The liberal trend slowly ebbed away, giving way to new ideologies and economic
perspectives. In 1920, president Irigoyen vetoed the authorisation to form a mixed enterprise
that intended to construct a line between Argentina and Chile. His main argument was that the
construction had to be administered by a public unit. (Cuccorese, 1984: 113). In 1921, he
ordered by decree the construction of that same connection. But having no solid financing, the
works were halted and only finished in 1948.
Though initiating at different times and places, the trend towards nationalisation slowly
encompaSSed practically all national railway systems (as well as other sectors). The rationale
behind that trend were disparate: Bismarck nationalised the railway system for strategic
reasons; in Britain the motive was rather of an ideological nature. In many developing
countries, and particularly in former colonies, the arguments often advanced for
nationalisation have been of nationalistic or political nature (López, 1991: 5).
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The latter two arguments prevailed when Perón, evoking and fostering the resentments among
some groups of citizens against foreign capital, nationalised the railway system on March 1",
1948. According to Perón, the acquisition of the English and French railway lines "constituted
the highest realisation of the patriotic strivings aimed at economic recuperation" (Cuccorese,
1984: 150).
As can be observed, the shift between public and private sector has neither been "one-way"
nor linear. However, the patterns that led to the nationalisation or the establishment of SOE's
in the transport as well as in other sectors, in Argentina and world-wide, were similar. The
underlying arguments also remained relatively undebated while the welfare-state ideology
remained ingrained in the public mind.
The cunent wave of privatisations has many, often strongly related sources. At a global level,
it has been set off by the examples provided by Thatcher and Reagan. Following her political
aims of privatisation and denationalisation, Thatcher disengaged British govemment from
many activities the state had become involved in after the second world war. In the US,
though the overall public involvement (and above all the use of SOEs) was substantially
lower, the deregulatory policies enacted by Reagan and Bush also set an example for the rest
of the world. Additional sources of particular relevance for the developing world have been
the loan conditions of the international donor community. Of utmost importance in this
respect has been the 1983 World Development Report of the World Bank. This report
formulated a conceptual basis for large scale economic change; it examined the role of the
government and public sector in general, concluding that a reduction of their power and
influence, and the simultaneous reorganisation of SOEs, would stimulate economic efficiency.
According to that same report, if privatisation is implemented thoroughly and correctly,
private investment would be enhanced and fostered and the government could do a better job
in those areas where its activities would be concentrated. Thus the return of the invisible hand
redirected the developing strategies of the World Bank and the International Monetary Found.
Further sources of particular relevance for the developing world have been the catastrophic
budgetary situation and the rising awareness -particularly after the fall of the iron curtain- that
there is not such a thing as a"third way" out ofeconomic poverty.
2.3 Privatisation, deregulation and semantics
Before attempting to identify the main objectives of privatisation and deregulation, it is
necessary to analyse the concrete scope of both terms. This seems to be a relevant task since
the extensive usage has eroded their specific meaning. To begin with, the emphasis on
privatisation found in much of the current literature on the topic is somewhat misleading: to a
certain extent, the privatisation concept has substituted that of deregulation, which is the
ultimate objective. Privatisation may have "become the model to promote economic growth
in Third World countries" (Van Dijk and Schulte Nordholt, 1994:7), but it remains a further
instrument to reach a deregulated market, which is the real target. The abuse of the
privatisation concept has also been noted by the same scholars, when noting that "Various
authors consider for example deregulation as privatisation" (1994: 19). However, and
paraphrasing their example, it is clear that stimulating competition is not necessarily
privatisation.'
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The difference between deregulation and privatisation is of extreme relevance for the
developing world; there is evidence suggesting that privatisation processes started amidst a
highly regulated economical environment do not succeed because of the abundance of
currency, wage or price controls. A deregulated market assumes that all obstacles which
restricted private initiative have been lifted across all sectors in order to maximise growth
opportunities and improve competitiveness. Freedom has to be granted to the currency
markets and controls on prices, wages and interest rates restricted or avoided. By the same
token, obstacles to and tax discrimination on foreign capital have to be eliminated, and the
access to the national market eased.
On the other hand, the term "privatisation" is not concisely circumscribed: Ramanadham
(1989) states IS different meanings, a list that according to van Dijk and Schulte Nordholt
(1994) could easily be extended. The term is usually considered to represent the shift in
ownership of a SOE or state unit from the public to the private sector. However, even this
restricted denotation allows diverse alternatives. A detailed analysis of these and further
privatisation alternatives (e.g. contracting out, management contracts, concessions, monopoly
franchises, privatisation of operations, etc.) exceeds the purpose of our study. Well aware of
its inherent limitations, the aforementioned definition will be used in this work.
2.4 The aims of privatisation
Privatisation processes have both economically and socially far-reaching consequences.
Depending on the political stance of the beholder, these consequences are weighted and
valued differently. In this section the three basic aims of privatisation programs are described,
each followed by its most commonly used corresponding arguments.
2.4.1 Political aims
Political aims are the most controversial, since underlying them are value orientations and
distributional interests. Their analysis is further complicated by the fact that these value
orientations and interests are seldom unequivocally explicit and can not be neatly classified
into some "right" and "wrong" categorisation. Nevertheless, the analysis is of crucial
relevance since any encompassing privatisation or deregulation program redraws the power
constellation present in a given society. The high political content of a privatisation policy is
evidenced by Bás when remarking that „Neither procedure (privatisation and nationalisation)
is embarked upon primarily for economic reasons" (Bás, 1991: 2).
By means of privatisation, the power to decide upon the prices of certain goods and services
are to a great extent handed over to private operators. Similarly, decisions about when or what
must be purchased are no longer made by politicians or bureaucrats, but by individuals who
are usually held accountable in a direct way. Hence, depending on the size of the public sector
and its SOE's and the scope of the privatisational effort, this process can completely reverse
the power distribution between the public and private sector. This is clearly visible in the
former socialist world, where the state was the main contributor to GDP.
A group usually adversely affected by privatisation are the employees of the former SOE's or
public units. Since these public imits have often been used as a mean to create or stabilise a
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certain level of employment, and rationalisation efforts seldom succeeded, in general they
were clearly over-staffed. Privatisation affects those who remain in the privatised unit (they
are stripped of some benefits and their status as public employees) and, obviously, those who
loose their job. Two further groups adversely affected are the unions and those companies that
-often working in collusion with the SOE's or public units- made most of their money selling
to the state. Nonnally after privatisation the number of inembers and concomitant power of
the unions dwindle (cf. Bds, 1991). Concerning the suppliers, the perspectives are not as
bleak: there are many cases where strong private contractors have integrated "forwardly" and
bought their former clients.
As mentioned before, after privatisation the power equation is redefined. While the influence
of some groups diminishes, the equation is enhanced by the atrival of new players. To a
certain extent, the inclusion of new power holders is an intended aim of the privatisation
promoters: by splitting up large SOE's and selling small, independent units, they hope to
dilute the strength of particular power centres, to spread property and to foster a new class of
small entrepreneurs. According to this argument, through the creation or widening of the
rniddle classes, such measures would not only contribute to economic growth, but also to a
healthy democracy (Boorsma, 1994). Similar political arguments have been considered to
implement the programs that distributed shares for free, or sold them below market price to
the SOE's employees. Other examples of arrivals to the newly formulated power equation can
be found in individuals or companies that have been restituted their former possessions or -
again of notorious relevance for the developing world- in foreign investors.
2.4.2 Budgetary aims
Most of the time the political struggle behind privatisation is not overtly explicited and
budgetary issues or efficiency arguments used instead. Leaving the analysis of the latter
arguments for later, it must be noted that the budgetary targets basically are a further mean to
enhance macro-economic efficiency and perhaps the main argument mentioned by the
supporters ofprivatisation.
Depending on the type and conditions of privatisation, different budgetary aims are
accomplished. The provision of a public service by private units is expected to relief the
burden on the treasury because of their more rational and efficient operation. The provision of
such services by private operators sometimes does not only relieve the budgetary burden but
actually generate additional resources: this is the case for all those services that are offered to
private operators under the obligation to pay a certain fee.
Budgetary aims often are of pivotal relevance for the divestiture of SOE's and their assets.
The sale of public enterprises may substantially improve the public cash flow. For many debt-
ridden countries of the developing world, it also constituted a mean to reduce the amount of
their external debt through "swap" mechanísms. By means of such mechanisms, shares of the
newly created companies were exchanged for an equivalent amount of foreign debt.
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2.4.3 Efficiency linked aims
Usually the improvement of efficiency is declared the foremost objective of any privatisation
effort. Though seemingly neutral and easily measurable, the term is elusive. Depending on the
particular definition and its width of scope, certain aspects are included, while other are left
out. A basic distinction that must be considered is the differentiation between macro-
economic and firm efficiency. If the latter, micro-economic definition is used, some of the
targets typically followed by most SOE's are left disregarded. On the other hand, if a broader,
macro-economic definition is employed, including targets as for example employment and
price stability or fiscal productivity, the possibility to measure and thus compare is severely
reduced (CICAP ~ OEA, 1985:95).
Many other objectives have frequently been mentioned by both advocates or opponents of
privatisation (cf Yarrow, 1986: 327; Hanke, 1987: 2). In general, they can be subsumed under
one of the aforementioned three aims. Further objectives are the promotion of economic
recovery, the reduction of the power held by public sector unions, or the promotion of the so-
called "popular capitalism" through the expansion of share ownership. The debate on
privatisation is full of arguments, many based on unsubstantiated premises. In many cases, the
premises underlying the aims pursued have to be carefully evaluated.
One of these arguments, commonly used by those who favour privatisations, is that private
enterprises are more efficient than public enterprises. This assessment is based on various
other partial arguments concerning, e.g., the motivation of management or the question of
competition. Though these partial arguments have all been elaborated on extensively, there
seems to be no general agreement. As noted by Aharoni, it is "very difficult to generalise that
SOE's are inherently less efficient or, for that matter, less innovative than private firms"
(Aharoni, 1986: 50). In the following section the main theoretical perspectives concerning the
relative inefficiency of public units will be briefly reviewed.
2.4.3.1 The political theory
This perspective analyses the influence that political actors bear on the decision processes of
public organisations. The analysis starts from the premises that 1) political success is
measured in won elections and that 2) each political actor will principally follow his own
electoral agenda. Consequently, a large public sector enhances the means government has to
pursue such electoral goals. A typical measure in this respect is to increase or maintain a
certain employment level. If such a policy is implemented, the political target may diverge
from the micro-economical target. Thus as a consequence of political scheming or
opportunism, firm efficiency is lowered. Private enterprises, on the contrary, not only are
exempted from such extemal influences, but are under pressure to generate profits and thus
unable to maintain or increase staff level unless economic circumstances indicate to do so.
2.4.3.2 Property rights theory
According to this theory, the sources of both firm and allocative inefficiencies are located in
the lack of coincidence between property and disposal rights. Maximal efficiency is expected
in those companies where property and disposal rights coincide (e.g. the business of an owner
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-manager). This interest in efficiency is also present -albeit to a lesser extent- when manage-
ment is separated from property but linked to the owner's interests by means of financial
participation.
In public units, on the contrary, two factors impede the aforementioned congnience. Above
all, the income of public management usually is not tied to the unit's financial performance.
On the other hand, and this constitutes the second obstacle, there is no individual or body that
actually performs the function exerted by the owners in the private sector.
2.4.3.3 Principal - Agent theory
This model is also based on the link between motivational factors and ownership, but
enhances the previous theory by adding the problems generated by the informational
asymmetry that further characterises the relationship between principal and agents. As noted
by the property rights theory, the menace of a take-over and the risk of bankruptcy are both
considered to be significant motivational factors to act according to the principal's interests
and pursue efficiency.
The model can also be applied to units under public ownership. In this case, al] citizens are
considered to be principals, which delegate through elections their power to govemment (and
thus to its ministers); public managers are considered to be the agents. Of crucial relevance for
their performance is the lack of motivational factors, since the threat of take-over or
bankruptcy is usually deleted by legal regulations. In addition, in any private enterprise, any
principal can sell his shares or stake when performance is low, or increase his participation in
order to reduce the informational asymmetry and thus increase the level of control.
2.4.3.4 The bureaucratic theory
According to this theory, the bureaucratic environment within public units further widens the
goal díversity that characterises the relationship between owners and management. For
Niskanen (1980), the sources of greater inefficiencies find their origin in one or more of the
following "3Ps": pay, power and prestige. This three components constitute the goals of any
public manager. Simultaneously, while micro-economical efficiency is hindered by
bureaucratic features (as for example over-regulation, fuzzy targets, incomplete information,
etc.), neither pay nor promotions are tied to performance. Hence, in bureaucratised public
units economically efficient behaviour seems to be less attractive than to pursue personal
welfare maximising pay, power and prestige.
To reach those goals, the public manager must constantly look for ways to enhance his duties
and thus the corresponding budgetary means. Naturally, such a behaviour generates allocative
inefficiencies (since public goods or services are produced above the optimum) and firm
inefficiencies (since production costs are higher than necessary) (Spelthahn, 1994). Public
inefficiency derives, following this theory, from the implementation of wrong motivational
structures and procedures. Case in point: only those units that use up all their resources are
guaranteed a similar amount of budgetary means for the next fiscal year. Even more, only if
the resources are consumed before the end of the period, the unit is in a good position to fight
for an increase (Niskanen, 1980).
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2.4.4 Theoretical perspectives: a conclusion
Based on the previous models it seems that the question of ownership is still unresolved.
However, these arguments also highlight the relevance of the aforementioned differentiation
between privatisation and deregulation: if public units are privatised in order to enhance
macro- and micro-economic efficiency, the corresponding competitive and motivational
structures must be present. By the same token, they imply that to increase efficiency, a public
unit must not necessarily be privatised: the creation of a competitive environment through
deregulation and a restriction on the financing of incurred losses could suffice.
Numerous studies have been conducted to prove the relative inefficiency of public enterprises
when compared to private ones. These data has been collected and systematised by
Pommerehne (1990). In many aspects, his conclusions coincide with the property rights and
the bureaucratic theories: in those areas in which the provision of a certain service can easily
be invited to tender and the transactional control costs are low (e.g. garbage collection),
private units are usually more efficient than public ones (Spelthahn, 1994: 42). The results are
not conclusive in those areas that feature high sunk costs (e.g. huge network investments).
Nevertheless, a small majority of the aforementioned studies also point to a relative higher
efficiency of private enterprises under such situations. (Spelthahn, ibidem).
2.5 Natural monopolies
For many years, those enterprises that operated a network (e.g. railway, electricity, gas or
water companies) were considered to be out of reach of the increasing wave of privatising
efforts. Their main technical feature was believed to transform them into monopolies that
required public regulation. This believe counted with some relevant blessings: in his 1848
published "Principles of Political Economy", Mill (1875: 88) recognised that in the case of
utilities, the service is more efficiently provided by one company than by two or more.'
However, the actual regulation of a public service started even earlier, as demonstrated for
example by Gladstone's 1844 Regulation of the Railways Act, in the words of C.D. Foster "a
far-sighted attempt to write a workable and monitorable licence, as it would be now called„for
a natural monopoly" (Foster, 1992: 4). But before starting to analyse what and how is
regulated, it is of importance to circumscribe what could be considered to be a natural
monopoly.
2.5.1 The classical definition
For a classical perspective, a natural monopoly is present when a single enterprise is able to
provide a market at a lower, cost covering price than if provided by two or more enterprises
This perspective is based on two premises: the existence of economies of scale and of
decreasing average costs. "The critical and -ifproperly defined- all embracing characteristic of
natural monopoly is an inherent tendency to decreasing unit costs over the entire extent of the
market. This is so only when the economies achievable by a larger output are internal to the
individual firm, -if, that it to say- it is only as more output is concentrated in a single supplier
that unit costs will decline" (Kahn, 1971: 119).
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Economies of scale exist when an increase of inputs is followed by more than proportional
increases of output. Hence if output is increased, the average costs are reduced, because
production costs grow less than proportionally. A characteristic indicator for the existence of
economies of scale in natural monopolies are large fixed costs, as e.g. investments in railway,
gas, water or electricity networks.
According to the classical theory, natural monopolies have to be regulated by some authority
in order to ensure allocative efficiency because a monopolist would, according to the Coumot
theorem, set both price and production at a level where marginal costs equal marginal income.
At that monopolistic price and output level, monopolistic income is maximised. It is exactly
this redistribution through the skimming of consumer rent that justifies -in the classical theory
of natural monopolies- the need for public intervention.
2.5.2 The theory ofcontestable markets
This necessity was questioned by the theory of contestable markets developed in the early
80's by Baumol, Panzar and Willig (1982), among others. The behaviour of the monopolist is
influenced, according to this theory, by the existence of potential competitors. The threat of
the arrival of new enterprises, that is, if the market is contestable, would discipline the
monopolist and thus make any public regulation superfluous. According to Baumol et al., a
monopoly should only be regulated if the enterprise presents a subadditive cost function and
its investments are irreversible.
2.5.3 Subadditivity and irreversibility
In the classical perspective, all natural monopolies were considered to have a subadditive cost
function. In other words, the monopolist was considered to serve the market cheaper than two
or more enterprises would. Baumol (1977) showed that the correct definition of natural
monopoly is not that long-run average costs decline, but that the cost function is
"subadditive". Subadditivity is defined by a situation where the costs of one firm that provides
a service, including its transaction costs, are lower than the costs of any two or more firnis
who would provide the same service. Subadditivity integrates the concepts of scope and scale
economies and transaction costs, and justifies a monopoly if subadditive cost characteristics
were exhibited (Shames, 1999; Geddes, 1998).
Baumol's analysis pointed out that the existence of economies of scale respectively of
decreasing average costs is a sufficient, but not a necessary condition for the subadditivity of a
cost function. In the multi-product case, Baumol showed that economies of scale are neither
necessary nor sufficient for the subadditivity of costs. However, next to the analysis of
economies of scale, an analysis of the economies of scope must be performed. Economies of
scope are present when the costs of the combined production of certain quantities of two (or
more) products are smaller than the costs of their separate production. Probable sources of
economies of scope are for example the common use of inputs. When analysing the
subadditivity of a many-products enterprise, both type of economies play a significant role,
since the economies of scale may be compensated by diseconomies of scope.
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The proof of subadditivity in a many-products situation requires insight into the cost structure
of all potential producers for a specific demand. Such an analysis requires much detailed
information, making the proofof subadditivity an extremely difficult endeavour.
Irreversible costs, on the other hand, are "sunken" costs, past investments e.g. in some kind of
works or infrastructure. Their absence is the main feature of contestable markets (cf Baumol
et al., 1982). For the settled provider, these costs are not included in the short range decisional
processes. They amount to a barrier, however, for any potentíal competitor. Any potential
competitor can only invest if the expected profit covers both irreversible and reversible costs.
The existence of these costs implies that an inefficient monopolist is not threatened by
potential competitors as long as the efficiency advantage of the newcomer is smaller than the
sunken costs. The higher the irreversible costs, the stronger the screen against competitors.
2.5.4 The subadditivity I irreversibility matrix
In summary, the detailed analysis ofnatural monopolies provided by the theory of contestable
markets proofed that decreasing average costs over the whole market is a sufficient, but not
necessary condition for the existence of a natural monopoly. For specific natural monopolies.
where no sunk costs exist, regulation is considered to be superfluous. Above all, the theory
highlighted the relevance of two independent variables: subadditivity and irreversibility. In
the following matrix (see Table 2-1), the four possible combinations are represented.
Table 2-1




No (1) Active competition ( 2) Active competition
Yes (3) Potential competition (4) Regulation required
Field 1 represents the classic situation of active competition: in a market with enterprises
lacking subadditivity and sunken costs, any kind of regulation is superfluous. In the second
field we find enterprises in which no longer subadditivity exist, but irreversible costs are still
present. An example of such an industry is the generation of electricity: technological
advances permit to produce electricity efficiently by small units (even solar or eolic) that is
then delivered into the grid. Also in this cases regulation seems superfluous and active
competition reasonable.
The third quadrant represents situations in which the existence of potential competitors suffice
to discipline the monopolist. Examples of field 3 are the delivery of letters or parcels or -of
importance for this study- the operation of passengers and freight trains. .Again, regulation is
not necessary. The last quadrant includes all those "natural" (or technical) monopolies where
24
subadditivity and irreversible costs are present and public intervention is required. Typical for
this category are enterprises with fixed networks as e.g. gas, water, electricity, telephone or
railway systems.
In summary, according to the theory of contestable markets, only if the two aforementioned
conditions coexist, there is a natural monopoly, and public intervention is required. A salient
issue lies in the fact that the activities of most utilities can be broken down into three different
components: production, transmission and distribution. Most scholars agree that the ususally
vertically integrated utilities can be "unbundled" and that the production stage is inherently
competitive in most cases (Crandall, 1997). Thus for example, while the generation of
electricity is no longer a natural monopoly, the transmission network still is. By the same
token, the railway network is a natural monopoly, but the operation of trains is not.
2.6 Regulation of natural monopolies and competition: some alternatives
The privatisation or deregulation of natural monopolies was completely out of question until
not very long ago. This tradition has been broken by Mrs. Thatcher's successful privatisation
of British Telecom in 1984, only to be followed by other divestitures in the UK (British Gas,
the Water Authorities, etc.) and elsewhere. The rupture of monopolic enterprises or industries
are usually accomplished by diverse means. This section will offer a broad overview of the
currently used regulatory and competition-enhancing mechanisms, specifying their respective
benefits and disadvantages.
2.6.1 Rate of retum regulation
This mechanism basically regulates the yield obtained by the owners. The initial price level
and its further alterations should allow a"fair" rate of return on the invested capital. This brief
description reveals the mechanism's main weaknesses: since profit is primarily tied to the
amount of invested capital, there are practically no means to induce a cost-conscious use of
resources or to foster the introduction of efficiency-enhancing technological innovations.
Secondly, and based on the same reason, there is a tendency to capitalise in excess (Averch -
Johnson effect). A further weakness lies in the considerable amount of information the
regulating body has to obtain in order to determinate if a price increase is justified or not.
Under certain circumstances, the informatíonal asymmetry can lead to the "capture" of the
regulator by the monopolist.
2.6.2 Price - cap regulation ~ RPI - X
This mechanism intends to avoid the weaknesses of the rate-of-return regulation. First
proposed by Littlechild for the privatisation of British Telecom, by no~v it is the main
regulation mechanism in the UK.
The main feature of this mode is that for a given period of time -usually four to five years- the
company is able to introduce any modification to its prices, under the condition that the
average price of a previously specified basket of products or services does not exceed a certain
value or index. This index is provided by the RPI - X formula, where RPI is the Retail Price
zs
Index and X a factor determined by the controlling unit and basically related to the expected
efficiency. Once the period finishes, the controlling unit is free to set a new value for X.
As mentioned above, RPI - X avoids many of the dysfunctional consequences of the rate of
return mechanism. Above all, thrifty behaviour is induced, since the obtained results can (or
must, in the case of losses) be kept by the monopoly. Based on the same reason, enterprises
regulated by RPI - X usually avoid the inefficiencies described by the Averch - Johnson
effect. On the other hand, increases in efficiency can be passed on to the client; as a matter of
fact, RPI - X prices tend to be lower than those formed under the rate of return practice. An
additional advantage concerns the issue ofauditing: RPI - X is far easier to control.
There are, however, some difficulties in its implementation and control. The main obstacle
resides in setting the X factor. It is clear that if the figure is too high, the monopoly will exert
pressure to redefine it; if X is too low, consumers will protest. A further weakness of this
mechanism is that it can lead to a covert use of the rate of retum mechanism. Since in a last
analysis, X is a negotiable factor, the monopoly can employ its available political means to
reduce X to a desired level. If such ex-post negotiations take place and the factor is redefined,
the situation does not differ from a rate of return arrangement. Hence it is of utmost
importance, when implementing RPI - X, to specify, the conditions under which X can be
altered before the expiration of the period.
2.6.3 Yardstick competition
This instrument is extremely useful when two or more regulated companies operate in the
same or at least similar markets. The basic idea behind yardstick competition is to compare
the performance of each enterprise with the performance of the most efficient enterprise or the
sector's average. The information obtained can then be used to intervene, e.g. through price
controls. Though theoretically it can be applied where the market is shared by just two
companies, it is most useful in situations in which many companies compete, as in the case of
garbage collection, bus transport, etc..
2.6.4 Common carriage
Common carriage implies the possibility for any enterprise to use the infrastructure of a
certain system. As an example, different railway operators may use a common track system
that belongs to a third enterprise (public or private), or diverse shipping companies may use
the waterways maintained and commercially exploited by another organisation. The common
camage mode] is not a regulatory mean but an instrument to increase and enhance
competition. It has been successfully implemented across diverse sectors and nations, the first
experiences taking place e.g. in electricity in the UK and railways in Sweden.
2.6.5 Franchise bidding (concessions)
The main idea behind this procedure is to allow many companies to compete for one market
whenever the competition within this market is unprofitable for two or more enterprises.
Already in 1859 Chadwick proposed to organise a"competition for the field as compared to a
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competition within the field". Resuming Chadwick's ideas, Demsetz (1968) developed an
"auction" model in which at least two companies compete to be the only providers of a certain
market. The auction is organised by the government, specifying the required conditions. The
interested bidders then submit closed offers, including their basic business proposal and the
price they would pay for the concession. The most efficient bid is then awarded the monopoly
right over the market for a specified period of time.
There are many alternatives to this basic mechanism: in some instances, the state may take on
with the construction or enhancement of the network, thus carrying the bulk of the future
sunken costs. Under such conditions, the concession may be shortened to only 5 to 10 years.
The larger the investments done by the franchisee, the more difficult it is to set an according
period of time for the concession, since all sunken costs that have not been amortised
constitute a barrier to exit for the current operator and a barrier to entry for its successor.
Considering that investments in areas like railway, sewage or water systems take more than
half a century to pay off, it is of utmost importance to neatly regulate the price to be awarded
for all investments not written offby the time the period of concession expires.
As mentioned by Vickers (1988), a further difficulty inherent to this mechanism is the
considerable chance of collusive behaviour by the potential bidders. This danger can only be
circumvented through wide publicity and the attraction of many bidders, thus making secret
arrangements an impossible task.
2.7 Deregulation and privatisation in Argentina
Although considerable differences in the pace and depth can be found between Latin
American countries, privatisation has transformed the region's social and economic
landscape. This policy, which started in Chile in the mid-1970s (cf Valdés, 1993) has
expanded amidst stabilisation and structural reform programs during the late '80s and '90s.
The share of the GDP generated by Argentinean SOE's, which had a significant and growing
economic and political role as in most Latin American countries during the '60s and '70s, did
not differ significantly from the averages that could be found in both developed an developing
countries (Short, 1984; Devlin, 1992; Rausch, 1993). Their origin and evolution are
comparable and can be traced to mainly ideological, national security or industrial and
development strategies.
Argentina had approximately 300 public financial and non-financial SOE's in 1982. The
overall weight of the Argentinean public enterprise sector before privatisation started in 1989,
was approximately 70~0 of GDP, 560~0 of public sector deficit, 260~0 of an extemal debt of USS
58.5 billion and 290.000 employees, i.e. 2.80~0 of the total labour force ( Rausch, 1993). Public
utilities in the fields of energy, transport, telecommunications and water constituted nearly
900~0 of the SOE's, the other l00~o being formed by industries related to the Ministry of
Defence ( mainly steel, chemicals and petrochemicals).
The neo-liberal ideology that swept through both developed and developing countries gained
strong adherence in~Latin America's newly elected democracies. The implementation of neo-
liberal politics had many roots: to a certain degree, it was the result of the International
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Monetary Found's (IMF) programs. The depth of the changes, however, suggest that there
was more than simple compliance with the indications of the International Monetary Fund.
Many Latin American countries, Argentina playing a paradigmatic role, have fully embraced
deregulatory processes. This commitment can only be understood after considering what the
state as such and particularly the SOE's have been considered in Latin America: a parasitic
apparatus, whose representatives embodied for a majority of the population only arbitrariness,
incompetence and inefficiency (Dirmoser et aL 1993: 12). When the debt crisis erupted in the
early 80's, the SOE's overall financial performance set a burden on the fiscal accounts. The
consequent adjustment process further eroded the quality of service and capital base in many
sectors, enhancing the popular endorsement of deregulation policies.
In general tetms, the deregulation processes in the area approached the necessary reforms
incrementally, starting with the restitution, transfer or liquidation of inedium and small-size
enterprises, while stabilisation measures took hold, to move in a second phase to the larger
non-tradable service sectors (Rausch, 1993: 2). On the contrary, given its fiscal restraints and
the presence of a politically advantageous environment (political capital of the newly elected
govetnment and weak opposition), Argentina began a massive, rapid and encompassing "sell
first" policy.
To understand this speedy and overriding deregulation process, Argentina's particular setting
has to be analysed. On this issue the inflationary process plays a key role, particularly the
hyperinflationary episode in mid-1989, a year in which prices soared above 45000~0, and a
second one during early March 1990. This situation generated serious fiscal constraints, which
wore out public policy tools and access to financing.
Amidst this situation, the population and the main economic operators discounted President
Alfonsín's political capital, which led to a loss of credibility, govemance capacity and the
elections and, finally, provoked the anticipated departure of Alfonsín's government and the
take-over by the incoming elected administration of the peronist government under President
Nlenem.
Immediately after taking office in July 1989, the government began to advance towards state
reform by presenting an ambitious legislative package to Congress for its enactment and
implementation. The basic policy can be summarised in the term subsidiarity: in his first
message to Congress (July 1989), Menem declared that all that the private sector, provinces
and municipalities can undertake by themselves will not be done by the National State.
The State Refotm Law (Ley 23696, August 1989) set the rules and procedures for
deregulation and privatisation. Preparatory conditions included e.g. transfer of rights, statutory
reforms, dissolution and liquidation of entities or the assumption of total or partial liabilities.
The main modalities employed for the deregulatory process have been: asset sale, share
offerings, lease and management contract with or without purchase options, concession and
license. The selection procedure included public bidding, public competition and auction, with
or without baseline prices; share offerings in different markets and direct contracts.
The main stated target was to start an overall divestiture process which would increase fiscal
revenues to service both internal and external debt. This latter end could also be accomplished
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through debt-equity swaps, a mechanism instrumented for debt reduction. Further objectives
have been to contribute through the divestiture process to stabilisation and to improve the
quality and coverage of the remaining public services. The process was backed by a World
Bank Sectoral Public Enterprise Reform Adjustment Loan and a Technical Assistance Public
Enterprise Reform Execution Loan. Both packages provided the necessary funding for layoffs,
early retirement packages and consultancy.
The aforementioned "sell first", comprehensive and massive privatisation strategy was
launched because of the acute economic, financial and political constraints that Argentina
faced. On the other hand, the government neither had the means to finance a SOE's
restructuring process (which requires consistent and substantial investment capacities over
extended periods of time) nor the political will (past experiences indicate that this was a rather
impossible endeavour). Thus, the opportunity was seized and the problems tackled under an
incremental, step by step approach.
The financial results of the privatisation program have helped to restore stability. Between
1990 and 1994, the government obtained 59920 m. in cash, and reduced its debt by some
527.5 b. through debt-equity swaps (MOSP, 1995). Perceived country risk has been
drastically reduced; capital inflow increased manifold.
2.8 Deregulation and privatisation of the Argentinean railway system
From 1985 until 1989, Ferrocarriles Argentinos on average lost some S2 m. a day, a deficit
equal to la~a of GDP or 3o~a of the national budget. Thus it came as no surprise when in 1989,
and by decree 666 (September 1, 1989), the government announced the privatisation of the
Argentinean railway system.
Many and diverse mechanisms have been used to accomplish this target, always using the
tenn "privatisation" Paradoxically, only in a few cases the mechanism implemented was an
actual privatisation, that is, the direct transfer to private hands. Grossly simplified, the
divestiture followed three main lines: a) the concession of the bulk of the network, b) the
transfer to the corresponding states ("provincialización") of specific -usually unprofitable or
even closed- lines, and c) the sell up of all assets not transferred through the previous means.
The design of the concession process was built around the a strategic decision that proved to
be of crucial relevance for its success: the concession would not offer the whole operating
system (some 35 000 km by the time of privatisation) as one package, but partitioned into
several financially attractive units. Two main reasons backed this decision: politically, it was
considered to be more acceptable to hand over the system to many operators than to only one
(which, given the capital requirements, would most probably be a foreigner); the economic
reasons were related to the fact tha[ since the capital requirements would be substantially
lower for each unit, the number ofbidders would increase, thus enhancing the aforementioned
competition for the market and avoiding collusive behaviour.
Following recommendations of a UNDP commission (PNLJD, 1988), the system was divided
into three "businesses": freight, interurban passenger services and metropolitan services.
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Leaving for later the concession process of the metropolitan services, the following lines will
briefly describe the privatisation of the cargo lines.
The cargo lines were the first to be franchised and to some extent constituted the model
according to which the other concessions were forged. The cargo system was divided into six
subsystems, to be handed over for a period of 30 years through a public, international auction.
The mechanism employed was an "integral concession", i.e., the franchisee must take charge
of all railway related activities: marketing, operation maintenance, and the rehabilitation of
rolling material and infrastructure.
As mentioned before, the concessions were awarded through a public and international
bidding. The process' main steps have been:
1) Public and international invitation to tender.
2) Interested enterprises present their technical and economical qualifications (Envelope A).
3) As a consequence of Ferrocarriles' monopolistic situation, no private company m
Argentina had the necessary technical knowledge. Thus all bidders were required to
include as a partner a foreign operator responsible for the actual operation of the system.
4) Those companies that qualified according to the first presentation submit their business




7) Signature ofcontract (max. 90 days after the awarding).
8) Transfer (max. 120 days after the signature ofcontract)
This procedure has also been used in the case of public units that belong to other sectors. The
use of two different qualification instances intends to assure that only qualified companies
enter the last phase. The selection procedure consisted of a point rating system of the
submitted operative, economic and financial plans. Of utmost relevance were the following
criteria: a) the net present value of the planned investments; b) the net present value of the
fees to be paid to the government for the use of tracks and rolling material; c) the number of
FA employees the new operator would assume; d) the proposed personnel training program
and e) the planned service improvements.
2.8.1 The concession of the cargo and intercity systems
At the end of 1991 the second round of privatisations began, including among others the
energy, water and transport sectors. As a consequence, between November '91 and December
'93, approximately 27 200 km of track were transferred through concessions to private
30
operators (see Table 2-2), among them the former Mitre line. This 4500 km long line was
handed over to its new operators in December 1992 and renamed "Nuevo Central Argentino"
(NCA).
Table 2-2
The Argentinean Railway Network








Roughly 9000 km of tracks were handed over to the provincial states. About half of them still
were in operation by 1989; the other halfhad been closed during prior rationalisation attempts
in 1978 and 1984. The provinces usually followed the policy of the centra] government and
tried to privatise them. This was an extremely difficult task since many tracks belong to FA
former tertiary network and the cost-benefit relation of their operation is highly negative. All
those provincial lines that found no private operator have been closed by March 1993.
2.8.2 The concession of the metropolitan railway system
In early 1991, the bidding process of the cargo lines well in advance, the central government
decided to separate the Buenos Aires suburban railway system from Ferrocarriles. Thus in
March 1991 Ferrocarriles Metropolitanos Sociedad Anónima (FeMeSA) was created.
FeMeSA was awarded further degrees of autonomy, and constituted, from a legal point of
view, a new entity. A few months later the central government took an even more radical
stance and decided to prívatise FeMeSA.
From the very outset it was clear that even after huge efficiency improvements and substantial
increases in the number of transported passengers, the financial results -contrary to the cargo
lines, which were economically self-supporting- would not cover expenses. Nevertheless, the
government decided to go on, starting with what is considered to be world-wide the first
international auction for a suburban railway system co-financed by public subsidies. In other
words, the basic proposal was to subsidy all those operations where incomes would not cover
exploitation costs.
With the purpose of privatisation the entire metropolitan system has been divided into seven
units, approximately congruent with the six lines that converged in Buenos Aires. The
decision to further divide the system ~vas taken because of the aforementioned political and
economic reasons and to increase comparability. As for the previously transferred units, the
privatisation actually took the form of concessions. The basic features of the concession
contracts are:
~ the term of concession is 10 years, indefinitely renewable for other 10 years periods.
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~ the infrastructure, fleet and all installations are handed over to the operator, the state
retaining their property. The operator takes charge of all railway activities, from marketing to
the maintenance of the aforementioned assets.
~ the state defines the maximal tariffs, minimal frequencies and the quality conditions. If the
operator reaches or improves these standards, price increases above the set tariffs are
automatically conceded. If the operator does not meet these standards, a financial punishment
is accorded.
~ the concessionaires have the freedom to negotiate new labour conditions and define the
number of employees. The state is responsible for all exceeding personnel.
~ for the first term of concession, the state defines a minimal investment plan for
infrastructure, fleet and installations. Each concessionaire may, if considered convenient,
invest in additional works of infrastructure, but always at his own cost.
~ each concessionaire must include a foreign operator that is responsible for the technical
operations of the company.
~ in their respective proposals, each bidder has to include a business plan stating, for each
year of the concession, a forecast of the financial outcome. In addition, each bidder has to
specify an estimate for the investment plan. These two values build the financial outcome; if it
is positive, the concessionaire must pay a specific fee ("canon") to the state; if it is negative,
the concessionaire is entitled to ask the state for a subsidy. The bidding process of each of the
seven units is won by the bidder that offers the largest fees or requires the least subsidy.
A central aspect of the followed deregulatory strategy is that once a specific fee or subsidy has
been accepted, it is valid over the whole period of concession. From that we can infer that the
concessionaire runs the intrinsic risk of any entrepreneurial activity: if the number of
passengers (and hence the income) is above the estimated figures, this additional income
belongs to the concessionaire, thus increasing profitability. If, on the contrary, the actual
demand is lower than expected, the operator has to absorb the losses. This also applies to
operative costs; profits resulting from any lowering of the estimated costs belong to the
operator. By the same token, any additional costs not included in the business proposal has to
be covered by the operator.
Though the operator will try to reduce the operating costs, the bottom line is delimited by
requirements concerning the number of services to be delivered (amount ofcarriages to be nm
on each track) and their quality (maximal percentage of cancelled trains or belated arrivals). If
the standards set by the bidding process are not kept, financial penalties are applied: the fee is
incremented (or the subsidy reduced) and the companies are not allowed to adjust their tariffs
in real terms.
From the time the Argentinean goverrunent decided to deregulate the metropolitan railway
system (April 1991) until the pre-adjudication of each of the seven subsystems (December
1992) only 20 months elapsed. The bidding, promoted in the USA, Canada, Europe and
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Japan, had considerable success: seven groups participated in the process. In the most
attractive lines, the seven bidders submitted proposals. No bidding process counted with less
than three proposals.
2.9 Summary
As other sectors of the Argentinean pre-deregulation economy, the railway system was
radically transformed. Broadly speaking, the system has been unbundled horizontally, i.e.,
following line and business criteria (Rodríguez Pardina, 1996: 5). The resulting units thus had
to administer both production and the network. This runs counter to other privatisation
experiences, where the system is unbundled vertically: in Sweden, Switzerland and the UK for
example, infrastructure has been separated from operation, a policy that has been suggested
for all European rails (de Waele, 1993). Once Ferrocarriles was divided, the resulting business
units were auctioned off. In a first round all six cargo lines were handed over as 30 year long
"integrated" (that is, not-unbundled) concessions. These bundled concessions include
marketing, operation maintenance and rehabilitation (Rausch, 1993: Anexo l; ). Aware that
even efficient passenger services of the metropolitan area would incur heavy losses, the World
Bank funded Railway Restructuring unit started a unique experience: the 7 units in which the
metropolitan system was partitioned were handed over to those bidders that required the
lowest subsidy. As a consequence of the lower investment requirements, suburban
concessions lasted in principle a third of the period of the cargo concessions (i.e., ten years).
In all cases, the Argentinean state keeps the property of all physical assets, but hands them
over to the new operators for exploitation.
The deregulation of the Argentinean railway sector was not preceded by a thorough study of
the market's contestability. This notwithstanding the whole process has been extremely
successful. "Viewed in its entirety, the Argentinean government accomplished in just three
years a remarkable and, given its magnitude, world-wide unique restructuring process in the
railway sector" (Knechtel, 1993: 491). No encompassing study has gauged the long term
effects of thís process. However, a substantial decrease of the public budget has been reported
by many observers (Knechtel, ibid; Kogan, 1994; 1995b; Pipan, 1994a). In short, though a
precise quantification of the overall effects of the "regulatory reform" (Stigler, 1981) is still
pending, the results hitherto obtained are outright positive and in line with the outcomes
reported by Crandall and Ellig (1997) for the American railroads.
' Here „liberal" is used as a synonimous for „conservative". This position holds that the key to economic
development lies in reducing the size and role of government in the market economy through deregulation of the
financial sector, privatisation and lower taxes. Broadly speaking, the term „interventionist" stands for a posuion
that, among other issues, advocates a stronger involvement of govemment in the economy. Its meaning partly
overlaps with the common usage of the term „liberal" in the US.
' In their distinction, LeGrand and Robinson (1984) state a reduction of regulation as a kind of privatisation.
'„It is obvious, for example, how great an economy of labour would be obtained if London were supplied by a




the need of a delimitation
More than two decades after practitioners, consultants and scientists started giving their
attention to the issue of organisational culture, the field is far from reaching a commonly
supported, unambiguous definition. The absence of such an unquestioned definition generates
considerable difficulties, since a) the width of the definition can play a crucial role when the
possibilities of cultural management or the performance of a change program must be
measured; b) people feel free to use the concept resting upon purely intuitive knowledge and,
finally c) it fostered the view of this particular field as being non-scientific.
Justified doubts have been voiced conceming the actual need (and the convenience) of such a
definition. The possibility to make an active use of the myriad of perspectives and definitions
without serious methodological restrictions may be viewed as a liability, but it certainly holds
some analytical advantages. Even more important, and as noted by Alvesson and Berg
"reducing [culture] to a rigid framework or precise and absolute definitions would seriously
reduce its inborn complexity" (1992: 48).
The strong interdisciplinary character of the field enhances the aforementioned difficulty. The
plurality of perspectives, approaches and definitions retarded the formation of a common
analytical frame. Finally, a common definition seems difficult to arrive at because the concept
"organisational culture" is formed by two words, each showing considerable latitude in their
respective definitions.
The lack of a commonly supported definition notwithstanding, some advances have been
reached regarding the construction of a common framework and the differentiation of the
main approaches and perspectives (cf Smircich, 1983; Allaire and Firsirotu, 1984; Alvesson
and Berg, 1992).
The main line of cleavage divides the field among those researchers that treat culture as a
variable, and those who see it as a root metaphor (Smircich, 1983; Alvesson, 1993: 13).
Culture is elaborated as an (independent) variable "in the rationalist perspective of popular
writers such as Peters and Waterman or Deal and Kennedy, as well as in the functionalist
perspective exemplified by Schein. Culture is used as a metaphor in the symbolic perspective,
which draws on the works of anthropologists, especially Geertz" (Rowlinson, 1999). The
main differences between both perspectives are summarised in Table 3-l.
Central to the "culture as a metaphor" perspective is the idea that symbolic resources
(symbols, metaphors, concepts and images that are representations of reality) can be used to
elicit and guide corporate strategic action. For those authors that support this view, the culture
of a company cannot be changed: "By definition, a corporate culture cannot be forced upon a
collective, nor can it be controlled or manipulated at will" (Alvesson and Berg, 1992:168).
However, these authors acknowledge the possibility to start an emancipatory process making
"people aware of and illuminating certain aspects of the culture in which they exist"
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(Alvesson and Berg, ibidem). On the other hand, those who treat culture as a variable consider
culture to be a further subsystem of the organisation, holding the same ontological status as
structure, technology or strategy. The most salient feature of this perspective (and specifically
of the American contributions, cf Deal and Kennedy, 1982; Peters and Waterman, 1982;
Kilmann et al., 1985; Kilmann and Covin, 1988) is its instrumental view of cultural
phenomena.
Table 3-1
Main differences among perspectives'
culture as a variable culture as a root metaphor ~
conception of culture as a socio-cultural system system of ideas
the organisation has a culture is a culture
orientation results oriented process oriented
main goal transformation explication
approach functional , instrumental interpretative
' adapted and revised from Kaschube ( 1993: 105); Buchanan and Huczynski (1997: 514)
3.2 Delimitation of the concept
As a further consequence of the attempts made "towards more rigorous conceptualisations of
both the concept and the field" (Sackmann, 1997: 1), there is agreement among most scholars
about what organisational culture does not encompass. In the following lines the concept here
under scrutiny will be demarcated from other fields. Such a differentiation seems to be
necessary since to a considerable extent, the field of organisational culture has been unduly
related to other areas of interest within the field of organisational theory.
3.2.1 Organisational culture and Organisational Development (OD)
Looking at Schein's definition of organisational development we are tempted to believe those
who recognise in the field of organisational culture, and particularly in its more instrumental
approaches, a simple reformulation of this older technology: "OD is a response for change, a
complex educational strategy intended to change the beliefs, attitudes, values and structure of
organisations so that they can better adapt to the new technologies, markets, and challenges,
and the dizzying rate of change itself' (Schein, 1969: 2).
A first difference constitute the respective contents. OD is an application oriented change
technology, its scope less wide than the one of the field here under analysis. But even the
more instrumental approaches within this field can be differentiated from OD (Alvesson and
Berg, 1992). A comparison between intervention techniques proves that, for example, within
the frame of OD, group techniques (e.g. Team building activities) were the most commonly
used means of intervention. As will be shown later on, the organisational culture approach
owns a wider instrumentarium. Secondly, the implementation of OD measures was generally
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aimed at the individual; on the contrary, the new approach is aimed at the whole institution
(Kaschube, 1993: 110).
However, nobody denies that the theoretical knowledge and practical experience gained
through OD formed the basis of the field of organisational culture to a considerable extent.
These similarities have led some researchers to propose to maintain the old denomination.
Probably because of a"certain aversion" developed against OD (von Rosenstiel et al., 1988:
196) it was decided to change the denomination. Kilmann and Covin have formulated this
thought very clearly: according to them, "to keep the new ideas of transformation under the
rubric oforganisational deveiopment would be to give them the `kiss of death'." (1988: 3).
3.2.2 Organisational culture and corporate ethics
Both fields are concerned with values and norms, but they investigate different issues. While
research conducted within the organisational culture field is aimed at the measurement and
transfonnation of the aforementioned elements, the study "of corporate ethics concentrates its
efforts in their justification" (Osterloh, 1988: 145). The starting point of this line of thought is
based on the increasing awareness and responsibility of decision-makers concerning society
and environment and the conviction that their own work is not a ethically neutral, purely
rational activity (cf Pawlas, 1991: 384).
Nevertheless, that both concepts are often used interchangeably has less to do with the fact
that both fields study the same objects. Since the instrumentalisation of values and norms
should be checked for their ethical orientation, researchers and managers alike eschew to use
both concepts separately.
3.2.3 Organisational culture and corporate identity
Though used as synonyms, the concepts of organisational culture and corporate identity are
not interchangeable but causally linked: the culture of an organisation mediates a certain
corporate identity. Different approaches within the prescriptive (organisational) theory bear as
main purpose the creation of a culture that leads to a corporate identity with which employees
can identify (Kahle, 1988: 1231). A further difference between both concepts has clearly been
stated by Alvesson and Berg: "Corporate identity is the concept that the marketing
professionals use to capture the visible manifestations of the organisational culture. It is
essentially considered a collective property, a commonly shared understanding of what the
organisation stands for and how it should operate" (1992: 145).
3.2.4 Organisational culture and Organisational climate
Employees hold diverse ideas or preconceptions concerning for example the appropriate
behaviour of colleagues and superiors, participation, compensation, etc.. Such expectations
can be understood as targets to be met. The climate within an organisational environment is an
expression of the degree of fulfilment of the working conditions desired by the majority of the
members. In other words, these expectations build the frame in which the climate develops
(Kaschube, 1993: 109). Consequently, while these preconceptions indicate the ideal situation
to be reached, the climate mirrors the discrepancies between the desired and the actual
37
situation. Both approaches partly compete and overlap; their (dis-)similarities strongly suggest
a complementary use (cf Mullins, 1996: 716; Bdgel, 1991; Kaschube, ibid).
3.3 The adopted definition
In spite of the aforementioned advances, the question of defining corporate culture remains
problematic (Rowlinson, 1999: 371; Buchanan et al., 1997: 516). The perspective problem is
compounded by the definitions themselves: many authors, particularly those that follow an
instrumental approach, try to define the concept citing all those cultural elements that it
presumably contains (cf. Ouchi, 1981; Schein, 1985). In a strict sense, these are not even
definitions, since just by citing those elements the concept presumably contains, it is not
defined. In addition, these enumerations are often controversial, reducing their value as (so-
called) "extensional" definitions.
Throughout this thesis, Hofstede's concise definition has been used. According to this author,
the culture of an organisation is the "collective programming of the mind which distinguishes
the members of one organisation from another" (Hofstede, 1991:180). The consequences and
advantages of this definition become clear when comparing it to other conceptualisations.
Hofstede's definition has the advantage that it approaches the concept from another direction;
instead of using vague metaphors or always disputed listings, i.e. using the output of the
cultural processes, he defines the concept through an superordinate instance, the „collective
programming", that involves any ideal cultural element. Avoiding the weakness present in
other definitions, the one coined by Hofstede has wider applicability. Secondly, since no
concrete examples are used, the definition can be used for any social unit.'
Many other definitions clearly suggest that each company has or develops "a" culture, which
in addition to its uniqueness is characterised by its harmony, cohesion and homogeneity. (cf.
the criticism formulated by Smircich, 1983; Alvesson and Berg, 1992). These impressions are
seldom corrected afterwards. This error is also avoided in the definition here adopted.
In summary: Hofstede"s definition circumscribes in concise manner the phenomenon under
analysis without the use of disputed enumerations. Wide applicability with no loss of
conciseness is thus ensured. These analytical advantages support its generalised use and have
been pivotal in the decision to adopt it here.
3.4 Shared perceptions of daily practices
Itrespective of these advantages, it remains open what exactly is programmed into the mind of
the company's employees and, secondly, what specific elements distinguish the members of
one organisation from another.
The core of an organisational culture, and hence what actually differs from one organisation to
another, are the perceptions of daily practices that a company's employees share (Hofstede,
1991:182). What a company programs into the mind of its employees are the meanings
attached to certain practices. If, for example, every member of a fitm gives the same
importance (or irrelevancy) to the issue of punctuality, it can be said that the organisation
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succeeded in programming them. Similarly, if a majority of the employees share the belief
that only the least effort must be done in their jobs, some form of cultural programming has
taken place.
Next to such attitudes, which will be elaborated in depth later on, the practices held within an
organísation encompass basically three elements, namely rituals, heroes and symbols. If a
certain person, e.g., the memory of the deceased founder of the company, has the ability to
arouse similar feelings or behaviours among the personnel, again it can be said that the
organisation succeeded in programming them.
3.5 How practices are generated and influenced
The shared perceptions of daily practices, or "practices" for short, have their origin in the
socialisation process at the workplace. The meaning of a certain symbol, a certain attitude
towards rules, the significance of a ritual: this knowledge is learned while working within a
group. Consequently, the practices are a by-product of the experience shared by a group and
can therefore only be found where there is a definable group with a significant common
history of problem solving (Schein, 1985: 7). Summarising the most relevant views about the
way culture is created and modified (cf Schein, íbid; Dyer, 1984b; Pettigrew, 1979), four
ways seem of importance, namely a history ofcommon problem solving, the leadership style,
the organisation's systems and procedures and its strategy and structure.
3.5.1 Joint problem solving
Practices emerge as a consequence of the interaction between the members of a group with the
purpose of solving two fundamental problems: internal integration and external adaptation
(Schein, 1985:148 ff). Solutions that consistently solved these problems are shared by the
group and passed on to the new members as the correct way to approach specific situations. If
the group has a stable membership and enough time elapsed to build a common history of
joint problem tackling, the commonly developed solutions become practices that are taken for
granted.
The concrete mechanisms by which culture is learned are context specific and have been
addressed by diverse theories. According to Schein (ibid.) the group dynamics and open -
systems theories provide important insights on the way the members of a group interact with
each other and thus shed light on the emergence of common understandings. On the other
hand, the mechanisms used by founders, owners or leaders in order to transmit their own
views to the other members are best explained by leadership theory. Finally the learning
theory, and particularly the trauma-based-learning and the positive reinforcement models, are
of considerable help when trying to understand why some commonly developed solutions
become practices but others not.
3.5.2 Leadership
As mentioned before, certain individuals have the means to impose the values they bear on the
other members of the group or company. Owners, founders and entrepreneurs are not only
situated in highly visible positions but also have a major impact on how the group defines and
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solves the issues of environmental adaptation and intemal integration. For Schein "a unigue
function of `leadership', as contrasted with `management' or `administration' is the creatron
and management of culture" (1985: 171).
Leaders create and manage culture through a variety of ineans, often completely unaware of
the cultural significance of their action. Drawing again on Schein, "the most powerful
mechanisms for culture embedding and reinforcement are (1) what leaders pay attention to,
measure, and control; (2) leader reactions to critical incidents and organisational crises; (3)
deliberate role modelling, teaching, and coaching by leaders; (4) criteria for allocation of
rewards and status; (5) criteria for recruitment, selection, promotion, retirement, and
excommunication" (1985: 225).2
3.5.3 Systems and procedures
The systems and procedures that govern an organisations' daily activities also have the ability
to build (or reform) a given set of practices. This influence is exerted in two dissimilar ways.
In an immediate and explicit way, these systems direct the behaviour of the employees and
thus form practices. A second way in which a company's systems build or modify practices
are the less overt messages sent by these same systems or procedures. Though such messages
can be sent by any particular system, their influence on cultural matters can be most clearly
observed in those norms that focus on personnel issues.
The remuneration policy also exerts a strong influence on the formation of specific cultural
traits. If pay is closely linked to performance, normally a results orientation permeates the
employees' mind. In analogous fashion, if promotions are granted trough a seniority system,
usually a less competitive working environment is the consequence.
Sometimes not one particular policy but the sum of different systems influence the shared
perceptions of daily practices. This is the case for the control as well as the human resources
systems. As regards the former, the relevance and utility of such controls must be evaluated.
Organisations characterised by a myriad of useless, bureaucratic procedures, typically develop
a normative-legalistic approach. The corresponding attitudes are more concemed with the
means than with the ends; the norms reign, far beyond their original purpose, the customers or
the actual perfonnance. On the other hand, a multitude of controls, if not merely bureaucratic
but meaningful, may generate a tightly structured environment and thus cost-conscious
practices.
3.5.4 Strategy and stmcture
Two further elements closely intertwined with the culture of an organisation are its structure
and strategy. Both elements create or may influence a given set of practices. At the outset of
an enterprise, the structura] design mirrors the perception the founders have about the market
and the best way to compete successfully within it. To those who are able to "read" from it, a
given structure may deliver answers to questions about where management is setting
priorities. In the course of time, the structure may shape the shared practices: flatter
organisational hierarchies (larger span of control for the unit top manager) for example
contribute to a stronger results orientation (Hofstede, 1990: 308) an organisation pursues. In
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addition to the structure, other institutional arrangements influence the organisational culture.
Gordon (1985: 107) has shown how the degree of vertical and horizontal interdependence
creates cultures that value stability.
As for the issue of structure, the relation between strategy and culture is also characterised by
mutual dependence. At the outset and with every strategic change there is a certain chance that
the views hold by founders or leaders act as blinkers. Once cultural practices have gained
pervasiveness, they may constrain the formulation or implementation of changes in the
strategy. This function has been studied at length by numerous authors (cf Schein, 1885;
Hofstede, 1991; Peters and Waterman, 1982; Beckhard and Harris, 1977) and is best
exemplified by those companies with a long-standing engineering tradition that in order to
remain competitive have to become market-oriented. On the other hand, once a strategy is
followed for a certain amount of time, it might influence the existing practices or give shape
to new ones.
The more instrumental perspectives view culture as a further variable and a potential source of
competitive advantage. For them, the appropriate culture is the one that fosters practices that
are in line with the organisation's aims, thus supporting and enhancing strategy as well as
structure. (cf Deal and Kennedy, 1982; Kilmann et al., 1985; Peters and Waterman, 1982).
That both structure and strategy should be moulded according to the existing cultural assets
makes sense from a theoretical perspective: it is, e.g., extremely difficult to follow a strong
customer orientation if the prevailing practices are concemed with the ritualistic fulfilment of
rules and procedures.
3.6 Influencing factors
Needless [o add, several other factors might (re-) create organisational practices. One way in
which the culture of an organisation is affected results from the hiring process: a given
industry or specific sectors within an organisation employ people with specific professional or
educational backgrounds, thus incorporating people that bear similar values, commonly
apprehended during their immediate pre-professional socialisation, e.g., at the umversity
(Hofstede et al.; 1990: 312; Trice, 1993). As will be demonstrated later, specific professions
develop their own practices which, depending on the particular setting, might disseminate into
other areas of the organisation beyond those occupied by the specific occupation (Martin,
1985: 154). Similarly, the values transmitted during childhood, i.e., national culture, might
also partially affect the culture of an organisation (Hofstede et al., 1990: ibid.).
Two other processes that influence the practices shared within an organisation are corporate
mergers and organisational downsizing. From a cultural perspective, downsizing is a rather
understudied phenomenon, and this in spite of the fact that, as stated by Hickok (1998: 1),
"the most prominent effects ofdownsizing will be in relation to culture change, not in relation
to saved costs or short-term productivity gains". As observed by Hickok (1998: i l),
"downsizing acts as an organisational destabilizer and thus as a catalyst for cultural change",
probable consequences being a change in the working conditions (from "familial" towards
competitive), and a shift in the employer - employee relationship (from long-term and stable
towards short-term and contingent). On the other hand, merger and acquisition related
activities also have a profound impact on the cultural fabric, depending on the different kinds
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of synergies and postcombination outcomes (see, e.g., Buono and Bowditch, 1989; Marks and
Mirvis, 1993).
Closely related to the cultural influence of occupations is the issue of technology. As stated by
Trice, "Subcultures may emerge as a result of tools, machines, computers, and equipment
used in work processes" (1993: 215). Moreover, the influence technology (and, more
specifically, technological change) bears on culture has been cogently demonstrated by
Laurila (1997). This notwithstanding, other scholars de-emphasise the importance of the
employed technology and accentuate the relevance of both management and internal
communications style for the successful introduction of the former (van Hasselt, 1991: 26).
For Deal and Kennedy, "A corporate culture embodies what it takes to succeed in a particular
environment". According to these two authors, "the degree of risk associated with the
company's activities and the speed at which companies -and their employees- get feedback
on whether decisions or strategies are successful" are the main moulders of an organisational
culture (Deal and Kennedy, 1982: 107). This influence was also observed by Hofstede (1990:
310): units operating in competitive markets scored pragmatic while units performing in a
monopolistic situation scored normative. As a matter of fact, four of the six dimensions found
in his study partly reflect the "industry culture" (Hofstede, ibid.). Depending on the particular
context, specific constituencies can have an important impact on organisational practices.
Among other scholars, Davis (1985: 138-144) explored the influence customers, competitors,
government, the public and shareholders had on corporate culture.
The aforementioned examples demonstrated how the culture of organisations was influenced
by forces that belong to the environment. However, the lack of such exchanges might also
affect the practices shared by some agents or employees. Research conducted about the
organisational culture of police units showed "the potential that isolation provides for officers
to engage in deviant behaviour" ( Harrison, 1998: 6).
In short, multiple factors constantly remould the practices shared by the members of an
organisation. The type of leadership or the systems and procedures followed are just a fe~~
examples of how internal forces might shape an organisation's culture. However, being open
systems, influence is also exerted on the cultural fabric from outside. Under some
circumstances, these external forces can outweigh the intemal ones; frequently they lead to the
fotmation of subcultures. In the following sections, and after reviewing the four main
characterisations cited in the literature, these subcultural formations will be analysed in detail.
3.7 Global characteristics
The concept ofculture, as well as the concrete practices entrenched in an organisation, remain
difficult to capture. Hence it is of importance, first and foremost for the more instrumental
approaches within the field, to gauge certain global aspects of the culture to be studied or
modified. Four interwoven characteristics will be shortly referred to: the culture's direction
and strength and its homogeneity and stability.
42
3.7.1 Direction and strength
The direction is the course that culture is causing the organisation to follow. The question is
whether the practices influence individual behaviour in such a way that the company's goals
are accomplished or if they refrain from doing so. Though the literature cites some (tnvial)
examples (innovation in an environment where the culture says "don't rock the boat"
(Kilmann, 1985: 5), to assess if the direction of a certain practice is the correct one seems
rather difficult. As we have seen, in many organisations the goals are only vaguely (if at all)
explicited. Secondly, the contribution a certain cultural trait makes towards (or from) the goals
is not always univocal and unambiguous.
Closely linked to the question of direction is the issue of strength. The question in this case is
whether the culture `mildly suggests' a certain behaviour or if the employees feel a strong
urge to behave according to the learned practices. The strength of a particular practice is in
principle unrelated to the overall strength of the organisational culture and can be measured
using the scales of some survey instruments (cf Hofstede, 1991)
3.7.2 Homogeneity and stability
This aspect refers to the consistency of the practices and measures the extent of psychological
penetration. This aspect is also related to what Peters and Waterman (1982) consider to be a
"strong" or "weak" culture and has been measured by Hofstede (1991: 189) calculating the
mean standard deviations to the key questions of his questionnaire. Basically what is
measured are the existing variations in the perceptions. A related concept is the degree of
pervasivess (or "sociological penetration", Louis, 1985: 80). Both concepts reflect the degree
in which the culture permeates the organisation. Pervasiveness however is mostly used to
assess in how far the culture of a certain group has reached other areas in the organisation.
Finally, the stability of the culture refers to the historical consistency of a given practice (or
set of practices) over time. It indicates the degree of entrenchment of the perception of a
certain practice and thus the potential resistance to change.
3.8 Subcultures
If the culture of an organisation can be formed or modified by several different sources and -
as mentioned at the beginning of this chapter - culture formation is basically a group process,
it is logical to expect the appearance of different subcultures within one organisation. Even
more, the existence of one unique culture, a possibility we do not negate, seems to be rather
the exception than the rule. "Unitary organisations evolve when all members of an
organisation face roughly the same problems, when everyone communicates with almost
everyone else, and when each member adopts a common set of understandings for enacting
proper and consensually approved behaviour" (Van Maanen and Barley, 1985: 37). Such
levels of cultural homogeneity are rather uncommon. Ifat all, they can be found in companies
that remained small and spatially concentrated, or at the outset of any enterprise, at a time in
which the influence of the founder is particularly strong and insufficient time elapsed to
develop cultural diversity (Schein, 1983b, 1985). Those who write about "the" culture of an
organisation or of companies having "a" culture, hereby stressing the unity of the concept,
take a simplistic view, often associating it with the culture of the ruling coalition or that of the
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founder. However, the number of authors taking such a stance is dwindling; all relevant,
recent contributions take due note of the possibility that diverse subcultures coexist in most
enterprises.
3.8.1 Sources of cultural differentiation
According to the influence exerted by the aforementioned variables, the practices a certain
group shares are altered. Cultural differentiation originates in the dissimilar influence those
variables have on sometimes even close units. The particular features of a subculture are that
this subset of an organisation's members identify themselves as a distinct group within the
organisation and have a unique perception of the daily practices.
One possible source of internal differentiation lies in the geographical dispersion of the units
that form a company. Other potential cultural borders can be found along product lines,
market divisions or along functional areas. Some organisations are culturally divided
according to hierarchical levels or for ideological reasons. Though often the boundaries
generated by these two factors overlap, this is not always the case: ideological borders are not
necessarily congruent with the hierarchical design.
A further cause for cultural differentiation may be found in the used technology. When a
group of employees is devoted to operate a certain line or type of machines, the probability of
differentiation is increased by proximity and shared working condítions (Van Maanen and
Barley, 1985; Trice, 1993). Technological innovations, when implemented in existing
organisations, may create new or alter old subcultures, leading the latter to disappear or
flourish. A good example of the disruptions caused by the use of new technologies has been
provided by Barley in his study of radiology departments in two community hospitals after
the introduction of ultrasound and CT-scanning (Barley, 1984). Lines of cultural cleavages are
also frequently found in companies created as a consequence of integration, in general along
areas that belonged to the units merged or acquired (Buono and Bowditch, 1989; Marks and
Mirvis, 1993).
What it basically takes to build a cultural formation are a few employees that interact more
frequently among each other than with the environment and share some kind of common,
unique experience. Herein lies the relative ease with which such formations occur. Therefore
also the disparate and numerous sources of cultural formations that can be detected even in a
single unit.
3.8.2 Countercultures
The multitude of concomitant influences that form a group's culture often lead them in
directions that do not follow the cultural pattern explicitly (or implicitly) pursued by the top
echelons. In some situations, centripetal forces redirect sub-cultural tendencies far from the
"official" pattern. In the extreme case, a subculture is at odds with the practices held by
management. Nevertheless, usually counter-cultures are not the result of a gradual
differentiation process that ends in a pattern opposed to the practices proposed by
management. How counter-cultures emerge and evolve is not clear. For van Maanen and
Barley, "poor training, inadequate rewards, resources or equipment and unrealistic
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performance standards are all conditions that encourage countercultural movements" (1985:
46). Though such conditions are frequently found at the lower levels of an organisation, only
seldom a counter-culture emerges there, since lower status employees lack the power,
visibility and means to articulate it. Based on the study of John DeLorean's term as division
head at General Motors, Martin and Siehl concluded that "a powerful counterculture may be
most likely to arise in an organisation where the dominant culture is strong,...[and]...more
likely to be widely shared if articulated by a high, rather than low, status figure" (1983: 8).
A further subculture often neglected is the one that can be found at the bottom of a company.
Leaving aside for a moment the concrete possibility to articulate a strong subculture, some
literature presents strong evidence that the managerial perspective is not the prevailing way of
thinking at the bottom of the organisation. The distrust of management or boredom created by
deskillment and narrow jobs are only two of the many aspects that may engender the
formation of a separate culture. In addition, differences in the social values, position and
perspectives (sometimes even in dress and language) between members of the lower and
higher echelons deepen the cultural gap, resulting in destructive tactics, lack of collaboration
and a loss of goodwill (cf Davis, 1985; Lipsky, 1980; Botti and Pipan, 1991). It is frequently
at these lower levels of an organisation that unionism finds strong support. If, as stated by
Allen, "trade union cultures, structures and procedures differ considerably from those of
commercial businesses or public authorities" (1999: 3), it is plausible to expect that such
subcultures, once a reasonable degree of coalescence has been reached, become counter -
cultural formations.
3.9 Organisational culture and change
Can culture be changed? There is no doubt that this often posed question can be answered
affirmatively. As a matter of fact, the culture of an organisation is constantly being changed.
The real questions then is whether the entrenched practices of an organisation can be
intentionally redirected. The answer to this question depends on what one considers to be an
organisational culture, i.e., it depends on the employed theoretical assumptions. In order to
elucidate this question, we will refer to those two perspectives that have drawn most of the
attention and simultaneously represent opposite views on the issue of cultural change.
As mentioned in the introduction (see 3.1), one of the more relevant lines of thought in the
field is the symbolic approach. Authors enrolled in this stream of thinking consider that the
purposive redirection of cultural practices is not feasible. According to Alvesson and Berg a
true change program surfaces certain cultural elements, allowing the employee to become
aware of the culture that surrounds him or her, but "by definition, a corporate culture cannot
be imposed upon a collective, nor can it be controlled or manipulated at will"(1992: 168).
On the contrary, the basic idea underlying the "culture as a variable" approach is that the
culture an organisation has can be quantitatively measured, changed and redirected. The
empirical evidence concerning these concrete possibilities is no[ conclusive. As a
consequence, the framework here used assumes that within certain parameters the practices of
an organisation can be intentionally modified. This assumption is firstly based on the many
successful experiences cited in the literature. Secondly, Hofstede's definition of organisational
culture only covers those elements that have been programmed into the employees' mind at
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the working environment. It excludes all those elements that are programmed during primary
and secondary socialisation and hence are more difficult to change. Finally, there is some
evidence that even deeply rooted views or convictions can be proactively transformed (cf.
Festinger, 1957).
3.9.1 About the need of cultural change
Having acknowledged the possibility to redirect the practices the members of an organisation
share, it is necessary to analyse when such a change is required. Basically, when changes in
one or more of the forces that affect the culture of an organisation occur, a cultural adjustment
may be needed. Such adjustment processes however do not occur automatically. If for
example new companies enter the market, transfonning it from a place where every company
had an undisputed fief into a competitive environment, a new approach to business is
necessary. And of course, such a change must be culturally supported. A modification of the
culture may also be needed even though no external variable changed: when management
perceives that there is some degree of incongruity between the pursued strategy and the
practices shared by the bulk of the organisation's members, a cultural reorientation may help
to reach the required fit. There is consensus - at least between the more instrumental
approaches - about the need of such a fit, i.e., that the entrenched habits and perceptions must
support the strategy. This need, however, leads to a multitude of related questions and issues.
Above all, it is not clear whether in cases of incongruity the strategy should be adapted or the
practices realigned. "Cultural constraints determine which strategies are feasible for an
organisation and which are not. For example, if a culture is strongly normative, a strategy for
competing on customer service does not have much chance of success" (Hofstede, 1991: 199).
Though the adjustment of the strategy for cultural reasons is based on sound theoretical
arguments, we have doubts about the possibility to implement such a decision: the concept of
organisational cultures might have gained a considerable degree of acceptance, but for many
such a decision would still mean to "put the cart before the horse". The opposite alternative is
to modify the organisation's culture to match the strategic requirements. Such a decision
presupposes that it is known what specific cultural traits are required by a given strategy and
what changes have to be effected.
In order to be able to detect any incongruity or mismatch between culture and strategy, the
cultural requirements of the strategy to be followed must be compared against the actual
practices. Such an assessment constitutes a difficult task. Líttle has been written about the
cultural requirements of certain technologies, and even less about the conditions for a whole
strategy, thus the requirements must be inferred in an heuristic way.
Even assuming that by some means a diagnosis of the cultural gap is performed, and that the
decision has been made to modify the practices to fit the strategy, several issues still remain
unsolved. Next to the feasibility of the cultural tumaround, information is needed about the
costs involved.' There is also no clear evidence about the time needed to introduce and firmly
establish or to delete cultura] elements. Other obstacles might also hinder a rigorous attempt:
in some organisations, e.g., many state owned agencies or enterprises, the strategy is only
vaguely defined, if at all (cf Lipsky, 1980; Rainey, 1989; Nutt and Backoff, 1992). Under
such circumstances, any cultural change program runs the risk of failure: Beer (1985)
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convincingly demonstrates the inherent difficulties of a change program designed without a
clear strategic outlook.
In summary, those who try to strike a balance between the pros and cons of a cultural
transformation will probably finish with few clear cut answers to the demanded strategic
choices. However, although the existing tools might not give a clear picture of the actuai gap,
through the process itself a lot of insight can be gained. Thus management might be able to
decide based on educated guesses and not on mere hunches.
While the literature covers extensively the issue of planned cultural change, we believe that
explicit programs intended at modifying organisational practices are the exception. In most
organisational environments, cultural change occurs "naturally", as a byproduct of the
company's inherent activities within its specific context. In some instances, whether the
change is planned or not is less significant: "Whether we look at theories of `natural'
organisational change processes or of planned change, each of them are connected to a
particular conception of organisations" (Alvesson and Berg, 1992: 164). Thus independently
of the degree of explicitness, what needs to be revealed is the theoretical frame of the change
agent, since it is this frame that influences the way in which the organisational reality and its
modifications are conceptualised respectively implemented.
In the following sections two main issues concerning planned cultural change will be
summarised: focus and agents. The review includes those aspects on which a majority of the
authors of the more instrumental approaches agree and that will be needed to understand the
processes here under scrutiny. Nevertheless, many concrete steps followed within such
programs are often also performed by managers or leaders that are unaware of the cultural
consequences of their actions. To the extent that the observations made below are also valid
for the interpretation of modifications occurred under unplanned change, it is possible to
understand why certain measures or actions taken by `culturally unaware' managers still
transform practices.
3.9.2 Focus
The general aim of any cultural transformation program is to affect the shared perceptions of
daily practices (or any other type of collective cognitive structure) so that they are congruent
with and support the strategy. Underlying this perspective is an assumption that a certain
subgroup of inembers (usually the ruling coalition) possess the means to redirect the cultural
objects, that is, to manipulate views and perceptions. Once the decision to alter the culture (or
cultures) has been taken, it must be decided where such changes should be implemented. The
literature provides examples of change strategies directed towards each of an organisation's
dimensions. Most commonly, a change program is implemented "top-down", that is,
descending on a vertical axis, with each deeper level including an increasing number of
members in the process initiated by management. Nevertheless, in organisations whose
members show a considerable degree of commitment even before the transformation, a
"bottom-up" process is viable.'
Other strategies can be differentiated not according to the hierarchical level but to the
centrality of the business unit where it is first implemented. Because of visibility and
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credibility, Kilmann (1985: 315) advocates a strategy from the centre to the periphery, even if
grater risk is involved. The opposite strategy has been illustrated by Beer (1985) and Renz
(1985). If change is implemented in isola[ed business units the risk involved is minimised: if
the program fails, the organisation as a whole is not affected. However, the question whether
the experience gained in a removed unit may serve as an example that can be transferred to
other units remains open. Independently of the followed strategy, the critical issue is the
interaction that follows between the implementing unit and the rest of the organisation. In the
words of Beer "The transformation may start at the top or the bottom, the core or the
periphery. But if a reciproca] learning process does not develop, the transformation will stray
from the critical path" (1985: 44).
A further characteristic of any cultural change strategy that must be evaluated before
implementation regards both the timing and the degree of comprehensiveness of the change
effort. The odds of successful implementing a comprehensive set of changes within a short
period of time are exceedingly slim. The case of an "all at once" strategy presented by
Roitman et al. illustrates that attempting too much too fast, the company involved "sacrificed
work force morale and the trust of its employees and failed to achieve the benefits it expected"
(Roitman et al., 1985: 243). On the other hand, if changes are introduced too sparsely, cultural
momentum and hence commitment [owards the change may be lost. No definitive consensus
has been reached on this issue. However, the literature allows to infer the necessity to pursue
changes in an incremental way, timing the implementation of new techniques or procedures
according to the advances made in the social systems (cf. Finney et al., 1985).
3.9.3 Change agents and their roles
At the end of the change process, every member of the affected unit should have modified his
(or her) behaviour. Some members however, play a significant role in inducing such
alterations. Borrowing from OD literature these individuals are denominated "change agents"
(cf Schein, 1969; Bennis, 1969). The literature is not concise about the selection procedure,
location, or amount of designated change agents. Hofstede proposes to create a network of
agents in the organisation selecting some key people at all levels. Such advice is based on the
assumption that once key people start, others will follow (Hofstede, 1991: 202). Several other
authors propose the formation of task-forces co-ordinated by a central committee (cf Love et
al., 1985).
The evidence from theoretical contributions as well as field studies indicate that three roles
must be performed to successfully innovate an organisations practices. The most critical one
is the visionary role. If change is not perceived as necessary, the first step to be taken by those
who perform this role is to promote scepticism towards the present state of affairs.
Simultaneously, the visionary must "articulate, as clearly and as vividly as possible, the
desired future state of the organisation" (Belgard et al., 1985). For the vision to provide
direction and stamina, it has to be concise, easy to understand, memorise and exciting; the
visionary on its part has to have the ability to capture the imagination of inembers, and to
awake a common vision.
The orchestrator role is primarily concerned with the implementation, administration and co-
ordination of the change effort. Tasks performed within this cluster of activities comprise the
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creation of communication networks and decision-making structures (Beres and Musser,
1985: 174). The legitimator role involves the display of strong commitment towards the
proposed change initiative and the provision ofconfidence and assurance needed in situations
of organisational turmoil. The legitimator must be able to help others to cope with the varying
degrees of uncertainty, must be able to regain for the project those whose ideas have been
ignored or put on a side-track and possess the tenacity and conviction to stick to the ínitiative.
Two issues seem ofrelevance with respect to these roles. The three different sets ofbehaviour
are not neatly circumscribed functions attached to certain positions within the frame of a
planned change effort. On the contrary, to a certain extent the three roles are performed by all
change agents in systematic as well as unplanned change efforts. This notwithstanding, certain
change agents, depending on their position in -or with regard to- the organisation, make
extensive or even exclusive use of a single role.
3.10 A few concluding remarks
This overview allows to conclude that in spite of the advances reached so far, the field
remains fragmented. Those few aspects in which agreement seems to exist actually underpin
the perception that far more still remains debated and unresolved. This perception is also
reinforced by the myriad of -sometimes even antithetical- approaches, perspectives or
"conventions" (Alvesson and Berg, 1992: 94). In spite of these shortcomings, there is
common understanding -particularly among the instrumental approaches- with regard to
some issues central to the cultural transition here under study. This summary will briefly
review them as they constitute the pillars on which rest the hypotheses to be presented in the
following chapter.
A large number of authors analysed the link between organisational culture and business
environment. They all underline the ability certain extemal variables have, to mould or
recreate elements of a given culture. For Deal and Kennedy for example, "The business
environment is the single most greatest influence in shaping a corporate culture" (1982: ]3).
According to these same authors, "the degree of risk associated with the company's activities,
and the speed at which companies -and their employees- get feedback on whether decisions
or strategies are successful" are the two most important factors forming a culture ( Deal and
Kennedy, 1982: 107). If risk is considered, a radica] transformation of the culture can be
expected to occur at the former public railway company, since until privatisation there was no
threat at all: the govemment always covered the company's losses. Brooke Tunstall, writing
on the break-up of American Telephone and Telegraph Company (ATBcT) pointed out the
serious cultural consequences of divestiture. Though ATBcT was not a state owned enterprise,
it operated in a monopolistic situation. As in most privatisations, this market position was
eliminated through deregulation. Consequently, cultural elements had to be removed or
reformed. Among the changes introduced, Brooke Tunstall cited "less hierarchical orientation,
less consensus management and less avoidance of risk." (1985). The basic cultural need for
companies in such a transition phase has been precisely formulated by Robertson, Scott and
Caldwell (1982): "For companies out of the regulatory treadmill, success will come from
abandonment of the regulation mentality and adoption ofa competitive frame of mind."
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Of utmost importance for the research here presented has been Gordons' statistically
underpinned study of the link between organisational culture, industry sector and corporate
performance. More specifically, the contrast between a group of utilities against a group of
companies operating in a dynamic marketplace enabled to observe their dissimilar cultural
profile. Among other characteristics, utilities showed a high need for stability, as reflected for
example in relatively high scores on vertical and horizontal interdependence. "The most
dramatic contrast between the two groups are the much lower value placed on organisational
reach (an indicator of the extent to which the company sets venturesome goals and approaches
its business innovatively) within utilities and the greater value placed on the use of individual
initiative by the dynamic-marketplace companies" (Gordon, 1985). Considerable differences
have also been detected on issues concerning compensation (particularly the relation between
performance and pay) and the orientation towards action.
In brief, this chapter forwards evidence that some points of disagreement notwithstanding,
there is consensus on a number of causal links and relationships that are central to the
understanding of the cultural dynamics involved in any privatisation process. In the first part
of the following chapter, and on the basis of these findings, the six hypotheses of the present
study will be presented.
' As a matter of fact, the definition of Organisational culture has been adapted from the wider definition of
Culture (cf. Hofstede, 1980).
` Though a majority of the literature on [his particular issue treats owners, founders and leaders alike, it should
be noted that the latter not necessarily are at the top of the organisation and thus lack some of the means that are
available to the former. Leaders may neither belong to the ruling coalition nor share their views but create and
manage a culture which is antithetical to the "official" one (cf Martin, 1981)
' There is a conspicuous lack of data conceming the costs involved in such endeavours. To know that such a
change "costs a fortune and lasts forever" (Deal and Kennedy, 1982) is of little guidance. The few attempts to
find some retum-on-cultural-investments-factor (ROCI factor) have not been conclusive.
' The "bottom-up" case presented by Beres and Musser (1985) clearly illustrates some critical features of this
specific kind of change: a) the paradoxical demands on top management, namely to be actively involved and
promote a change that forces them to relinquish power and control and b) display commitment and provide
confidence in a change not proposed by himlherself, sometimes even neither understood nor desired by top
management. c) a bottom-up change process can only be generated and pushed forward by committed
employees.
50
4. Hypotheses and methodology
4.1 Introduction
In its first part, this chapter will mention those findings that allow us to expect changes in an
organisational culture as a consequence of the deregulatory process. These insights permit to
estimate the direction and strength of the changes caused by the exerted influences. In other
words, starting from the accumulated scientific knowledge, we will construct the hypotheses
to be tested. The second part of the chapter will deal with the methodological means
implemented to test these hypotheses.
4.2 Postulated hypothesis
In its most basic form, the privatisation of any SOE implies one or more of the following
changes: a) a change in the market situation; b) a change in the legal framework that regulates
the activities of the enterprise; and c) a change in the financial flow, particularly the inability
to be further funded by government. Based on the above-mentioned observations we can
postulate that as a consequence of deregulation, a privatised SOE will profoundly modify both
its legalistic and customer orientation, as well as the way in which control and performance is
exerted respective evaluated. The notable overlapping among these observations with the
findings of Hofstede et al. (1990) led to the decision to base the hypotheses here presented on
their factors. More specifically, we hypothesise that the following changes or shifts in
orientation will take place:
Hypothesis 1
The privatisation of a SOE will induce a shift from a concern with means
towards a concem with ends
Essentially, the privatisation of any typical SOE starts a process of debureaucratisation. One
of its most important features is a change in the perception of the function of those rules and
norms that until privatisation regulated the company's activities. Rules will not stand anymore
above anything else (including the clients) and continue to be an end in themselves. This will
happen as a consequence of a change in the way management approaches the business, from
legalistic or normative towards results-oriented. While a SOE employee was punished for not
fulfilling rules, independently of their intrinsic value, no one was punished for not making a
better use of existing facilities, etc. Since the public purse is no longer available in order to
finance economic losses, there is need for results. There is a change also on the accountability
that reinforces the new orientations. In addition, perhaps for the first time managers can be
measured against well defined targets.
State-owned-enterprises, particularly those with a long history and tradition, have traditionally
been regarded as a"big family" in which an often explicit policy promoted the recruitment of
members of the employee's family. The strong influence exerted by the particular unions have
created organisations that provided their employees clubs, holiday resorts, hospitals,
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Hypothesis 2
The privatisation of a SOE will induce a change in the source from where
the employees derive their identity: from being centred on the organisation
towards being centred on the particular job
sometimes even housing and schools. For a majority of the SOE's members, and particularly
for those at the lower and middle layers, the main question was to belong to the organisation,
the type of job being only of secondary relevance. Accordingly, employees derived their
identity largely from the organisation as a whole. When talking to outsiders, they define
themselves resorting to the company's main activity, e.g., "petrolero", "telefónico" or
"ferroviario".
After privatisation many of the factors that formed or enhanced this organisation - centred
perception will recede or be deleted. To begin with, in the process of deregulation the central
government sold separately the assets not belonging to the core business of the SOE's (the
aforementioned clubs, holiday resorts, etc.). In addition, SOE's have been downsized and
afterwards divided, in order to increase the potential number of bidders. Thus, the "big
family" and its tradition has been removed. The unions strength, after a peak during the
populist governments in the area, ebbed away during the military regimes and was further
weakened by the oncoming neoliberal governments. Two further elements point to a change
in the source of identification: a) the selection procedure implemented by the new owners
were mainly based on the ability and performance on the job, leaving aside any particularistic
elements; and b) in varying degrees, the new companies will be composed of former state
employees and people who formed their perception within the private sector, where such
levels of parochialism are rather unusual.
Hypothesis 3
The privatisation of a SOE will induce a shift from a concern for people
towards a concern for completing the job
The rather lax personnel policies of the SOEs in the area and their even weaker
implementation has often been pointed out. The average employee of any SOE had to work
fewer hours per week than his colleagues in the private sector. Each SOE had a myriad of
norms regulating reasons for justified absence from the workplace; as a consequence, the
actual time at work was extremely low: according to the Argentinean Ministry of Economy,
absenteeism was around 20 - 25 0~0 (FIEL, 1989: 279). The pressure to work was rather low:
according to a World Bank report on Argentina's railway company, that SOE could reduce its
work-force by 30 to 50 0~o without affecting output at all (PNUD, 1988). Needless to say, the
perception of the company's employee orientation also originated in the many possibilities the
company offered to their members: next to the aforementioned clubs and hospitals, the SOE
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not only offered schools for the members' children but also courses for the employees to
finish primary (7th grade) or secondary (12th grade) school.
This -sometimes patemalistic- employee orientation is interrupted with privatisation.
Companies are sold without all the clubs and amenities; the advantages gained through labour
disputes over many years (labelled "conquistas sociales") are no longer valid; employees have
to work longer hours and have less free time. In addition, performance is measured and people
are held accountable.
This obviously generates a shift in the perception the employees have of their working
environment. They notice that their personal problems now play a less important role and that
it is not a policy of the company to encompass the employees family into the organisation.
Hypothesis 4
The privatisation of a SOE will induce a shift in the orientation towards
clients: from "user" to "customer"
The proverbial lack of interest in the client on part of the employees of SOE and agencies has
been widely documented. That the customers of SOE are denominated "users" is certainly not
a mere semantic issue but a consequence of both the absence of competitors and the security
that any financial loss will be supported by the respective ministry, and hence the perception
of the clients being dependent on the SOE, rather than the other way around.
Since these two elements cease to exist after privatisation, it seems plausible to expect that the
perception will shift towards seeing the customer as the company's central constituency. This
even holds true for the newly created private monopolies, since a) they are held accountable
against a]icence contract and b) customers might choose between different (quasi)
monopolistic providers. While before deregulation the "user" has been confronted with the
same apathy at all public monopolies (natural or not), now the customer might choose
between them. In many regions, there is a real possibility to travel by plane or train or bus, or
to choose between different forms ofenergy.
Hypothesis 5
The privatisation of a SOE will induce a change in the amount of intemal
structuring: from loose control towards tight control
As results from the key questions used in Hofstede's study of organisational cultures, "people
in loose control units feel that no one thinks of costs, meeting times are only kept
approximately, and jokes about the company are frequent. People in tight control units
describe their work environment as cost-conscious, meeting times are kept punctually, and
jokes about the company and I or the job are rare" (Hofstede, 1991: 191). Unfortunately there
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is no data concerning SOE's about the last two key questions. On the contrary, there are
plenty of indicators on the issue of cost-consciousness in public units. Many explanations for
the apathic and "don't-rock-tlie-boat" attitude ofSOE's managers have been found; in the end,
such a behaviour permeates all levels of an organisation and induces a lackadaisical approach.
In his study of an Indian SOE, Phatak reports of employees that "admitted that the work
assigned to them could be accomplished by half as many employees and in less than half the
time taken" (Aharoni, 1986: 286). Similar considerations can be found in a thorough report on
Argentinean public utilities (PNUD, 1988).
Once the causes for the above-mentioned apathetic approach of management are deleted (e.g.
through the elimination of the temporary nature of managerial positions), it can plausibly be
expected that management's approach to costs will change, thus modifying the generalised
perception. The altered emphasis on costs will certainly also be induced by the arrival of
potential or actual competitors, since financial results will determine the continuity of the
company's existence.
Hypothesis 6
The privatisation of a SOE will induce a change in the consistency of the
culture: from homogeneity towards heterogeneity
Though many authors give the impression that an organisation has one culture, there is
sufficient evidence both of a theoretical and an empirical nature that an organisation is
composed ofmany different cultures. In the case of the SOE's, it seems that beside unit-bound
cultures, formed according to their regional or professional characteristics, there is an all-
encompassing cultural background they all have in common. This all encompassing culture is
formed by the entrenched bureaucratic habits most -if not all- SOE's share; it originates in
the same legal frameworks (esp. labour legislation) and in the analogous administrative
difficulties: high management tumover, procedural sluggishness, etc.
It is this particular aspect of the culture of the SOEs that will probably be changed as a result
of changes in the previously noted dimensions. Given the relatively short time that lies
between the date of transfer and the second measurement, the new culture will not have been
absorbed or settled. Many elements of the old culture will linger on, thus an increase in the
heterogeneity can be expected.
4.3 Selection conditions for the units of analysis
In order to be able to detect cultural changes it was decided to study a SOE in which the
conditions before and after privatisation would be as dissimilar as possible. To be able to
determinate that specific unit, a procedure was developed that included the following criteria:
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4.3.1 Property
The question of property is inextricably linked to the legal status conceded to the particular
organisation. The ample definition of Public Enterprise ( Empresa Publica) commonly used in
the Argentinean literature is of li[tle purpose for this study (cf. FIEL, 1976; Ugalde, 1984). It
includes types of organisations in which the state might only be a minority shareholder
(Sociedades Anónimas) or has only very limited administrative powers. In order to be able to
draw comparisons and relevant conclusions, it was decided to circumscribe the search to those
public enterprises that fitted Aharoni's more stringent definition ( Aharoni, 1986: 26).
Consequently, only the following categories of public enterprises have been selected: SOEs
ruled under Law nr. 13.653149 ( Empresas del Estado) SOEs with a specific regulation
(Empresas del Estado bajo regímenes especiales) and finally those societies in which the state
is the majority shareholder created under Law 17.318~67 ( Sociedades del Estado con
participación estatal mayoritaria).' In summary, before privatisation the state had to be the
only or at least the ]argest shareholder. After privatisation, the situation had to be the opposite.
Hence, of all privatised SOE's that pertained to the categories mentioned in the previous
paragraph only those companies have been of interest in which ownership belonged to one ~r
several- private investors.
4.3.2 Age
This variable is also ofcrucial relevance since if too little time elapsed between the creation of
the organisation and our measurement, no practice or value had the time to become
entrenched and taken-for-granted. There is, however, no clear evidence of the time certain
elements need to consolidate themselves and constitute an organisational culture. Based on
the examples cited in the relevant literature, it was decided to set the minimum age the
organisation has to have before privatisation at 30 years. Such a margin assures that the
groups within the enterprise had enough time to develop a common history of problem
solving and to stabilise their collective experience. Closely linked to this issue is the question
about the appropriate time to conduct the survey in the private enterprise. In other words, how
old should the new culture be by the time of its measurement? For obvious reasons there is
not an appropriate time; suitability depends on the interests of the researcher, i.e., the
phenomenon to be studied.
4.3.3 Market position
In order to find a paradigmatic example of SOE, it had to be certain that it fulfilled at lest one
of the following three conditions before privatisation: it had to hold a secure position as
monopolist in its market; a sizeable proportion of its clients had to be "caged" customers, i.e.
the clients were not free to choose between altemative means but were fully dependent on the
delivered goods or services; and finally, the central govemment continuously undertook the
payment of the losses incurred by the SOE. If this conditions were met, the existing
experience indicates that any traces of competitiveness are deleted and the role of the
customer is minimised.
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Here again, the situation after deregulation had to be -to the extent possible- the opposite.
The formal as well as actual monopoly has to be broken; clients have to have the possibility to
choose between competing services or products, and the newly created organisation has to be
financially independent and run the risk of bankruptcy
4.3.4 Size
Out of the myriad of alternative ratios and figures for a company's size, it was decided to
select a single indicator: the number of employees. This figure offers a clear impression of the
size of a SOE. Besides, it is extremely important for this study to count with a considerable
work force before privatisation since only a certain proportion of these employees usually are
transferred to the new organisation. In order to be able to recognise the relation between the
old and the imposed culture, it was further decided to focus our search on those companies
that according to the privatisation contract, would assume a large number of employees of the
former SOE.
4.4 Research design
Based on the accumulated knowledge mentioned before, the assumption can be formulated
that any privatisation will start to move two basic, intertwined cultural processes: one away
from the entrenched bureaucratic habits and a second that leads towards the new, imposed
culture of the new owners. The measurement of such cultural phenomena involves complex
methodological difficulties. Culture is difficult to identify because practices or attitudes are
taken for granted. On the other hand, cultural artefacts like rituals, the architectural design of
an office building or uniforms, though highly visible are difficult to decipher. Following their
specific interests or scientific formation, researchers have approached the phenomenon here
under scrutiny in a multitude of ways. In the following section the main features of the
research methodology used in this project will be described.
4.4.1 Multistrategy approach
The main objective of the methodology here proposed was to reach a balanced integration of
four different means: interviews, questionnaires, the analysis of diverse documents and the
direct observation at the research sites. Together, as indicated in Table 4-l, they cover three
out of the four available strategies for operationalising constructs of human mental programs
(Hofstede, 1980: 17).
Thus, this study employs stimulated verbal or written responses ("words") as well as deeds in
order to be able to operationalise the underlying mental constructs. The bits of information
gathered through the different approaches could afterwards be "triangulated" (Hofstede, 1980:
18; Schein, 1985: 135). Out of this process a cultural pattern emerges that, being composed of






words [ 1] interviews, questionnaires [2] analysis of documents
deeds [3] laboratory and tield [4J direct observation; use of
experiments available descriptive statistics
4.4.2 Diachronic study
i
If a single cultural diagnosis is conducted ex-post, little can be said about the changes in
practices or probable future developments. This is particularly valid for the transformation
that takes place in SOE's after privatisation, since data about the cultural reality of public
utilities is scarce. Consequently, in order to trace cultural shifts a longitudinal study is needed.
The research design of this project comprises two measurements: one before the actual date of
transfer to the private sector and a second one approximately a year after that date. The timing
of both measurements is complicated by several factors. Ideally, the ex ante measurement
would take place before the decision to privatise the company is made. Once the decision is
known by the employees, a rising tide of fears, expectations and rumours sets in, partially
blurring the culture's original patterns. This is often compounded by the simultaneous
implementation of rationalisation measures aimed at increasing the attractiveness of the
specific enterprise to potential investors. The selection of a specific point of time once the
decision is known by all members seems to be of minor relevance, an exception being periods
of strong confusion or upheaval (e.g. impending layoff decisions, strikes). Results obtained
during such transient periods must be validated against information sampled before the
aforementioned tide sets in.
On the other hand, the selection of a specific point of time for the ex post measurement is less
conditioned by sudden, external factors, the researcher having more latitude to set the actual
time according to his or her specific targets. Two aspects have been balanced when setting the
ex post survey at around a year after privatisation: if the survey is conducted too close to the
day of transfer, cultural practices had no time to develop and strengthen. On the other hand, if
too much time elapses in between, the study would loose some of its practical
meaningfulness, since possible dysfunctional trends or traits would subsist undetected and
correctional measures could not be developed.
4.4.3 Quasi-experimental design
The study has a"quasi experimental" (Stanley and Campbell, 1963) design: it was decided to
survey a second group of employees that worked until privatisation for a SOE and were then
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assumed by the new operators. For reasons of comparability, it was decided to select a unit
that shared several relevant traits with the selected unit. A second group of employees
belonging to another privatised unit that formed part of the original SOE was also surveyed.
This control group belonged to the Nuevo Central Argentino, a unit that obviously also
matches the ex post conditions set above (see Table 4-2). The fact that NCA assumed former
Mitre line staff and currently operates former Mitre line services is of the utmost importance
for the comparison, since according to a World Bank report (PNUD, 1988: ~4.03), "each of
the six lines that were united to form Ferrocarriles Argentinos have neither lost their
independence nor their identity" and this more than twenty years after their merger.
Consequently it seems to be relevant to employ as a control group a unit that not only
belonged to the same SOE, but also to the same line.
4.5 Survey methodology
In accordance with the methodological design, the survey was conducted using four different
means of investigation. Following their order of implementation, the phases have been: data
collection, first round of interviews, the administration of a written, "paper and pencil"
questionnaire, and finally a second round of interviews. Needless to say, the four phases have
been repeated in each unit and survey.
4.5.1 Data collection
This first phase intended to build links to the unit of analysis and to gather reports and
diagnosis about the former SOE and its market. Given the relevance of union activity in most
SOE's, the respective unions also had to be contacted during this phase. A literature research
was started in order to collect data about the organisational culture of the selected unit or
similar SOE's in Argentina and Latin America. The information gathered during this
introductory phase served -among other purposes- to define a research catalogue for the first
round of interviews.
4.5.2 First round of interviews
The most direct way to detect cultural practices is through spoken language. Though time
consuming, they remove part of the shortcomings of the "paper and pencil" measurements of
phase two. This is particularly valid for the more flexible interview approaches. Thus, it was
decided to employ a semi-structured, open ended interview technique based on a checklist that
included nine key questions. This basic questionnaire was enhanced or complemented
according to the specific type of interviewee. The four basic categories resulted from applying
hierarchical (manager or non-manager) and seniority (former employees I newcomers)
criteria.
The first eight questions were not formulated in a restrictive manner, thus covering all
relevant issues mentioned in the relevant bibliography. The ninth question was an
abridgement of the phenomenological oriented, issue-focused interview method implemented
by Sackmann (1991) in her study of cultural knowledge in organisations'-. Following
Sackmann, each interviewee was asked to mention the innovation he or she considered most
important and further asked to justify his or her selection.
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The material to be obtained through the interviews was regarded as a mean to assess globally
the thematical validity of the issues included in the written survey and to enhance by more
qualitative impressions the picture to be delivered by that quantitative approach.
This first round of interviews was complemented by a second one that took place after
obtaining the preliminary results of the quantitative measurement. The purpose of this second
round of interviews was to act as a mean to follow in-depth those mere hunches or more or
less elaborated ideas that could be distilled from the preliminary results. [n addition, they were
planned for clearing eventual misunderstandings or ambiguous bits of information.
Consequently, no specific questionnaire has been developed.
4.5.3 Written survey
This third phase aims to approach the culture of the SOE by means of an „paper and pencil"
survey, though many authors in the field argue that the use of written questionnaires is not a
valid approach to an organisation's culture. For Sackmann for example (1991: 180), "A
questionnaire approach ... ...was considered inappropriate ...[because it]... would require many
assumptions made by the researcher". Neuberger and Kompa go even further, declaring that
"Die „Stoff- und Faktenhuberei" der quantitativen Vorgehensweisen seit geraumer Zeit keine
Erkenntnisfortschritte mehr bringt. ...diese Ansátze [lassen] viele Phllnomene unberucksichtigt
und unerkl~rt" (Neuberger and Kompa, 1991: 56).
Ne~ ertheless, this study uses such an instrument. Among other things, a written questionnaire
allows to gain a representative image of the current practices within tight time and financial
restrictions. All those elements that the "dictatorial constraints" of a written survey
(Neuberger and Kompa, ibid.) might leave aside, can be discovered by the other research
approaches. Above all, the accusatíon concerning the lack of advances brought forth by this
approach can easily be rejected (cf Aiken and Bacharach, 1979; Negandhi, 1979; Hofstede.
1980, 1990, 1998). In addition, statistically underpinned studies have the advantage that they
can be easily verified by different observers (intersubjective checking).
By the time we decided to use a written survey, several questionnaires had been developed
and tested. In the search for a survey that fitted our purposes, we first discarded the Kihnann
Saxton Cultural Gap Survey (CGS). Above all, the four dimensions presented by the pair of
authors I consultants did only cover our hypotheses in an incomplete way. Besides, it is
neither clear by what means Kilmann and Saxton amved at this four dimensions nor if they
took into consideration the problem of ecological fallacy (Neuberger and Kompa, 1993,
Hofstede, 1990). The survey developed by von Rosenstiel et al. (1992) has been rejected.
Originally intended as a climate survey, the additional questions cover in detail some culture
related issues. However, the proposed dimensions, scales and calculated mean values do not
constitute a help in finding an answer to the formulated hypotheses. In addition, the length of
the survey (86 questions) was considered inappropriate, especially for low-level state
employees.'
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A further problem posed for the study of culture was found in the particular institutional
circumstances in which the survey would take place. Though neither the actual date of the
survey nor that of transference was known, by the time the survey was to be held the fact that
the SOE was being closed was certaín. Consequently many standardised questionnaires that
cover relevant dimensions ( e.g., commitment, intent to stay, etc.) could not even be taken into
consideration ( cf. Tsui et al., 1992).
[n the end, it was decided to administer an abridged version of the questionnaire used by
Hofstede et al. (1990) in their survey. This condensed questionnaire, known as the
Organisational Culture Module (OCM) includes those 18 questions that had shown high
loadings (over 0.60) on one of the six factors extracted, and that put together represented the
essence of the respective dimension (Hofstede et al., 1990: 302). Six dimensions were
extracted by means of a factor analysis performed on the mean answer (of the twenty units
sampled) to the 61 questions dealing with perceived practices. Each of these dimensions is
formed by three questions (or items) of the aforementioned eighteen.
Dimension P1 (labelled "process vs. results-oriented") opposes a concern with means (process
orientation) to a concern with goals (results orientation). According to their own perception,
members of process oriented companies feel uncomfortable in unfamiliar situations, avoid
taking risks, make only the least effort, and believe that each day is pretty much the same. On
the contrary, people working at companies positioned at the results oriented pole of this
dimension look upon their colleagues as individuals who are comfortable in unfamiliar
situations, who put in maximal effort, and who believe that each day brings new challenges.
These antithetical statements, presented in a 5-point Likert scale format, correspond to items
3, 8 and 18 of the OCM (see Appendix 1). As could be expected, Hofstede et al. detected e.g.,
companies with direct contact with clients or RBtD departments at the results-oriented side,
and production or mainly administrative units on the process-oriented pole (Neuijen, 1992:
176).
Dimension P2 (labelled "employee vs. job-oriented") opposes a concern for people
(employee-oriented) to a concern for getting things done (job-oriented). Members of
employee-oriented companies perceive that personal problems are taken into consideration,
that the company assumes responsibility for the well-being of its members and their families,
and that all important decisions are made by groups or committees. ln job-oriented companies
on the contrary, people believe that strong pressure is exerted to finish tasks, that he personal
problems of the colleagues are of only secondary importance, that the company is only
interested in the work the employees get done and, finally, that decisions in general are taken
by individuals (items 2, 4 and 10).
Dimension P3 (labelled "parochial vs. professional") opposes units whose employees derive
their identity largely from the organisation (parochial) to units in which people identify with
their type of job (professional), a distinction that reflects the contrast between an internal or
external frame of reference. Broadly speaking, when asked what kind of work he or she does,
an employee of a parochial company will answer "I work for xy company". Members of
professional companies on the contrary will answer "I work as an engineer". Employees
within a professional company think that job competence was the only criterion in hiring and
that the background has no influence. Moreover, they believe that a persons life is regarded as
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his (or her) own business and that they are expected to think three or more years ahead.
Members of parochial companies on the contrary believe that people of a certain family, class
or education have bigger chances to be hired, that the organisation's norms cover the
employee's behaviour at work as well as at home, and that no one thinks more than a day
ahead (items 5, 9, 16). According to Neuijen (1992: 180), units with a traditional technology
or employees with low educational level tended to score parochial; high tech units on the
contrary are located near the professional pole.
Dimension 4(labelled "open vs. closed system") opposes open systems to closed systems, and
partially describes the communication climate of an organisation. Members of open units
believe that both the organisation are its people are open and clear to newcomers and
outsiders, that anyone would fit the organisation, and that new employees only need a few
days to feel at home. On the contrary, members of closed units believe that both the
organisation are its people are closed and secretive, that only very special people fit into it,
and that new employees need more than a year to feel at home (items 6, 12, 14). As with the
employee vs. job-oriented orientation of a company, the position on this dimension is
influenced by the philosophy of the organisations founder(s) or top leaders and their styles
and traditions (Hofstede, 1990: 308; Neuijen, 1992: 181).
Dimension PS (labelled "loose vs. tight control") refers to the amount of internal structuring
in an organisation and is related to the way in which control is exerted within the organisation.
Tight units are characterised by a strong degree of discipline and supervision. People in tight
units believe that everyone is strongly aware of the costs of time and materials, that colleagues
always speak seriously about the company, and that meeting times are kept punctually. Loose
on the contrary implies less discipline and control. In such units, people adhere to the believe
that no one thinks about the costs of time or materials, many jokes about the company are
made, and that meeting times are only kept approximately (items 7, 11, 13). Hofstede et al.
found that organisations delivering precision or risky products or services tended to score
tight, while units with innovative or unpredictable activities tended to score on the loose
control side (Hofstede, 1990: 310; Neuijen, 1992: 182).
Dimension P6 (labelled "normative vs. pragmatic") opposes pragmatic (market-driven) to
normative units (bureaucratic) and to some extent evidences the degree of market orientation
of the organisation. Members of pragmatic units adhere to the statement that in their
organisation, major emphasis is exerted in meeting customer needs, that results are more
important than following correct procedures, and that regarding ethics and honesty, a
pragmatic attitude prevails. Members of normative units, on the contrary, assert that in their
organisations, major emphasis ís exerted on correctly following procedures, that these
procedures are more important than results, and that in matters of business ethics strict
standards are obeyed, even if they run counter to short-term results (items 1, 15, 17). On the
pragmatic side of this dimension Neuijen found units operating in a competitive market and
service industries; on the normative pole e.g., units with a monopoly position (Neuijen, 1992:
182).
Of utmost relevance for the formulation of the hypotheses and, more specifically, for the
selection procedure of the research instrument, has been the pertinence of these dimensions
with regard to commonly acknowledged traits of Fen-ocarriles. On the basis of information
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gathered before the study, this SOE could plausibly be expected to be located near one pole of
most dimensions. Ferrocarriles was clearly process and employee oriented and extremely
bureaucratic. Legends and facts about the numerous control and supervision instances
abounded. Given the low educational level of a majority of Ferrocamles' employees and the
preponderance of the institutional history and tradition, the likelihood a parochial attitude was
high.
As mentioned above (see 4.2), the coincidence between the dimensions found by Hofstede et
al. (1990) and the cultural issues raised by deregulation strongly suggested to base the
hypotheses on the former. This fact, together with the clear origin of the OCM and its easy
administration, led -in a second step- to use this questionnaire as main qualitative instrument.
In addition, only one question had to be reworded as a consequence of the imminent company
transformation. In order to ensure complete equivalence, the questionnaire has been translated
(and retranslated) by two independent, certified translators. To warrant full comprehension,
the instrument was tested with different members of the lower and middle echelons of the
FeMeSA. Fully aware that the questions were tailor-made for a particular set of organisations,
we decided to use them out of their area of proven relevance. A complete version of the
instrument has been included as an Appendix.
4.6 The unit of analysis selected
By the time the selection procedure was started, the second phase ofprivatisations was well in
advance and a considerable number of sectors and enterprises already privatised or
deregulated (e.g. the natíonal air carrier, the electric sector, TV and radio stations, oil
extraction, steel and petrochemical plants, etc.). In addition, it proved to be extremely difficult
to gain access to some of those interesting units that remained in public hands by then.
In early 1993, more than a year after their privatisation, the first two cargo lines handed over
to the private sector were running their operations at profit. According to the World Bank and
some relevant sources of the international railway business (cf. Knechtel, 1993), Argentina's
railway privatisation program was considered to be a model to be followed. This led the
attention to the metropolitan railway system and to the suburban Mitre line in particular, since
this line had not been transferred to the new owners. In February 1994 FeMeSA's Board
declared its interest and agreed to support this project. In addition, it was possible to reach a
similar agreement with the Nuevo Central Argentino, a private company that operates the
remaining network of what formerly constituted the complete Mitre line. According to the
methodological design described below, the NCA would serve as control group.
Since Ferrocarriles Argentinos as well as the two private operators matched the selection
conditions, it was decided to employ the Mitre line as unit of analysis. There are, however,
two additional considerations to be made. The first remark is related to FeMeSA's age:
according to our selection conditions, the SOE had to be at least 30 years old. FEMESA,
however, was created as an independent unit in March 1991. This notwithstanding, it was
decided to go on, since the transfer from Ferrocarriles to FeMeSA was by and large a mere
change in the name. Though through the creation as an independent unit FeMeSA gained
some managerial latitude, the bulk of the regulations and procedures remained intact. Thus it
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can be assumed that for the purposes of this study the change of the metropolitan railway
system's legal status quo was of no relevance.
The second consideration is of structural nature and concems the railways' market situation.
As noted by many authors (Pigliacampo, 1995; Baumgartner, 1993), at least since the massive
introduction of cars, coaches and lonies, the railway has lost its position as monopolist. The
markets of the competitive means of transport being completely deregulated, the railways
monopolic power actually only existed on paper. While Ferrocarriles served some distant and
remote locations and thus had some "caged" customers, this was certainly not the case for
FeMeSA, which operates within the densely populated area of the Buenos Aires Metropolitan
Area (BAMA), a region further served by 15000 buses belonging to 250 private companies
and a 44 km long subway network (World Bank, 1996). In spite of these arguments,
Ferrocarriles (and FeMeSA) can be considered a public monopoly because the central
government pernlanently financed its losses and thus to a great extent induced the disregard
for the customers and their needs.
4.7 Research activities
As mentioned in the preceding section, the different survey phases were implemented in each
unit. Table 4-2 states chronologically their main institutional milestones and the periods in




September Deregulation Ferrocamles Argentinos FA
1989 ~L y
March 1991 Creation ofFeMeSA FeMeSA
December 1992 Privatisation of Mitre cargo services I ~ NCA
NCA starts operations `:'
June 1994 Ex ante survey at FeMeSA
June 1995 Privatisation of inetropolitan services I TBA
TBA starts operations `:~
July 1995 Ferrocarrles Argentinos liquidated
October 1995 FeMeSA liquidated
April 1996 Ex post survey at TBA
May 1996 Ex post survey at NCA (concrol group)
4.7.1 Data collection
The main activity during this first phase was to collect reports and diagnosis about
Ferrocarriles Argentinos. Though the unit actually transferred was FeMeSA, the bulk of its
practices can expected to be rooted in Fetrocaniles' development. This notwithstanding,
6?
special attention has been given to the staff shifts that took place since FeMeSA's formation.
Of particular interest has been the information delivered by the unions. Simultaneously, the
research was extended to cover some aspects of the former private railway companies that
operated in Argentina before nationalisation, since some elements might have survived the
period ofpublic ownership.
Before the ex post survey was started in the private companies, similar information was
requested from both TBA and NCA. Examples are the policy manuals, the company's
magazine, and, of particular relevance, the labour agreements with the respective union. This
data was validated against the aforementioned diagnosis and reports to determine their
intrinsic vahie.
4.7.2 First round of interviews
In order to gain as many perspectives as possible, interviewees were selected from within and
outside the organisation. Examples of the latter are World Bank consultants working on the
deregulation project, a former Ferrocarriles Argentinos president, and former employees
(compensated leavers). Concerning the employees, in the three companies (FeMeSA, TBA
and NCA) participants were chosen following a sampling strategy that combined hierarchical
level and divisionalisation. The company samples always included the company's head, 2-3
managers and between five and nine middle or lower level employees. The latter have been
selected following the recommendation of previous interviewees, union representatives or the
personnel head.
A total of 35 people were interviewed: 13 at FEMESA, 9 at NCA and 13 at TBA. At FeMeSA
interviews were conducted with the unit's president, his main advisor, the directors of the
personnel and infrastructure divisions, five departmental heads and four low level employees.
At the end, the selection included interviewees from headquarters and distant locations,
employees of both genders, and "old-timers" and "newcomers" alike. With the exception of
the conductors (the union "suggested" their members not to participate) employees belongmg
to the remaining three unions participated. At NCA the president and three vice-presidents
have been interviewed, among them the foreigner (in this case American) responsible for the
technical operation. Two middle management and three low level employees have also been
selected, always respecting to the extent possible the criteria followed at FeMeSA. Following
an additional criterion, five of the nine respondents were assumed from Ferrocarriles by the
new operators. At TBA, interviews were conducted with the unit's president, two advisors, the
directors of the personnel and infrastructure divisions, three departmental heads and five low
level employees.
The checklist covered a wide spectrum of topics, ranging from perceptions about the company
in general and the Mitre line specifically, to more specific questions about cultural artifacts (as
e.g., heroes, misdeeds and rituals). Each interviewee was asked to mention some
demographical information, basically the data required by the last questions of the written
survey. The question about the previous working experience was of particular interest since
those employees that before entering Ferrocarriles had substantial experience within the
private sector could trace rich comparisons between both organisations as working
environments.
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At the beginning of each interview the researcher presented himself and the purpose of the
study, making very clear -in the case of the FeMeSA sessions- that absolutely no links
existed between this interviews and others projects started by the new operators. Absolute
confidentiality was assured. Each interview was tape-recorded. The interviewees were given
the possibility to stop the recorder whenever they considered necessary and instructed how to
do so. None of the respondents objected to tape-recording, but on a handful of opportunities
the interviewees made use of the offered option and stopped the recording for a few sentences.
The interviews have been conducted individually in a closed room, under exclusion of other
employees or superiors. They always took place during working hours on the company's
facilities near the interviewee's working place.
4.7.3 Written questionnaire
With only minor modifications the same questionnaire has been used in all three units. The
modifications did not affect the 18 core questions; only the wording of certain phrases related
to demographic issues were altered for the two ex-post surveys. The original version of the
questionnaire has been enhanced by an introductory note stating the purposes of the study, the
sponsoring university and -again- making very clear that participation was voluntary and
anonymous. Given the lack of experience of most employees on how to fill a Likert type
questionnaire, the second page included a brief description on how to complete it and
provided an example. Respondents were allowed to ask questions; time limit was orally set at
twenty minutes. The survey has been administered collectively, to homogeneous groups of
respondents that belonged to the same sub-unit. The written surveys were also conducted in a
closed room, under exclusion of non participating employees or superiors, and always took
place during working hours on the company's facilities near the group's working place.
The main target underlying the written survey was to get a clear and quantitative impression
of the perceptions of practices held by the employees. However, since their practices cannot
be fully grasped unless management's practices are known, it was decided to include the
upper echelons in the survey.
In order to be able to trace eventual cultural fragmentations, the three (company wide)
samples were divided into sub-samples according to the potential sources of internal cultural
fragmentation. The analysis started considering the departments, the type of occupation, the
different locations, and finally the hierarchical level as criteria for the divisions. After the first
round of interviews was held, it seemed interesting to add a fifth possible source: union
membership. In the respective chapters the selected criteria and according units are described
in detail (see Tables "Partition criteria").
Because of the strict divisionalisation, there is an almost absolute congruence between some
of these categories. At FeMeSA for example, all LF members were conductors and worked
exclusively on the train; all ASFA members were "senaleros" and worked exclusively along
the track. In the FeMeSA sample both categories are thus "pure": although a guard is also on
each train, they were not available for the survey; in the latter case, there are also other
workers who perform their duties along the track (e.g. the gangs that change sleepers) but they
do so only temporarily and have therefore not been included.
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Deeper divisionalisation was discarded because the small number of respondents per subunit
would have prohibited, in many cases, to draw valid conclusions. A sample covering l0o~o of
the total population was considered to be sufficiently representative; to the extent possible,
representative subsamples were obtained from all subunits.
4.8 Difficulties
In spite of the efforts conducted to circumvent foreseeable obstacles lying in its path, this
study met several hindrances and restrictions. This section will analyse these difficulties and
point out their consequences for the results obtained.
Without doubt, the most relevant difficulty encountered was the virtual absence of a common
cultural background at FeMeSA. While making any comparison extremely difficult, it made it
necessary to go back and investigate the culture of Ferrocarriles on the basis of diverse
sources. In other words, the ex ante measurement had to be complemented by a previous
diagnosis in order to make a clear longitudinal study possible. It can be argued that at that
point in time another unit of analysis might have chosen. It has to be noted, however, that the
unit studied was not chosen at random but was selected following stringent selection
conditions among a small (and decreasing) number of state owned enterprises. In addition,
most of those factors that destroyed FeMeSA's culture were also present in the other,
remaining units.
Having partially solved the lack of cultural knowledge about FeMeSA restoring to a diagnosis
on Ferrocarriles' common practices, two additional issues remained open. The first one was of
statistical nature: though the mean scores found were characterised as having "high" levels of
dispersion, it is in principle not clear where to draw the limit between "low" and "high" levels
of this particular index. The decision to use the term "high" was based on other studies that,
having used the same questionnaire, in general obtained lower degrees of response
heterogeneity (e.g., Hofstede et al., 1990; Ybema, 1998) and on the fact that the average
standard deviation nearly reached the dispersion leve] of a perfectly even distribution. On the
other hand, this study brought forward a strong increase in response homogeneity (particularly
among a selected set of "critical" items), a fact that -independently of any adjective- clearly
indicates the (re)construction ofcommon understandings and thus culture.
The second issue that had to be resolved was of practical nature: the considerable differences
between the reality at FeMeSA and the one experienced at Ferrocarriles generated some
difficulties for the respondents of the survey. Do the questions refer to the present situation or
the time before deregulation started? Left disregarded, this small but relevant difference might
have spoiled all results. To assure response consistency, it was decided (and communicated to
all respondents) that the questionnaire was asking about their present situation (at FeMeSA).
Nevertheless, whenever they saw particularly strong differences to the prior situation, they
were encouraged to annotate it next to the respective question. Constituting a deeply seated
line of cleavage, the distinction between the situation before and after the start of the
deregulation process has been followed throughout the entire study.
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A further weakness of this study has been generated by the decision to use as control unit an
organisation that belonged to the same railway line. This decision was taken because several
authors (Silverleaf, 1994; Tesoro, 1996) and many of our interviewees hold the opinion that
strong line-identities and completely disparate set of attitudes characterised the members of
the six original lines that formed Ferrocarriles. Neither the statistical data nor our ex post
interviews backed up these assertions. In the light of this finding, it seems that the decision to
use a cargo unit as a second ex post unit because of its common origin was mistaken, and that
more fruitful comparisons could have been obtained if the control unit had been chosen
among the five other metropolitan passenger carriers.
A third shortcoming of this study stems from the absence of organisation specific questions in
the written questionnaire. As a matter of fact, only the 18 item Hofstede et aL (1990)
Organisational Culture Module (OCM) has been administered. Though aware that this
instrument had been tailor-made for a specific set of companies and that it was being used out
of its area of proven relevance, it was decided to apply it. The reason why the OCM has not
been enhanced by a number of additional questions is straightforward: lack of time; little more
than a week elapsed between the arrival in Buenos Aires and the start of the written survey,
which had to be conducted under such time restrictions because of the imminent transfer to
the new owners. The consequences of this absence are clear: some of the items do not allow to
discriminate between the situations before and after deregulation, probably because of their
lack of pertinence. It has to be noted, nevertheless, that the information lost was regained
through other means, as e.g., the personal interviews.
4.9 Summary
Next to the aforementioned weaknesses there were other, more common difficulties: union
representatives that boycotted the survey, officers that were unwilling to co-operate,
suspicious interviewees. In spite of all these restrictions, the available data allows to
determine several broad but unambiguous trends. After revealing these trends for each of the
units sampled in the following four chapters, the acquired knowledge will be combined in
chapter 9, where the main findings are discussed and put in perspective.
'The following categories or organizations have been excluded: Departamentos de la Administración central;
Cuentas especiales; Organismos descentralizados; Sociedades de Economía mixta Ley 15349~46; Sociedades del
Estado Ley 20705173; Empresas Privadas incocporadas a la Administración del Estado; Corporaciones
Interestatales; Corporación Argentina de Cames; BANADE y CNAS.
Z The oral questionnaire encompassed the following questions: a) Please mention the main three innovations
since privatisation. (e.g., why was it important?; who was involved?; what has the innovation accomplished?;
who or what constituted a barrier?); b) Define, characterise and contrast company goals; c) Own task: contrast
degrees of responsibility, working hours, effort level, productivity, availability of tools and parts, tidiness. d)
Contrast supervision levels, degrees of freedom; e) Management: contrast styles, attitude; f) Leadership 8c
leaders; role models; heroes; g) Unionism: strength; representativeness; h) Company loyalty 8c idenuty; sense of
belonging; i) Contrast newcomers with former agents; role of experience and background.
' An updated, customerized version of that same survey consisted of 104 questions. CE Betriebsklimaanalyse der




The following four chapters will analyse in detail each of the units that took part in the study.
The present chapter offers an overview of the Argentinean railway system in general and of
Ferrocarriles Argentinos in particular. While a first section of each chapter briefly
characterises the organisation's institutional development, in a second part the main cultural
traits are presented and discussed.
5.2 The Argentinean railway system
5.2.1 From the beginnings until nationalisation (1857 - 1947)
The Argentinean railway system is one of the oldest in Latin America. In 1855 the
construction of the first 10 km was started, which were inaugurated two years later. From then
on and until nationalisation the network increased -though at an erratic pace- steadily to reach
roughly 46.000 km in 1948. By the turn of the century, the main communication axis had
been developed. As can be observed in other former colonial countries, the railway system's
design reflects the needs of an economic model based on the exportation of agricultural
products. The network is best described as a fan: the different lines al] start from the interior
of the country and converge on the marine ports, mainly on Buenos Aires. Links between the
axes were (and still are) scarce, a feature to some extent related to the diversity of gauges.
The aforementioned deficiencies hint to a wider and deeper problem, which was the lack of an
unambiguous railway policy. According to Cuccorese (1984: 8), "Argentina never had a
guiding and defined policy concerning railways". Basically, the pattern actually followed
oscillated between the British and the French railway development models. Since local
sources of financing were scarce and mainly oriented to agriculture, private foreign capital
was attracted. Funds and knowledge arrived predominantly from Britain, asking for
conditions that would match the conditions in Britain or many of the newly opened markets
(e.g. Australia or India). These requirements were not only met but improved: bonowing from
the French model, the national or provincial govemment guaranteed railway investors a given
return on their shares, normally between 5 and 7 0~0. At the same time, again following the
French pattem, the national state and the province of Buenos Aires started their own railway
companies, in both cases with considerable success.
The whole system developed at considerable pace. Though initiated thirty years after the first
tracks were laid in Britain, in 1912 it had an extension of 31.161 km, operated by 14
independent companies. At that time, Argentina's railway network was the most developed in
Latin America and the eighth world - wide. Public railway activity was particularly strong
during the initial years. In 1880, the extension of public and private networks were roughly
the same. In the last decades of the XIX century however, influenced by liberal streams of
thought and privatisation experiences in for example Italy (Cuccorese, 1984: 77), the national
state and the province of Buenos Aires transferred some lines to private owners. This
notwithstanding, at least five public railway lines subsisted and even expanded their services.
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After 1920 the public share of railway activity started again to increase. By the time of
nationalisation, 30 0~0 of the tracks where not in private hands.
For Argentina's economic and above all political development the railway system has been of
utmost relevance. The lines opened and widened the internal frontiers and interconnected
distant locations that until then were completely unexploited. Seen from a political
perspective, it transformed into a country an assembly of remote and relatively independent
areas. The railway companies delivered much more than a mean of transportation. For many
years, all railway companies taken together were the main employer; they introduced shops
and factories where until then only carts had been used. Private as well as public railway
companies set up schools, technical institutes and provided housing for the families of the
employees.
Based on the developments of the foregoing decades and the late diffusion of automotive
transport, the railway companies were at their apogee in the '20s. Improvements are
introduced in all lines, traffic figures reach unprecedent levels and the invested capital obtains
consistently high returns. The crisis of 1930 brings to an end this period. The economic
downturn is marked by a shortage of capital, currency exchange control and a dramatic
reduction of demand. Two further factors contribute to a decline in revenues: a) during the
'30s Argentina starts an extensive road construction program and b) as soon as demand
decreases, the consequences of the absence of a planned design surfaces: many tracks have
been laid too close, and ruinous competition characterises many markets (FIEL, 1993: 76).
5.2.2 From nationalisation to privatisation (1947 - 1991)
In 1947, in what constitutes one of the most debated historical disputes in Argentina, all
foreign railway companies have been nationalised. We will not try to find out whether it was a
good deal or not; what we are interested in, are some peculiarities of the transaction because -
as we will see - they shed light upon one of the basic traits of FA. Following is a summary of
the facts that led to the decision to nationalise the foreign railway companies.
As a consequence of World War II, Argentina's trade balance with the UK was extremely
positive: by 1946, the UK owed Argentina ~145 m. Since convertibility had not been re-
established for transactions preceding 1947, the money was blocked. A treaty signed in 1946
allowed the government to take-over British investments in Argentina. In 1947 the eleven
British railway companies were bought for f150 m. A similar agreement was closed with the
French government for the (three) French railway companies then operating in Argentina
(Cuccorese, 1984: 154).
What remains clear, is that Argentina had little choice than to nationalise the railway system,
because its assets in London were frozen. Thus in 1948 the government incorporated more
than 29000 km of tracks not as the result ofsome specific policy, but because of the economic
situation in the UK (Cuccorese, 1984: 155). In addition, it fitted the - however vaguely
defined - economic ideology then prevalent. The absence of concrete objectives characterised
not only the acquisition but also the later exploitation of the network. Needless to add, this
void had profound consequences on the organisation's structure and strategy. It also affected
the organisational culture, a point which will be elaborated in detail further on.
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Almost a month after nationalisation (March 1, 1948) an ad-hoc railway commission was
created with the purpose to manage a network comprising almost 43 000 km and more than
170 000 employees. Having no defined policies, its main accomplishment has been to merge
according to their geographical proximity some minor tracks to the main lines, thus building
six independent units. Their English (or French) denominations were dropped and mostly
renamed after Argentinean (military) heroes: General San Martín, General Belgrano, General
Roca, General Urquiza, Sarmiento and Patagónicos. With the exception of the latter (which
has been merged with the Roca line), the lines remained under this configuration until
privatisation.
In 1950 and by decree 20 024 each line was transformed into a Public Enterprise that resorted
under the Ministry of Transport. The relative independence of each line allowed them to
regain some momentum: 1000 km of tracks were added, reaching the maximum length of
43958 km. In 1956 this unique decentralisation experience was interrupted and all the lines
merged into one SOE ( Empresa de Ferrocarriles Argentinos I EFEA) by decree 15 778 (1956).
The purpose of this decree, signed by the military govemment that ousted Gral. Perón from
power, was to centralise and thus rationalise the company's operations. They did not succeed:
the separation remained intact.
In 1965 the SOE was recreated (by Law 18 360) under the denomination Ferrocarriles
Argentinos. In a further attempt to streamline its activities a central organism was created that
concentrated all administrative, commercial and operative functions. Again, though the
intention was to rationalise and avoid redundancy, the duplication of functions as well as the
indefinition of the concrete limits between the central organism and the lines persisted until
1989.
In 1970 Ferrocarriles Argentinos transported 15 b. Tonnes - Kilometres (Tkm) and 13 b.
Passenger - Kilometres (Pkm). Since 1970, however, a steep decrease began; its share in both
markets (i.e., cargo and passengers) on average fell from 150~0 (in 1970) to 80~0 (in 1989). The
loss in the amount of transported units, a trend that can also be observed in other countries,
was accelerated in this case by several dysfunctions which will be elaborated in detail further
on. The financial performance reflects this difficulties: in 1973 the deficit reached 5500 m.,
never to be improved. In 1989 it reached 5700 m., that is, roughly 30~0 of the national budget
or lo~o of Argentina's GDP. A prognosis in which a status-quo scenario was used resulted in a
deficit of51200 m. for 1992 (Knechtel, 1993).
In early 1991 the second round of privatisations began in Argentina. Next to SOE's from the
energy sector, steel plants, the metropolitan subway, etc., the complete railway system was
deregulated. Assisted by a S 7,1 m. "Railway Reconversion Process" loan from the World
Bank, a Railway Restructuring Unit was created (Kogan, 1995; Knechtel, 1993). The
government accepted the Bank's proposal of 1988, that recommended the partition of the
system into three independent businesses: cargo, interurban passenger services and
metropolitan services. In the case of Ferrocarriles, the privatisation took different forms. The
main modus was the selling of concessions (for a period of 30, 20 or 10 years) that included
the responsibility for the maintenance of all infrastructure and rolling material.
Simultaneously, the government transferred some tracks to the provincial governments
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(decentralisation) which had to finance their own railway system as well as decide on its
future legal and ownership status. A majority of them decided to follow the central
govemment and proceeded with privatisation (Knechtel, 1993).
The first railway subsystem that was offered for privatisation was the cargo line that connects
Rosario with Bahía Blanca, bidded in 1989. On November Ist, 1991, the first 5200 km of
tracks were handed over to private investors. In 1989 the metropolitan system was partly
restructured as an independent business unit within Ferrocarriles Argentinos (Kogan and
Kohon, 1994; Knechtel, 1993). Two years later, in March 1991, Ferrocamles Metropolitanos
Sociedad Anónima (FeMeSA) was created. FeMeSA administered a network of 885 kms. and
had at the time of its creation a staff of roughly 13 000. By this mean, the metropolitan
transport system was legally and technically separated from Ferrocarriles Argentinos. A
schematic map of both the cargo and metropolitan grids after their transfer to private
management have been included in the Addendum at the end of this chapter.
5.3 Organisational diagnosis
In the following sections a brief organisational diagnosis will be elaborated. It will point out
the main weaknesses and thus help to understand both the government's decision to privatise
and some of the difficulties the new operators had to tackle. A summary of Ferrocarriles' legal
framework before privatisation will serve as introduction, to be followed by a description of
the company's performance and an explanation of its main causes. The chapter ends with a
more detailed analysis of the metropolitan subsystem.
5.3.1 Ferrocarriles' legal and institutional regulations
As a state owned enterprise that belonged to the transport sector, Ferrocarriles' performance
was heavily influenced by the legal and institutional arrangements that regulated its activities.
To begin with, though the national Congress hàd -under constitutional right- ample faculties
to regulate the companies activities, it was not clear until privatisation if this power was
exclusive or the national and provincial govemments had concurrent rights. As mentioned
before, the question remained unresolved until 1989, and was a constant source of conflict on
matters of jurisdiction (FIEL, 1989).
This notwithstanding, the law 2873 (1891) and the decree 90 325 (1936) establish
unambiguously a national jurisdiction on all those lines that linked the capital with one or
more provinces, or crossed either provincial or national borders. This faculty of the central
govemment was exclusive, thus implying that the provinces had not even a consultative role
in the process. Only those lines that started and ended within the temtory of a province were
not under national jurisdiction. However, the above-mentioned law and decree, as well as
many other regulations, to a considerable extent also applied to provincial lines.
The exploitation, administration, construction and maintenance of the national railway
network was Ferrocamles' exclusive function. By law 18 360 (1969), it was accorded the
highest degree of financial, administrative, technical and commercial autonomy. Due to this
autarchy, Ferrocarriles -at least potentially- was free to undertake all core and complementary
activities considered convenient. Among other possibilities, it could a) design and approve its
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own structure; b) dictate its own norms and the procedures concerning auditing, acquisitions,
constructions, etc.; c) hire, promote, degrade, suspend or fire its employees, etc. Hence in
principle, „law 18360169 offers the same conditions and opportunities any private company
has (FIEL, 1989: 1S8). Particularly regarding FA's operations, the aforementioned law
authorises the company a) to propose to the govemment the creation, closure, or redeployment
of tracks, services or stations; b) to determine schedules, frequencies, routes and the
composition of trains. Only conceming tariffs and conditions of passenger services, the
approval of the Transport Secretary is required. Hence Ferrocarriles activities, and particularly
the freight services, were free of restrictions.
In summary, from the analysis of the institutional framework that regulates Ferrocarriles we
can conclude that the company had -at least potentially- the necessary latitude and flexibility
to develop a competitive commercial activity and run its operations efficiently. In the
following sections Ferrocarriles' performance within this framework will be analysed.
5.4 Ferrocarriles' network
During the SOs, the Argentinean railway network had an extension of 44.000 km. As a
consequence of several rationalisation experiences implemented by both military and civilian
governments, some 10.000 km have been deleted. By 1989, less than So~o of the remaining 34
000 km were lines with double or multiple tracks, and only halfpercent were electrified. One
of the network's most salient feature is the diversity of tracks (Knechtel, ] 993; Roccatagliata,
1987). The first line was constructed with materials originally intended for the Crimean war
(1853 - 1856). Hence its gauge has a width of 1676 mm (5"6). While roughly 57o~a of the
network has this „wide" gauge, 330~o are of „narrow" or metric gauge (1 m). Though the
diversity has been inherited, there has been no serious attempt to unify the system, as can be
observed in Table S-1.
Table 5-I
Gauge diversity
Gauge distance ( mm) 1912 (in o~o) 1989 (in o~o)
wide 1676 62 57
mean ~ normal 1435 8 8
narrow ]000 30 33
industrial 7S0 0 2
This diversity originates two main type of problems: the mean gauge for example has no
direct access to the port of Buenos Aires, thus forcing to either transfer the goods or to change
boogies, both time consuming and costly activities. On the other hand, traction and rolling
material, particularly locomotives, are not easily interchangeable.
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5.4.1 Ferrocarriles' tracks
One of the main difficulties that affected the railway's operation was the deficient state of the
infrastructure as a consequence of insufficient conservation and renovation and the wrong
administration of maintenance expenditure. This shortcomings have many negative
consequences; since maximum velocity and the maximal load per axle have to be reduced,
transport capacity diminishes. In 1989, the conditions of 25 0~0 of the tracks only allow speeds
of40 km~h or less (FIEL, 1989: 171).
The state of tracks have deteriorated constantly over the past decades. While in 1970 48,7o~o of
the network was in either "regular" ( meaning just acceptable) or poor condition, this figure
increased to 55 a~o by 1989 ( Knechtel, 1993).
The chronically insufficient maintenance and improvement of tracks on one hand reflects the
endemic financial shortcomings of the enterprise. On the other hand, however, it is possible to
observe situations of severe mismanagement: there is no policy that gives priority to specific
lines according to their density or potential. A case in point: of the 81 km renewed in 1987,
12 0~o belonged to the metropolitan system and 51 0~o to the secondary network (FIEL, 1989).
5.4.2 Ferrocarriles' rolling material
In addition to the four gauges, Ferrocarriles used five different traction technologies (diesel
and steam locomo[ives, and three disparate electrical systems). Obviously, the different
„basic" technology employed made any transfer between lines an extremely costly or
impossible endeavour. The differences also increase costs, since they require more specialised
personnel and spare parts stocks. This situation is exemplified in Table 5-2 that describes the
technologies used within the system of the Buenos Aires Metropolitan Area network.
Table 5-2
Technologies used in the BAMA network'
Line
~ o 0
,~ C) N `
u G ~ ~ á
c v'
~L ~ c~ vCAi a m F-o
Technology I Gauge
Electric lines
25Kv AC ~ wide 89 89
800V AC I wide 121 105 226
600V AC 1 mean 5] 51
Non-electric lines
Diesel I wide 382 253 125 172 932
Diesel I narrow 245 245
Total
' Length in Kms.
471 374 l25 277 51 245 1543
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Insufficient maintenance and improvement also affected the rolling material. The disponibility
index (the relation between the number of units in working conditions and the total fleet)
varies widely according to the vehicles considered (locomotives, wagons, cars). The
disponibility of diesel locomotives for example has never been above 75 0~0, though under
normal operating and maintenance conditions it should lie around 90 0~0 (USA 91 0~0, France
92 0~0, Mexico 85 0~0, Paquistan 87 0~0) (FIEL, 1989). This index also shows a steep decay from
1980 on; in 1989 only 50 0~0 of the locomotives, were in good condition (Knechtel, 1993 ). The
more intensive the use of the rolling material, the higher is the efficiency, since the capital
costs are divided by an increasing number of transported units. Hence Ferrocarriles" attitude
concerning this index also evidences serious management negligence. In freight operations,
each wagon run -duríng 1982-1985- an extremely low yearly average of 15 600 km
(Australia 38 000 km; USA 32 000 km). The lowest disponibility index (and the oldest fleet,
with the highest concentration of locomotives of more than 21 years) pertains to the wide
gauge network, though these lines perform the traffic with the highest profitability (they
transport 90 0~0 of the grains transported by Ferrocarriles). The disponibility index of wagons
slightly improved (to around 74 0~0), as a result of the reduction of the fleet (from 61225 in
1976 to 34258 in 1987), and, hence, of the fleet's mean age (Ferrocarriles, 1990).
5.4.3 Ferrocarriles' maintenance
The chronic unavailability of rolling material substantially reduces the offer of services. The
main reason behind the low levels of availability is related to the accumulation of deferred
maintenance as a consequence of the insufficient activity of Ferrocarriles own repair shops.
The Sindicatura General de Empresas Ptíblicas (SiGEP) has detected the following problems:
"discontinuity, disorder and lack of trustworthiness of the materials and spare parts purchase
system; absence of a diagnosis defining what tasks can actually and potentially be performed
in the company's repair shops; excessive number of different brands and series; high number
of non-periodic, unplanned interventions; deficient programming and coordination of
activities" (FIEL, 1989).
5.4.4 Ferrocarriles' quality of service
The quality of service is measured by the absolute regularity index (punctual trains ~
programmed trains) and the relative regularity index (punctual trains ~ run trains). The
deficient service is reflected in Table 5-3.
Table 5-3
Relative regularity indices
Suburban Suburban Interurban Interurban Freight Freíght
etectric diesel (express) (Regular) (express) (regular)
86 74 44 76 40 23
All data for 1987 (Ferrocarriles, 1990)
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The situation is particularly poor for the express services, in which 560~0 of the run trains did
not arrive on time and even worse for the freight services, in which 60 respectively 770~0 of the
trains were late. In 1988, the last year for which data was available, every tenth train of the
metropolitan system was cancelled and every fifth arrived at least 5 minutes behind schedule
(Source: FA). The degradation of the service is directly related to the aforementioned
shortcomings in the infrastructure (the explain SOo~o of the indices). There are, however, many
other causes, among them the unavailability of personnel, lack of fuel, etc.
5.4.5 Fenocarriles' traffic levels
With only minor exceptions, Ferrocarriles' share in the passenger as well as cargo markets has
been constantly decreasing for the last three decades. The driving forces behind these losses
were (Knechtel, 1993; Ferrocarriles, 1990):
D the inability of Ferrocarriles' management to adapt to an increasingly competitive
environment caused by the advent of new means of transport (automobile and later atr
transport).
D deficiencies in the administration of the enterprise
r`~ scarce investments
D imperfect allocation of the available financial resources
Table 5-4 summarises the evolution of demand of FA measured in freight units and
passengers as well as in traffic units.
Table 5-4
Ferrocarriles Argentinos traffic (1965 - 1989)
Freight Interurban Suburban Total TU
tn tn-km passenger pass.-km passenger pass.-km
~ 106) ~ 109) ~ 106) ~ 109) ~ 106) (109) (10`)
Mean
1965-'70 20,8 13,2 43,9 5,8 430,2 8,5 27.5
]971-'75 18,8 12,3 29,0 5,8 391,1 7,5 25,7
]976-'80 17,9 10,5 14,7 4,6 383,3 8,0 23.2
1981-'86 16,8 10,5 10,3 4,3 303,8 6,5 21,5
1987-'89 13,5 7,9 12,5 5,3 339,9 7,1 20,4
The negative trend shown in Table 5-4 continued until privatisation. The yearly figures for the
last three year period were the lowest of the series or near the lowest levels, according to the
type of market. Of particular interest is the reduction of freight transport: the level in the years
before privatisation was roughly 35 0~0 lower than in 1965-'70 (Source: FA). The reduction of
the market share is even more notorious if a comparison is traced with years in which the
automobile as a mean of transport was weak. At the end of the '30s, for example, 75 0~0 of all
freight was transported by railway operators; in 1987-'89 the share is lower than ] 0 0~0 (FIEL,
1989: 179). For the transport of grains, which constitute about 50 0~0 of the transported freight,
Ferrocarriles has lost an enormous market share to private automotor transport. While FA
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transports approximately 25 0~0 of all the grains bound to marine ports, this same figure
amounts to 40 0~o in the USA, 90 0~o for Australia and 98 0~o for Canada (Ferrocarriles, 1990).
The passenger traffic shows two distinctive patterns. While the suburban traffic has remained
fairly stable both in passengers and passengers - km, the interurban traffics have lost, after
1976, more than 50 0~0 of their passengers when compared to the previous period and 67 0~o in
relation to the quinquennium starting in 1965. From 1983 until privatisation there was some
increase in the number of interurban passengers transported. Nevertheless, this trend points to
an incorrect assignment of Ferrocarriles' marketing strategies, since the noticeable increment
of the interurban passenger - km index was gained offering services on secondary routes, thus
diverting scarce resources ( as e.g. locomotives) from the genuinely profitable routes (PNUD,
1988).
5.5 Ferrocarriles' poor performance: an explanation
The ample freedom given to the company by the legislators back in 1969 has never been
exploited. To a certain degree, this has been management own's fault, a point which will be
elaborated in detail further on. The main restrictions, however, can be traced back to
dysfunctional institutional or normative elements.
5.5.1 The legal jungle
To begin with, though law 18360 I 69 has been approved, many of its operational bylaws have
neither been explicited nor formally enacted. This void forced administrators and policiy
makers to look for guidance in decree 90 325 (Reglamento General de Ferrocarriles) which
dates from 1936. However, the company never made use of this legal "gray areas".
A second source of legal restrictions has historical roots. At the beginning, railways had little
or no competitors, thus having quasi monopolic power. Thus early on, some regulations have
been imposed in order that the companies did not abuse their monopolic situation. Examples
of such regulations are the controls on prices and tariffs or the obligation to run unprofitable
lines. Some decades later, the business environment changed radically: some railway lines
competed between themselves and, in addition, automobiles began to lure customers and
freight away from the railways (PNUD, 1988; Roccatagliata, 1987). The restrictions,
nevertheless, remained, and from the first year of nationalisation the system had to be
financed by the central government. It has to be noted that this process has also taken place in
many other countries, in principle unrelated to whether the companies were private or public.
The third source of restrictions is rooted in the numerous links that bind the company with
agencies belonging to the central public bureaucracy. An analysis performed by FIEL (1989)
discovered that the number of agencies Argentinean SOE's had to deal with in their daily
operations almost reached 200.' The sheer number of links is a clear indicator of the legal web
that trapped any SOE: the system's main feature were the superposition of controls and the
duplicity of evaluations.
The last -and main- source of restrictions is rooted in the bundle of regulations that affect all
Argentinean SOE's. They are located in the legal frame that link the company with the
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regulating bodies: The regulations can take diverse forms and denominations, according to
their provenance: laws (Congress), decrees (Central government), resolutions (Ministries,
Secretaries, and Undersecretaries). In addition, there are informal forms of regulat~on -
customs and ]ong-established habits- that also affect the company's performance. In the
following section, examples will be given that illustrate the weight of the aforementioned
deficiencies.
5.5.2 Ferrocarriles' poor performance: external control
According to the law, the Accounting Tribunal (Tribunal de Cuentas de la Nación) controls
the SOE in all legal, economic, and financial issues. On the other hand, the General
Accountancy (Contaduría General de la Nación) is allowed to control all those public units
that receive funds from the Treasure. In addition, the Office of the Administrative
Investigations Prosecutor (Fiscalía Nacional de Investigaciones Administrativas) may by itself
start to investigate the administrative behaviour of public agents. The General Syndicate of
Public Enterprises (Sindicatura General de Empresas Publicas) performs the external contro]
of the largest SOEs.
There clearly was a high degree ofcontrol duplicity (FIEL, 1989; 1993). However, the actual
control is weak or non-existent because a) the needed infomlation is scarce and -if available-
of poor quality, and b) the multitude of sectional regulations, exemptions, extemal
regulations, etc. makes it difficult to identify or proof individual responsibility of public
managers. Historically, the inefficiency of the legal dispositions has been countered with
additíonal layers of regulations. All these attempts have proved to be futile, giving too much
preponderance to the formal aspects of decision processes. This feature also generated a rather
conservative approach to management, where inaction was praised and innovativeness
eventually punished, two features characteristic for the central administration but completely
ill-suited for the operation ofa SOE.
5.5.3 Fenocarriles' poor performance: purchase policies
As mentioned before, many aspects of the SOE's daily operations are regulated by sectorial
norms and procedures. The adverse consequences of this policy are particularly notorious in
the case of Fenocarriles' purchasing practices.
In a extremely inflationary environment that constantly modifies the relative prices of goods
and services, the annual nat~onal budget and the corresponding action plan of Ferrocarriles are
of little use. This void has been filled by a multitude of disperse norms issued by the central
government that limit, forbid or redirect the SOE's purchase and contract decisional process.
This situation is compounded by Fenocarriles' dual dependency. As a public organism, it has
to observe the public sector norms, in this case the Accountability law (Ley de Contabilidad),
the Public Works law (ley de Obras Ptíblicas) and the Administrative Procedure law (Ley de
Procedimientos Administrativos). On the other hand, by law 18360 I 69, private law regulates
its relationship with the markets. To find out the valid regulation has proved extremely
difficult; the relation between both systems shows many voids and open contradictions (FIEL,
1989).
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In more general terms, the decision process can be described as highly bureaucratised: there is
an emphasis on the administrative procedure, leaving disregarded considerations about
opportunity and optimisation. The bureaucratisation also generates serious deficiencies in the
analysis of suppliers, the anticipation of needs, and the flexible management of stocks.
Since the implementation of the "sound principles" of public purchase ( publicity, competition
fostering and equal treatment of al] suppliers) included in the valid law are often time
consuming, three purchase mechanisms have been employed next to the public invitation for
tenders: private call for tenders, price competition and direct contracting (FIEL, 1989: 143). It
is noteworthy that a SOE is only allowed to contract directly if a) the purchase is of limited
amount, b) the purchase must remain secret, c) out of unexpected circumstances, reasons of
urgency exist and d) the supplier is another state unit.
While point d) is a clear case of protection of public activities that vulnerates the principle of
equal treatment, point c) has been frequently abused of In many instances, the "urgency" has
been the result of improvisation in the buying process, of erroneous planning or stocks
mismanagement. Table 5-5 states the percentage of purchases for each mechanism.
Table 5-5
Total purchases by employed mechanism
Public call Private call Price competition Direct contract
I Soro 3oro 1 oro 81 oro
Data for 1986; Source: Presidencia de la Nacion, Secretaría Legal y Técnica
In summary, the valid regulations generated a lack of transparency of the purchase procedures
and simultaneously allowed the perpetuation of a selected group of providers. Collusive
behaviour and inflated prices have been the consequences.
5.5.4 Fetrocatriles' poor performance: tariffs and services
A further obstacle to performance has been the Central governments' influence on prices and
tariffs. Particularly for the interurban and metropolitan services, tariffs have been set
following social or electoral considerations, disregarding operative and infrastructure costs
(FIEL, 1989; 1993). Basically, the wider policy followed by the central economic authorities
was to employ Ferrocarriles' tariffs (as well as the rest of the public prices) as an instrument
of their macroeconomic policy, thus severely damaging the SOE's financial performance.
In addition, the central authorities have in general been reluctant to discontinue unprofitable
services (i.e., those services whose income does not cover the operation plus the capital costs
of the rolling material employed). On the other hand, the central authorities have not
implemented the specific subsidies (stipulated by law) to adequately compensate Ferrocarriles
for running unprofitable services. Analogous considerations can be made about the length of
the network.
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5.5.5 Ferrocarriles' poor performance: transport policy
It is the central authorities duty (specifically of the Transport Secretary) to develop a sectorial
policy that coordinates the activities of the different means of transportation, particularly those
of the railway and automobile transport. Nevertheless, the market of road transportation, and
above all of freight, is free of restrictions. There are no barriers to entrance or exit, and there is
complete pricing liberty. Hence the State's tutorial function should have been concentrated on
reaching a situation in which each mean (air, waterways, rail, road and pipe transport)
internalises the long term economic costs it generates.
In this respect, the governments activity has been disappointing. A closer look at the
conditions of competitiveness of the railway and the road transport reveals that the authorities
not only did nothing to harmonise the market, but actually damaged Ferrocarriles
(Roccatagliata, 1987; Ferrocarriles, 1990): the domestic prices of oil derivates (gas oil and
diesel oil) have been set below their production costs, to the benefit of truck and bus
companies. It has also been unable to design a policy that forces the road transport to
undertake the payment of the infrastnacture's costs or to enforce the norms intended at
preserving it. As a matter of fact, heavy trucks are the main source of road deterioration. A 30
tn truck damages the road as 70.000 cars do; however, the fiscal system that finances road
construction and maintenance does not take due note of this fact and taxes similarly cars and
trucks, thus allowing low freight fares and uneven competition.
5.5.6 Ferrocarriles' poor performance: subsidy policies
Almost without exceptions, in all countries the central government has to subsidise the
railway companies. Different methodologies and techniques have been developed to set the
optimal level of subsidy. Sometimes the target is to maximise the passenger-miles (e.g.
London) for a given budget; in other cases specific „social fares" are determined according to
the route and market. Leaving aside the specific techniques, they all have in common that they
set targets to the companies' management. On the accomplishment of these targets depends
not only the level of subsidy but also the appraisal of managements' performance.
Contrasting these efforts to link the subsidy with an economic cost-benefit analysis, the
Argentinean government always assisted Ferrocarriles through a"general subsidy". The
amounts transferred are not linked to a certain service ( e.g. passengers) but given globally.
There is no stable rule regulating the amount ( it is discussed yearly by the intervening
Ministries and Fenocarriles) and ultimately depends on the possibilities of the National
Treasure. Obviously this mechanism does little to improve the productivity or efficiency of
Ferrocamles' management.
5.5.7 Ferrocarriles' poor performance: the administrative systems
The last section offered a brief view of the exogenous restrictions that hindered Ferrocarriles'
perfonnance. Though focused on the metasystemic hindrances, some specific situations (e.g.
the erroneous priorities of track and rolling materia] maintenance tasks) clearly reveal that to a
certain extent Fenocaniles poor performance can be traced back to managerial ineptitude or
negligence. The following lines are focused on hindrances not directly related to exogenous
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regulations, that is, the main endogenous sources of organisational inefficiency will be
analysed.
The wrong allocation of priorities in traffic, maintenance or stock decisions all find their
origin in poorly designed or non-existent administrative systems. Paradoxically, though
innumerable internal norms exist, it is extremely difficult to find flow-charts that establish a
specific decisional sequence. Thus, there are regulations in abundance, but the current
decisional process is not standardised, generating decisions based on the collected experience
of prior situations (ILO, 1994). As further consequence of this fack of standardisation is the
perpetuation of the file (expediente) as the main administrative instrument (Felcman, 1987).
5.5.8 Ferrocarriles' poor performance: planning and control systems
Between 1989 and the date of transfer, the planning unit was lacking a specific assignment
and basically idle. However, the situation before ]989 was not radically different (see, e.g.,
BIRF, 1988): its main task was to prepare the yearly budget according to the requirements of
the central economic authoritíes. Thus, all planning activities were reduced to the ritualistic
accomplishment of the budgetary process, further characterised by its incrementalism. To a
certain degree, this was coherent with the actual relevance of the budget: imtil 1990, the
National Budget (Presupuesto Nacional) was approved almost without exception shortly
before (and some times even after) the end of the respective period of validity.
Void of any substantive targets, the emphasis did not rest upon the accomplishment of ends
but on the accomplishment of ineans. Consequently, a control system was established (and
permanently enhanced) that verified their legality. Since the norms regulate instrumental
aspects and the targets are either vaguely or not at all defined, nobody controls if targets are
reached, and wide organisational sectors concentrate their efforts in controlling the proper use
ofregulations of unknown utility.
5.5.9 Ferrocarriles' poor performance: information systems
Though some areas are computerised, the bulk of the work is done by hand. On the other
hand, the different systems are only partially linked, thus further decreasing the overall
efficiency. In general terms, the information that reaches management is outdated and of poor
quality. Case in point: it was not possible to obtain a list with the number of employees
distributed by gender or age; after two weeks a computer printed form was delivered, with the
actual data typed in.
5.6 HRM at Ferrocarriles
In order to grasp the employees' reality and the sources of the organisational culture, it is
necessary to take a closer look at those issues concerning the human resources. On the other
hand, as the analysis will reveal, these issues are a paradigmatic example of both the intemal
limitations and external hindrances, thus making a detailed analysis even more fruitful.
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5.6.1 Staff number
From 1853 until the early 30's, the number of employees rose constantly. As soon as
competition grew too strong, reducing profitability, and the network's expansion slowed
down, foe the first time the number of employees was reduced. By the time of nationalisation,
the railway system employed 173.000 employees. Eleven years la[er, having added just 1100
km to the system, 44.000 employees were incorporated, reaching a peak ofroughly 220.000 in
1959. In the period 1965 - 1969 the average staff was 163.000, further reduced to an average
of 142.700 during 1970 - 1977. From 1978 on a systematic and relevant staff reduction takes
place. After some expansion in 1983 and 1984, when 10.000 agents where again incorporated,
from 1985 and until privatisation the staff was constantly reduced (Knechtel, 1993; 1L0,
1994).
5.6.2 Productivity indices
After 1978, and mainly as a consequence of a personnel reduction, there was a significant
increase in the traffic units per agent: while the average for 1970 - 1977 was 177.000, this
figure increased by 26 0~o to 225.500 TU per agent in 1978 - 1984. In the years before
privatisation, due to the reduction in traffic, the number of traffic units per agent oscilated
around 210.000, a low figure compared to French or American railways, where this index is
higher than 600.000. Since staff reductions have been greater than network reduction, there
has also been an increase in the number of track km per agent (1950: 4,3 agents per track km,
1970: 3,4 1990: 2,5).
Direct comparisons between Europe or North America and the Argentinean companies are not
very meaningful because one is not considering "like with like" in neither technical nor
operating terms. Nevertheless, the significant gap between productivity in the three areas is
worth further analysis in order to find some paths to improvement. In 1992, Swedish State
Railways (SJ) headed the European productivity table with 986.000 TU per employees. The
six Japanese passenger railways averaged 1.3 m. TU per agent, while the United State's Class
I railways achieved an average of 7.2 m. TU per agent. Best practice in the U.S. was achieved
by Burlington Northem (the foreign management partner of Trenes de Buenos Aires), with 11
m. TU per employee, roughly twenty times better than the major European railways of France
or Germany (Knutton, 1994).
To some extent, these differences are due to the stronger passenger orientation of some
railways (which demands more staffJ, to shorter freight hauls (particularly in Europe), or
technical backwardness. However, as mentioned by Knutton (1994: I), it is an inescapable
fact "that in the United States, about 20 0~0 of the world's railway traffic is handled by only 2
o~o of the world's railway workers".
5.6.3 Staff characteristics
The distribution of staff, according to common criteria, was unbalanced. The staffs main
feature was its high average age, particularly in the operative functions. This trend was the
consequence of a) the imposition -by the central authorities- of a prohibition to hire new
agents (congelamiento de vacantes) from 1983 on and b) the high unemployment rate that
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characterises the Argentinean labour market since deregulation, offers little chances to those
that take advantage of the voluntary retirement programs (retiro voluntario) that offer an
enhanced indemnification package. This mechanism, originally intended at the older
population of Ferrocamles backfired, luring away those young and relatively educated agents
that had good chances in the labour market. From 1986 to 1989 the average age increased
from 43,5 to over 50 years. A further imbalance concerns the staff's educational level: in
1987, less than 10 0~o had finished secondary school. Only 2 0~o had eamed an university
degree, and these were strongly concentrated in Buenos Aires.
5.6.4 Absenteeism
As for all Argentinean SOEs, from 1982 on the absenteeism rate increased constantly. The
main causes behind this trend were a) an increase in union struggle b) absenteeism through
illness (this cause almost doubled from 1983 to 1987) and c) vacations (as a consequence of
high average of seniority, since hiring was restricted). Ferrocarriles mean absenteeism rate
increased from 13,9 0~0 (1982) to 17,1 0~0 (1989). These official figures are rather low; during
our interviews the actual rate for the decade before privatisation was estimated at 30 0~0, a
figure in line with the findings of the PNUD (1988) and Knechtel (1993: 486).
As a matter of fact, absenteeism was a covert form of remuneration; the losses in the real
salary, a consequences of inflation and restrictive macroeconomic policies, were compensated
through non-monetary advantages. These "fringe benefits" may take the form ofa reduction in
the number of workable days (absenteeism) or a reduction in the number of hours in which
work is performed (without a reduction of remuneration). According to the PNUD (1988)
Fetrocarriles' agents averaged 3 hours ofproductive work per day.
To grasp the real magnitude of the problem, FIEL (1989) has drawn a comparison with the
private sector (average absenteeism 11 0~0). Computing an average absenteeism value of 24 0~0
for Ferrocarriles (based on the PNtID 1988 inform), there still is a gap of 13 points (all data
1987). At that time, FA had a staff of roughly 97.000 agents, averaging an income of á5700
per year. Thus, if absenteeism would be in line with the private sector, the staff could be
reduced by 12.610 agents, saving approximately S72 m. per year (10 0~0 of Ferrocarriles'
average yearly deficit).
Though the absenteeism rate of 240~o is high, the labour agreement (Convención Colectiva de
Trabajo, CCT) between Ferrocarriles and its four unions allowed an even higher rate. Simply
adding some of the free days for vacations (between 17 and 35 according to seniority), illness
(up to three months), mourning a relative (up to 6 days), exams (up to 28 days), man-iage (6
days), moving (up to 6 days) or to donor blood (one day), an agent could easily exceed 75
days (30 0~0 of 250 yearly working days).
5.6.5 Remuneration
The main problem when trying to analyse Ferrocarriles' remuneration policy is the notorious
lack of transparency. The basic salary (salario básico) sometimes represents less than SOo~o of
individual income. The rest is composed of a multitude of different items called "additionals"
for overtime, incentives, educational degrees, etc. but always related to the basic salary. The
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number and magnitude of the additionals has varied over the last decades. Basically, they are
a mean to get round the remunerative restrictions imposed by the central economic authorities
(FIEL, 1993). Some of these additionals were created as a mean to tie pay to performance.
Nevertheless, more sooner than later they developed into fixed complements, thus loosing
their motivational power. In addition, when a loss in real income is compensated -even for the
upper echelons- by paying overtime not actually performed, any remaining línk between
remuneration and results is further weakened and morale eroded.
There was a tendency -fostered by the central economic authorities- to reduce both the
income levels for all agents and the income differentials between the less and more qualified
staff The first trend made it extremely difficult to attract or retain qualified resources. The
second trend, i.e., the narrowing of the income pyramid ("achatamiento de la pirámide
salarial"), had pemicious consequences upon management's morale and induced lower level
management to refrain from positions with additional responsibility.
In Ferrocarriles, as in all other Argentinean SOEs, there were no incentive mechanisms, for
management and non-management alike. These mechanisms had been expressly forbidden by
some labour agreements (FIEL, 1989). Management's wages were set by the centra] economic
authorities and, since its creation, by the Directorio de Empresas Publicas (DEP). This faculty
had been often used, setting maximum incomes, establishing the percentage of expenses,
defining incompatibilities, etc.. These policies, nevertheless, were always valid for all SOEs,
and made no distinction conceming the particular situation ofFerrocarriles (or any other SOE)
or the productivity of its management.
5.6.6 Tenure
From a strictly legal point of view, Ferrocarriles' agents had no security of tenure (estabilidad
del empleado publico). Nevertheless, the unions have succeeded in extending this benefit, in
principle only valid for the agents working for the central administration (art. 14~2, of the
Argentinean national Constitution of 1853), to the agents of all SOEs. Thus, a de facto tenure
was granted.
5.6.7 Further education and training
Ferrocarriles' management never perceived the further education and training of the staff as a
priority. As a consequence, there were no concrete training policies. Some introductory
courses for train conductors were offered, but coordinated by the union (with financial
assistance from the company). However, following a traditional, socially oriented pattem
("School of the Nation"), the company offered its employees the possibility to finish primary
or secondary education in the company's own schools.
Because of its monopolic situation, the disregard of fur[her education and training activities
had particular pernicious consequences for Ferrocarriles: for many of the company's jobs (e.g.
locomotive mechanics, etc.), there was no altemative pool of qualified resources. Since the
only alternative for such tasks was the formation of new cadres, and this duty had only been
accomplished to a very low extent, specific areas were chronically understaffed.
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Diverse dysfunctional regulations had generated the poor performance of Ferrocarriles' staff.
In order to understand the situation at FA it is necessary to consider that labour regulations in
Argentina have a pyramidal design, and that it is impossible to abrogate a norm established at
the different levels (FIEL, 1987: 94). In other words, since there was no trade-off between the
different regulations, there was no room for negotiation. Acts, Conventions or any other kind
of regulation made by a legislative body could only establish benefits that enhanced those
established elsewhere. Moreover, because of the aforementioned pyramidal design and the
fact that the negotiation had always the character of a claim, later presented as "social
conquests", the norms developed into a rigid, inflexible and cumulative body ofregulations.
A further hindrance to a rational management of personnel has been the influence exerted
since the 40's by the centra] economic authorities on the labour market, generating strong
alterations of real wages. Salaries had frequently been used as a mean of macroeconomic
policies, sometimes as "anchor" variable during stabilisation programmes (forcing them to
lower levels) or as an expansive variable during programs of "induced reactivation" (FIEL,
1987; 1993). In addition, salaries were regulated through various commissions that had to
approve the modifications proposed by the company. In a high inflation environment this
procedure often generated delays, forcing the company to pay covert increases using legal
loopholes (e.g. "errores de liquidación"). Other forms of influence have been the
aforementioned prohibition to incorporate new agents, the notms concerning the damming of
public resources (contención del gasto publico) that restrict the number of allowed overtime
hours, or the promotion of agents independently of the need of their qualifications.
Of relevance for Argentinean SOEs in general, and at Ferrocarriles in particular, has been
their longstanding tradition of strong unionism. La Fraternidad, the largest of Ferrocarriles'
four unions, was created in 1887. Fostered and strengthened above all by the previous peronist
governments, the union's power covered all areas of the company and was particularly intense
in personnel matters. They counted with vast resources, financed by their ownership of the
employee's mutual funds (Obra Social) and contributions of the company and the agents
(membership was mandatory). To a great extent, their power also derived from the fact that
agents aligned with it not only because they were their representatives, but because while
management has always been transitory (on average, Ferrocarriles had a new president every
tenth month) the unions presence was permanent.
Of course many of the aforementioned aspects were heavily interrelated and compounded by
external factors. The relatively high average age of Ferrocarriles employees for example, ~vas
further increased by their unwillingness to retire before the maximum age (65 years). Thus the
low level of pensions, the staff reductions by means of poorly designed voluntary retirement
programs and the restrictions to hire new agents drastically increased the average age of
Ferrocarriles' population (PNUD, 1988; FIEL, 1987). As a consequence, the capacity to
assimilate new technologies or to accept modifications of routines was reduced. In addition,
costs per agent soared as a consequence of more vacation and illness licences, as well as
diverse other fringe benefits. The abovementioned traits strongly suggested the reduced
capacity left for Ferrocarriles' management to optimise the use of human resources.
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5.7 Conclusion
As the preceding sections have revealed, while there were strong hindrances to an efficient
performance from the environment, Ferrocarriles management did little to widen its margin of
liberty or, even worse, fully exploit the degrees of freedom it actually owned. According to
the PNUD report (1988), "Ferrocarriles management [was] "schizophrenic" conceming its
relationship with the central economic authorities. Fen-ocarriles wishes more "autonomy" and
is able to clearly define the damage caused by the present situation. At the same time,
Ferrocarriles is afraid to change because its administration is aware that many of its current
practices are irrational and that a change will mean a reduction of employment and status. A
further, strong obstacle to change is the independency of the six lines that were merged into
present Ferrocarriles. These six lines have not given up their identity, and the unions have
zealously retained their independency in order to hinder the job rationalisation a fusion would
imply"
5.8 A cultural diagnosis
This section constitutes the first comprehensive effort to survey Ferrocarriles culture. Such an
effort is necessary in order to be able to trace the alterations of the railways company's culture
and understand the condition depicted by the quantitative analysis performed at FeMeSA. The
ex-ante cultural situation forces to take an historical perspective since it can be assumed to be
inextricably linked to three recurring themes: a glorious past, a slow institutional decay, and
finally a never-ending agony that began with the first rumours about a forthcoming
privatisation and finished the day the unit was handed over to the private concessionaires.
Though hard evidence is scarce, it seems likely that some kind of common cultural
understanding existed at Ferrocarriles, common views that can be summarised in a number of
overarching themes. It is too venturesome to elaborate about the culture of each individual
railway company before they were amalgamated and simultaneously nationalised in 1948.
The excellent reputation of the English and French railway companies however was inherited
by the new, public owners. The newly created Ferrocarriles was a company members were
proud to work for, among other reasons because at that time the railways had had extremely
important social and political roles, and both the employees and the public were aware of
these functions.
The extolling of the past is a recurring theme in a vast majority of the interviews and the main
source of myths. Many of the latter begin with "During the English epoch...", referring to the
period between the foundation of the railway companies and the departure or retirement of the
last British managers and supervisors some years after nationalisation. Since at that time it
was possible to start working at the age of fourteen, some employees hired in the forties were
still working for FeMeSA. Beautiful examples of such myths are the often heard statements
that "During the English epoch, every mother wanted her daughters to marry railway workers"
or that "During the English epoch, the guys working for the railway always had the best
chicks". This economic prosperity and the associated financial trustworthiness appear, in rich
variation, in other myths.
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Even though -as seen before- no clear policies emanated from the central government after
nationalisation, those working within Ferrocarriles had a clear notion of where to lead the
company. As accounted by some interviewees (often talking about their fathers' views), "they
all agreed that the network had to be expanded, and that more and more modern rolling
material had to be incorporated". As noted by Tesoro (1996) there we find the roots of
Ferrocatriles "hard ware oriented" (as opposed to customer oriented) culture. The analysis of
former organigrams perfotmed by this same scholar point into the same direction: engineering
tmits were consistently given structural priority over e.g., financial departments, not to
mention customer needs.
There were other overarching themes: there was a company-wide belief that passenger trains
had to be given priority over cargo trains. This common understanding, to some extent
fostered by politicians turned SOE presidents, led to severe losses in the until then profitable
cargo business. In the end, after it stopped to be able to cross-subsidise the passenger services,
the cargo business started to loose money itself Another widely shared perception was that
Ferrocarriles was an exclusively male domain. Only well after 1950 a sizeable number of
female personnel entered the organisation, but even then always restricted to clerical duties.
By the time of privatisation less than 3 0~0 of the employees were female. Also commonly held
was the belief that Ferrocarriles was a"great family". And indeed it was: some of our
interviewees were the third generation of railway workers. Employees proudly mentioned that
they were "sons of railwaymen" (hijo de ferroviario). Clubs founded by the British
companies, mismanaged by Ferrocarriles and finally left in the hands of the unions provided
ample opportunity for interaction after working hours and the formation of many so-called
"railway couples".
5.9 Ferrocarriles subcultures
Of course, a company with more than 100 thousand employees covering an area roughly the
size of Europe provided many lines of cleavage along which subcultures flourished. The main
cultural division seems to have been formed on the basis of the six lines that formed the
network (PNUD, 1987; FIEL, 1989). The roots of these subcultures can be found in the
different (British or French) companies that made up each line. Other sources could be the
highly diverse and often extremely distant geographical locations served and the employment
of disparate technologies. The main reason however can be found in the strict
compartimentalisation fostered by the unions. The identification with own one's line
developed attitudes that ran counter to efficiency. The lines reciprocally accused each other of
improper handling of locs and wagons. Thus, rolling material was not exchanged even where
possible technically. As a result, when additional wagons were needed at harvest time by a
line running to the east, they stood idle in the north.
Within each line, the main subcultural divisions were also fostered by the unions. Considering
some peculiarities of Ferrocarriles, it seems plausible that the affiliation to a particular union
could be a source of cultural diversity. Historically, the Argentinean SOEs have been a
fiefdom of the respective union leaders. In the case of Ferrocarriles Argentinos, the power of
the unions has been extremely high. As mentioned before, affiliation was mandatory;
employees were obliged to deduct a certain percent of their income to the union, which
included money for the health insurance and pension funds.
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Each union worked out a particular labour agreement (CCT) for their members. Thus, the
work conditions were dissimilar not only for technical reasons. Ferrocarriles was structured
following occupational patterns, thus reinforcing the importance of the individual profession
and affiliation. Due to the aforementioned power of the unions, this divisions grew to
insurmountable barriers: when the engineers were on strike, the output of the work shops was
halted because even in the marshalling yard only the engineers were allowed to shunt. This
strictness was compounded by the inborn tendency of state-owned bureaucracies to specify
exhaustively the individual tasks.
From the comments of our interviewees two groups of inembers can be differentiated: the
engineers and the switch operators. The former are perceived -and , to some lesser extent,
perceive themselves- as an élite within the unit. They have been characterised as "the
company's eye" (el ojo de la empresa), because of their power to control: while guiding the
train, they are able to observe irregularities along the track. If for example a ban-ier at a level
cross remained open or a station platform was unduly swept, the conductors were obliged to
mention it at the tenninus. Other workers illustrated their differentiated perceptions pointing
out the difference of the workplaces: while those working along the track stand outdoors
under sometimes extreme meteorological conditions, the engineers pass by at high speed
nearly two meters above them. In addition, the engineers are the only group to which
consistent instruction is given. This group has developed (or perhaps is the only one that still
maintain) a high esteem for their own profession; in part, this is caused by the responsibility
borne, the immediacy of their task and the believe that their chances of being admitted by the
new owners are high.
The second group of employees that could be differentiated were the switch operators. Even
though according to our statistical analysis they have the most differentiated and (intemally)
consistent perceptions, they are not perceived as different by most of the others. As a matter
of fact, while the conductors and their role were often mentioned during our interviews, the
switch operators seemed to play only a marginal role. If the engineers were the "visible head"
of the company, here we find the invisible one. The switch operators work in groups of up to
four persons in isolated towers near the network's junctions. According to our interviewees,
the importance of their work has been consistently underrated. The time pressure and amount
of responsibility under which decisions must be made are extreme and similar to the working
conditions of air traffic controllers (Ketns et al., 1997; Wickens et al., 1997). At the same
time, the technical assistance is poor: they receive outdated time schedules, must deal with
many exceptions (e.g., deleted or belated trains), scarcely illuminated tracks and frequently
have to operate manually purely mechanical or electro-mechanical devices. As many of them
noted, they are the ones who bear real responsibility: "We are the actual engine drivers; the
guy on the train is a simple accelerator".
5.10 Sources ofcultural weakness
The previous evidence suggests that from the start, diverse subcultures coexisted within
Ferrocan-iles. Nevertheless, the simultaneous presence of diverse subcultures should not be
interpreted as a sign of weakness. In principle, if the overarching themes do not contradict the
narrower, e.g., professional perceptions and both are in line with the policies and requirements
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set by the organization's upper echelons, these cultural layers may complement or even
enhance one another. Such cultural synergies could strengthen a company's position.
The historical evidence collected, particularly the orally transmitted stories, suggest that at
least during the aforementioned "English epoch" a number of common understandings
supported and enhanced the companies missions. On the other hand, this was probably not die
case during Ferrocarriles' last years and certainly not at FeMeSA. As indicated by our
statistical analysis, neither company-wide [hemes nor specific subcultural groups proved to be
statistically significant. The question then is to find the reasons and point in time when the -
once strong- culture started to erode and became fragmented and weak.
Broadly speaking, the weak culture encountered at FeMeSA was inherited from Ferrocarriles
and was the outcome of a managerial void. This void was generated by the endless succession
of short-lived presidencies. As a consequence, neither leadership nor any explicit and clear
message has been provided from the upper echelons. The ephemeral character of the
successive presidencies inhibited the formation of any cultural message that pernleated the
organisation in any relevant way. To some extent, this void was filled by the unions.
However, the political transformations both at a national and international level eroded the
union's power base, creating a second void. Leaving for later the union's role in the process of
cultural fragmentation, we will focus now on the formal power holders' inability to (re)direct
Ferrocarriles' shared perceptions.
5.10.1 Absence of leadership
Leaders play a vital role in shaping an organisational culture. For diverse reasons,
Ferrocarriles lacked such role models. The discontinuity in the company's presidency is
striking: in 35 years (from 1955 to 1989), there have been 41 different presidents; only one of
them (J.C.de Marchi) remained in office for (little) more than three years (MOSP, 1995).
After deregulation began, the situation did not change. Almost nobody, leaving aside some of
the employees working at headquarters, knew the name of the current president and, of
course, they neither saw him nor any other president during their time at the company. Not
surprisingly the only president remembered by many members was the one who held this
position the longest time.
5.10.2 Absence ofstrategies
It is extremely difficult to build a strong culture in an organisation with unclear or, even
worse, non-existent strategies. At Fenocarriles there neither was visible leadership nor
explicitly defined policies or strategies applied in a consistent manner. The problem arising
from the weakness of the planning units within the company was compounded by the
institutional disarray which surrounded Ferrocarriles. By different administrative means, the
railways' policies were formulated from a bundle of extemal agencies. In many of them, the
discontinuity of top management was also a usual pattem. The Secretaría de Obras Publicas
for example, the secretariat Ferrocarriles depended from, changed in the aforementioned
period its jurisdiction seven times (MOSP, 1995).
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5.10.3 Mismanagement
Was the often heard lament about the impossibility to redirect the organisation ("our feet and
hands are tied") a reality or a myth? The answer to this question requires a profound analysis
of the legal framework that coordinated the relations among the main stakeholders of
Ferrocarriles, an analysis that exceeds by far the limits of the present investigation. However,
there is evidence that some decisional latitude has been left unexploited and, accordingly, the
cited image of the manager trapped in shackles may have been the base of a self-fulfilling
prophecy.
The unit's poor performance can be traced back to three main sources: a) endogenous, b)
concerning the relationship between the unit and the institutions that regulate it and c)
exogenous. Starting in reversed order, it is clear that if, for example, inflation runs at a daily
rate of 1 o~o and you are not free to increase transportation rates, the financial performance ~~~ill
be weak at best.
This problem leads us to the second source of performance restrictions; the most important
constraints have their origin in the thicket of laws, procedures and assorted decrees that
emanated from the institutional bodies that regulated Ferrocarriles. Clear examples of
hindrances to sound management practices are the procedures that regulate acquisitions (in
particular the "Compre Argentino"), tariff and income policy. By law (Ley 18360169) the
company had the same conditions and opportunities any private enterprise has. Nevertheless,
there has been a progressive pruning of these liberties (FIEL, 1987). As a result, the degrees
of freedom of this company (and of many other SOEs) were very similar to the degrees of
freedom of units pertaining to the central public administration.
Though constricted, there are some areas in which the prerogatives of Ferrocarriles had been
left intact. Everything strictly concemed with the commercial exploitation (e.g. deployment,
closing or modifications of tracks; frequency, routes, times and composition of services) could
be decided without any external approval. The only exception to this rule was the approval of
the time schedule for passenger trains, which must be issued by the Transport Secretary.
Paradoxically, between 1965-70 and 1981-86 Ferrocarriles lost twice more cargo [tn.~km.]
than passengers [pass.lkm.] units (FIEL, 1987).
In trying to find an answer to the question posed above, we might say that the myth of the
shackled manager is not unfounded. Nevertheless, many commercial opportunities have been
left unattended or mismanaged. In any case, the actual managerial possibilities were much
wider then perceived.
5.10.4 Labour regulations
As has often been noted, the systems that regulate payment, promotions and other issues
directed at the human resources have a dual purpose. While guiding in an immediate ~vay the
members' behaviour, they also function as signals. To the educated observer, these signals
express the do's and don'ts and the general policy regarding the company's personnel. For the
average Ferrocarriles employee it was difficult to interpret (to "read") the messages sent by
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the systems. This was the result of the many regulating sources that affected often
contradictory policies.
From a long-term perspective, the employees did not see a clear pattem concerning the overall
income policy. From 1940 on, and more frequently since 1970, the salaries have been used by
the Ministry of Economy as an anchor, keeping them at a low level when stabilisation was the
target or as a mean to expand demand during periods of induced expansion. In other words,
the money pocketed depended less on one's own or the company's performance and more on
the government's macroeconomic policy (FIEL, 1993).
Also as a consequence of state-level economic policies, there was a trend to "flatten" thc
salaries' pyramid. This had obvious motivational consequences for the upper echelons, and
simultaneously affected the base of the organisation. These consequences are an interesting
example of how macroeconomic policies might fom~ the employees shared perceptions af
daily practices. In order to retain their managers, at Ferrocarriles (and virtually all other
Argentinean SOEs) i[ was common to pay "extra hours" no[ performed. Since this fact was
known to everybody in the company, the management's "ethic" -and thus its authority- were
seriously undermined.
The remuneration structure had lost its ability to provide incentives. Financial rewards for
additional working hours not actually performed, regulations that prohibit to tie payment to
results, the common practice of the salary "hook-up" (enganche salarial), by which the
salaries have been automatically adjusted according to the rise conceded to another (usually
very powerful, in terms of their bargaining leverage) public unit: these are only examples of a
long list of items that generated the absence of clarity and any relation with productivity or
performance.
There were also only extremely limited ways to punish deviant behaviour; though stability of
tenure is not explicitly mentioned in either one of the four labour agreements (CCT), the
unions succeeded in extending this constitutional right for the civil servants to the employees
of this SOE. Any punishment required a preliminary written inquiry (sumario administrativo)
and had to be negotiated with the union officials. As noted before, the main criterion for
promotion was tenure.
In summary, the different systems built a non-consistent array of regtilations that averted any
comprehensive and efficient personnel management. Out of this mess, even an educated eye
can "read" little. What employees mostly perceived, as detected through the interviews, was
that any kind of individual effort remained unrewarded, that "you had to kill someone in order
to get fired", and that hard-workers and sluggards eamed the same and advanced at equal
speed.
5.1 I Cultural negligence
One reason that clearly affected the development of a culture was the underutilisation of
symbols. Rites and ceremonies that are commonplace in every organisation of comparable
size have not been exploited. Paradigmatic in this respect is the fact that in an organisation
proud of the stability of tenure offered, not even to those members that celebrate 40 years
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within the company some kind of recognition was granted. Even worse: in 1983 It was
decided that employees celebrating their 20, 25 and 30 years of service would be awarded a
medal in recognition of his or her services. A year later, citing austerity measures, this
"costly" (sic) initiative was interrupted, never to be resumed (Res. MOSP 1104183, 2439~84).
To some extent, the void ]eft by the upper echelons' mismanagement and the institutional
restrictions was filled by the unions. As mentioned before, at least from the first Perón
government onwards, and fostered by his populist policies, state controlled unions conquered
key positions and power within Ferrocarriles. It was at that time that Raítl Melgarejo, a union
activist, became the company's president (1949-1950). Rapidly succeeding presidencies led
Ferrocarriles' employees to side with what became the only institution to represent continuity.
However, as a consequence of military interventions and non-peronist governments, their
previously gained force was subsequently considerably reduced. Unions regained some
momentum during the third presidency of Perón (and his wife Isabel Martínez), from 1973
until the military coup in March 1976. During the following years union activity was
forbidden, and many activists persecuted, forced into exile or -in some cases- disappeared.
After the reinstallment of a democratic government in 1983 union activism started again, but
cadres had to be reorganised, key activists were missing, and rumours of ~vide spread
corruption generated a feeling of distrust towards unions in general. The unions' high
expectations after the peronist party regained power in 1989 were truncated after President
Menem announced his neoliberal program and the intention to privatise Ferrocarriles.
Menem's economic U-turn forced union activist to reposition themselves. Unions leaders (and
followers) were divided and started to cluster around some conservative hard-liners and more
modem, pro-government leaders. A strike against the privatisation plans organised by the
former found many followers but ended up in a disaster: after ten weeks without suburban
passenger services the central government did not gave in to any of the union's demands. This
defeat marked the watershed of union activism within Ferrocarriles. Union officia]s fell in
absolute discredit and were blamed for a wide array of organisational deficiencies; they
started to be considered as traitors that either supported or witnessed inactively the company's
sell-out.
In summary: union power decreased progressively during the eighties, and was totally
defeated after the ill-fated attempt to halt the privatisation plans. The (to some extent counter-)
cultural forces that filled the void left by management slowly decayed. It is probably this
second absence that further weakened Ferrocarriles culture and led to the situation of anomia
that characterised FeMeSA, as will be analysed in the following chapter.
' To qualify, Ihe organisms had to be an unavoidable step for one or more of the SOE's activities and, though not
necessarily influencing directly the SOE's policíes, play a specific administrative or control function. The units
related to most SOEs were (in hierarchical order): 7 ministries, 25 "Secretarías", 46 "Subsecretarías", 100
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6. Ferrocarriles Metropolitanos SA
6.1 Introduction
As mentioned before, in 1989 FA was segmented into several units in accordance with two
criteria: line and market. Based on the latter, the former national railway company was
divided into its three main business activities, namely cargo transport as well as interurban
and metropolitan passenger transport. While the cargo sector was again subdivided following
the existing lines and subsequently privatised, the interurban passenger service was, almost
without exceptions, either deleted or transferred to the provincial govemments.
Two years after the initial reorganisation took place, what basically remained were the urban
sections of the six lines that together formed the Buenos Aires metropolitan railway system.
Since 1989 this sub-system run, partly restructured, as an independent business unit,
providing transportation to the urban market located in and around Buenos Aires. In early
1991, and with the more immediate purpose to dismantle a protracted strike of railway
employees, the government decided to form a]egally independent entity that would be
transferred to the private sector that same year (Felder, 1994: 64). In March 1991
Ferrocarriles Metropolitanos Sociedad Anónima (FeMeSA) was created; at its outset it
administered a network of 885 kms and had a staff of 13 000. FeMeSA's existence was rather
ephemeral: between January 1S', 1994 and May 1995 the unit was again subdivided and
handed over to private operators.
6.2 The metropolitan railway system in brief
As can be deducted from the previous lines, the reality of FeMeSA can only be understood by
restoring to Fer-ocarriles institutional development. Nevertheless, and in order to provide a
more specific view of the market it served, the following section will briefly outline and put in
perspective Ferrocarriles' (only) suburban railway system. Ferrocaniles Argentinos'
metropolitan services covered Buenos Aires and its surroundings, a vast market of roughly 11
million people. As indicated in Table 6-1, the system is rather large and comparable to those
of other relevant cities. With an average of 620 passengers-kilometres per person and year,
the level of utilisation is also in line with the figures of the other cities. However, the
metropolitan system runs considerable less trains and more than doubles the average number
Table 6-1
Metropolitan services (1990)
B. Aires Sydney N. York London
population (m.) 11.5 5.5 10 18
pass.-kms. (pp 8c a) 620 676 579 802
track length (km) 1400 1400 1800 7300
trains-kms. (pp) 2.5 27.6 14.6 7.7
pass.~train 246 24 40 104
Source: Kohon, 1992
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of passengers per train of London. Though these factors should make the system
economically more efficient than comparable systems, income has eroded mainly because
tariffs have increased slower than inflation.
Buenos Aires has a need of 12 million daily rides. Ferrocarriles' market share has decreased
consistently over the last forty years. In 1989, the metropolitan railway system transported
268,7 m. passengers and required additional resources of 5475,7 m.. Thus, each transported
passenger was subsidised with 51,77 (Kohon, 1992: 7)~. Before privatisation, it satisfied
approximately l0a~o of demand. To a certain extent the switch to other means ( particularly
buses, with a share of 80a~o) can be related to their intrinsic advantages. Nevertheless, the
decay of service enhanced the loss of customers: in 1988, l l,lo~o of the trains were deleted
and 21,10~o suffered delays ( Kohon, 1992; Kogan, 1994).
6.3 A cultural diagnosis
In June 1994, a year before the company was finally transferred into private hands, a written
survey was conducted at FeMeSA. At that time, 2021 employees were working for the
company. Excluded from the sample has been the intermediate, supervisory level. According
to data delivered by FeMeSA, approximately l00~0 of the company's population belonged to
this third level. Its members do not configure a homogenous group that could be characterised
as "middle management". As a matter of fact, as a consequence of restrictions on promotions
and wage increases, this level includes employees with disparate activities and responsibilities
that have been granted a covert salary increase while performing their usual task. It seemed of
little interest to treat them as a separate entity and it was decided to exclude them from the
sample, thus concentrating efforts on the remaining two levels. As a consequence, the
population to be sampled amounted to 1838 employees, unequally distributed among the five
existing "Departamentos".
6.3.1 A first overview
The most striking characteristic of the survey conducted at FeMeSA is the wide dispersion of
the individual answers to the different questions. Table 6-2 presents the rounded-up means
and dispersion of all items when considering the whole sample (the actual scores can be found
in the Addendum at the end of this chapter).
Table 6-2
Means and dispersion FeMeSA
item 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18
mean 3,3 2,3 2,4 2,6 2,6 2,8 2,6 3,9 2,1 4,2 3,5 3,1 3,7 3,2 3,2 3,2 2.8 3.0
dispers. 1,5 1,1 1,4 1,6 1,3 1,5 1,5 1,3 1,3 1,2 1,2 1,4 1,3 1,4 1,5 1,5 I,3 1,5
As we might observe, the standard deviation of no question is below 1,1 and the mean
dispersion approximately 1,4. In order to grasp the full meaning of these values, it should be
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noted that on the 5 point Likert type scale used, if the answers would be perfectly even
distributed, the dispersion would be slightly above 1,41.
The obtained scores allow three basic interpretations. A first explanation is that the questions
were unintelligible to the respondents and therefore were answered at random. Second, high
levels of dispersion could be the result of aggregating disparate groups. In this case, the
obtained scores could be concealing the presence of several subcultural groups. Finally,
standard deviations which are consistently above 1,1 could indicate the existence of a
heterogeneous group, i.e. the absence ofshared practices.
We do not preclude the possibility that the questions were unintelligible to the respondents,
but there are some strong arguments to counter it. The dispersion of the answers of the 24
managers surveyed, for example, (min. - 0,92; max. - 1,72; mean - 1,36) is well above 1,1
and it seems improbable that even this subsample found the questions unintelligible.
Concerning the second altemative explanation, the -often union lead- stnct
compartmentalisation increased the likelihood of subcultural entities. Finally, there is a bundle
of reasons -mainly rooted in what FeMeSA inherited from FA- that could have caused the
fragmentation of the culture by the time of our survey.
The crucial importance of the high levels of dispersion regarding the meaningfulness of the
data, forces to analyse in further detail this particular issue. More specifically, we are
interested to find out if disparate subcultural groupings emerge from the data, or if the
absence of shared understandings is a pervasive organisational feature.
6.3.2 Hofstede's organisational practices
As mentioned before, this study employed Hofstede's Organisational Culture Module (OCM)
as sampling instrument. Therefore, a comparison with the dimensions they obtained in their
multicompany, binational analysis is of utmost relevance (cf Hofstede et al., 1990). A first
step in this direction is to detect if FeMeSA's data -with regard to cultural practices- reveals
a structure similar to the one found by Hofstede et al. in their study. In other words, could we
expect to find triads of specific questions strongly linked among themselves but at the same
time unrelated to the other 15 questions?
According to Hofstede et al., the dimensions were formed by the following triads of
questions: P1 -(3, 8, 18); P2 - (2, 4, 10); P3 -( 5, 9, 16); P4 -(6, 12, 14); PS -(7, 11, 13),
and P6 - (1, 15, 17). As can be observed in the corresponding table in the Addendum at the
end of this chapter, FeMeSA's correlation matrix indicates that Hofstede's dimensions are not
present in this sample. Out of the expected 18 strong links, not a single significant correlation
coefficient has been detected. Even more, in some cases the questions expected to build a
triad aze practically unrelated.z Consequently, we will in the remainder of this chapter analyse
the data on an item-by-item basis.
6.3.3 Response heterogeneity
A good general impression can be gained using boxplots. Summarising data, they allow to
quickly determine if and how the responses given to the individual questions differ from each
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other. The amount of information revealed by boxplots have lead to their being considered as
a„robust explorative data analysis procedure" (Hoaglin, 1983). The following table shows the
boxplot of the complete FeMeSA sample. Each column (or box) represents a single question,
starting at the left hand with question 1(labelled QOl ). The values on the y-axis correspond to
the values present in the (Likert-type) sampling instrument.
At first glance, the presence of high levels of dispersion is confirmed: almost all boxes show
large interquartile ranges, thus indicating considerable degrees of variability. In questions 03,
04, 06, 07, and 18 for example, 750~0 of the respondents selected 4 or less. On the contrary, in
question 10 (organisation's interest), at least 750~o selected 4 or 5(near the "only interested in
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Boxplots further allow to recognise the absence of symmetry in the responses. This is the case
whenever the median (indicated by the black row dividing the box) is not centred. Leaving
aside a few exceptions, the distribution of the answers to the particular questions are not
symmetric. An extreme case of asymmetry is question 08; the median coincides with the
value 5, an example of strong kurtosis. An exception to the aforementioned response
assymetry is question 15 (anybody ~ only very special people fit well with the organisation).
Median lies at 3 and the first and third quartiles at 2 and 4 respectively, a perfectly symmetric
response pattern.
6.3.4 Comparing the variance among groups
As suggested by the second explanation, the considerable degrees of variability could be the
consequence of ineasuring as a single group several culturally unrelated groups, each holding
a particular view of the organisational reality. As a matter of fact, in any organisation, the
odds of finding an all-encompassing, monolithic culture are small. That much literature
speaks of „an" organisationa] culture instead of using the plural is a mistake probably rooted
in the believe that the culture proposed by the organisations' top echelons is the only one.
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Cultural subgroups can in principle be found anywhere within an organisation, but they tend
to form along those lines where frequent interactions take or took place. If these groups share








Department Transporte 69 1 Transport
Rec. Humanos 15 2 Human resources
Infraestructura 47 3 Infrastructure
Material rodante 56 4 Rolling material
Unidades 4 S diverse units
Previous employer first job 34 1
another SOE 16 2
Public sector 8 3
Private sector 83 4
Independent 30 5
Union membership La Fraternidad 29 I conductors
Asoc. SeíSaleros 11 2 switch operators
Union Ferroviaria 127 3 general
APDFA 24 4 managers
Education Primary school (or less) 90 1 7 years or less
Secondary school (or less) 74 2 8 to 12 yrs. or less
Tertiary education 27 3 13 or more years
Age 34 or less 60 I
45 - 49 90 2
50 or more 41 3
Seniority 10 or less years 50 1
11 to 20 87 2
21 or more 54 3
Occupation Engineers 29 1 Engineers
Seiialeros 11 2 Switch operators
Administrativos 29 3 Administration
Operarios 98 4 Shop-floor wrkrs.
Gerentes 24 5 Managers
Locality On the train 29 1 (engineers)
Along the track 11 2 (switch operators)
Headquarters 50 3 (at the temunus)
Other, distant locations 101 4 (t20 km. from 3)
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Starting from the consideration that a single culture is -at the organisational level- rather the
exception than the rule, and taking into account the huge variances observed, various attempts
were undertaken to discover possible subcultures within FeMeSA. As mentioned in the
chapter on methodology, the sample was divided following potential lines of intemal cultural
fragmentation. Probable cleavages within FeMeSA were structural, occupational, or
geographical boundaries. In addition, subsamples were formed according to union
membership, previous working experience, seniority, age and educational level. Table 6-4
offers an overview of the criteria employed and the resulting subsamples.
The criteria "occupation", "locality" and "union membership" partly overlap, generating some
degree of redundancy. The identical subsamples are a direct consequence of restrictive
regulations or of sampling conditions imposed by the unions. The criterion "hierarchical
level" has been left out ofconsideration because by the time of our measurement the positions
within the organisational structure were in absolute disarray. Given the high level of
personnel fluctuation, positions were covered for extremely short periods of time (often less
than a week), and on an ad-hoc basis. As a matter of fact, during our two-months-long stay in
the company the personnel department was not able to produce a single valid organigram.
The different subsamples and their associated mean and dispersion are presented in the
Addendum at the end of this chapter. This table was first approached in an exploratory way,
looking for systematic differences among the categories. None of the generated subsamples
showed consistently different (particularly low) degrees ofdispersion.
Not having found a useful grouping criterion, it was decided to corroborate these findings by
means of altemative procedures. As a first step, we ran the Levene test in order to examine if
the assumptions are given to run an Anova3 and to test if statistically significant differences
exist among the variance of the subsamples.
Table 6-5













1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 l6 17 18
~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~
An asterisk meaning that the variance of two subsamples is significantly different at the p 5 0.05 level.
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As can be inferred from Table 6-5, the variance ofno subsample differs significantly on all 18
questions from another subgroup. Since our previous exploratory analysis demonstrated that
no subsample shows consistently low degrees of dispersion, it can be concluded that there
was no culturally homogenous group at FeMeSA.
However, on the basis of the partition criteria proposed, the Levene test shows that some
subsamples do differ from others - at least on a number of questions. The fact that some
partition criteria divide the sample into groups that show significantly different dispersions
while others do not, raises the question about the usefulness of such criteria, an issue treated
at length later on. Regarding our second aim, the preceding table shows that the assumption of
homogeneity of variance has been violated.
6.3.5 Comparing the mean of the diverse groups
Following our analysis of the different subsamples, their respective means will be scrutinised
closer. Taking into account the violated assumptions, Kruskal-Wallis' H test will be used, a
non-parametric alternative to the one-way Anova.
Table 6-6
Comparison of ineans FeMeSA
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Kruskal-Wallis test: an asterisk shows that the means of at least two subsamples are significantly different at
the p 5 0.05 level.
As can be observed from Table 6-6, no subgroup differs both significantly and systematically,
that is, along all or most of the questions, from the other subsamples. On some items however,
the means of some groups differ significantly. To determine the specific subsamples that
constitute these exceptions, the Scheffe test was employed. The following Table enumerates
the groups whose mean values differ significantly.
No data is available pointing out a single group. Some evidence nevertheless confirms the
often heard comments about the engineers as "being different". Though limited to only some






criterion question (specific subsamples)
union 7 (]s3); 8 (3~4); 13 (lx2).
department 6(3x1,2,4); 8(2x3); 9(3s1,2) (2x4); 10 (2s3,4); 14 (1~3) (3x4); 18 (1~3,4).
occupation 7 (lx4); 8 (4m3,5); 9 (3~5); 10 (3~4); ]3 (2s1,4) (3x4).
locality 7(ls4); 8(3x4); 10 (3x4); 13 (2x1,4) (3s1,4); 18 (Ix4).
prev. work experience 10 (3~4)
seniority 17 (2x1,3)
education 1(2x3); 6(]x3); 7(1~2,3); 8(Ix3); 11 (1x2,3); 12 (1~3); 18 (1~2).
age 2 (2x3); 12 (lx3); 15 (2~3).
Scheffe test: listed between parenthesis are the subsamples significandy different at the p 5 0.05 level.
In general terms however, the results hitherto obtained allow to infer that the subsamples do
not differ significantly and systematically from each other. To say that the only trait in
common is the absence of a common trait is paradoxical but illustrative. The few exceptions
are largely outweighed by the lack of statistically significant differences. Consequently, and
as a final step in the search for a subsample that differs significantly from the rest, a
hierarchical cluster analysis was performed. The resulting dendrogram can be found as
Appendix 3.
The results of the cluster analysis are in line with the previous findings: no clearly defined
group emerges. Three wide clusters are formed (81H164; lOHl29; 131H105), but a
performed case-by-case analysis does not forward any singular pattem. On the other hand, the
relatively small distances on the scale allow to infer that if any differences are found, these
will most likely be very small ones. In other words, the kind of "super-clusters" found by
Hofstede (1998: 6) in his a posteriori identification of subcultures, could not be detected.
In summary, the rather large level of variability suggested by the boxplot and reflected in the
obtained dispersions is the most relevant trait of this sample. Neither the analysis of variance,
the comparison of ineans, nor the cluster analysis have forwarded a single subsample
significantly different from the other groups. There is not a single group that systematically
shares organisational practices to a statistically significant leveL Thus we can conclude that
the observed fragmentation is clearly not an error derived from the use of global
measurements but a deeply rooted pattern of the unit. In other words: from a cultural
perspective, the population of FeMeSA is highly heterogeneous.
6.4 A global assessment
The observed cultural disparity raises the question whether this cultural weakness was a long-
standing trait, and if not, when the process of fragmentation started to dilute the previously
existing cultural order. Aware of the reasons behind Ferrocarriles' weak culture, the
significance of the high levels of dispersion found at FeMeSA may be recasted. Needless to
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add, their rather high degree reduces the meaningfulness of the questions' mean value. On the
other hand, precisely their high degree implies that there are were no common understandings
present at FeMeSA. In other words, that practices within that same company -or at least the
perceptions thereof- were not shared. In addition, the correspondence between this latter
interpretation and the qualitative analysis debilitates the possibility that the questionnaires
were answered at random. The general pattern depicted by the statistical approach is aiso
consistent with the findings ofother scholars (Tesoro, 1996; Silverleaf, 1994).
It is clear that the most striking cultural trait lies in the fragmented and differenuated
perceptions of the respondents about the daily practices. There were, nevertheless, some
common traits. In what follows the quantitative data will be combined with information
obtained through interviews and the analysis of documents, in an attempt to sketch the
culture's main facets.
6.4.1 Apathy
According to Sethia and von Glinow ( 1985), the major underpinnings of an organisation's
culture are provided by its human resource orientation. These authors build a typology based
on the management's level of concem for people and for peoples' performance in the
organisation. These two orientations correspond to the two axes of Blake and Moutons'
Managerial Grid (1964), who also handle them as two independent dimensions.
Concern for people refers to the organisation's interest in the well-being of its members and
their families. One of the few questions from which a clear pattern emerges asks where the
organisation's interest lies. While about two-thirds of the respondents perceive that "the
company is only interested in the job done by the employee", less than 7o~a of the sample
believe that the company takes direct responsibility for the workers and their families'
welfare. The mean of 4,2 unequivocally signals what employees see as lack of interest and
disregard on part of the organisation. Even though it could be argued that this perception has
been generated by the recent string of layoffs and thus only constitutes a circumstantial trait,
there are several characteristics that allow to conclude that the view has deep roots.
As an indicator of the importance attributed to the human resources, it could be mentioned
that there never was a coherent personnel development program, or that out of all Argentinean
SOEs, Ferrocarriles -at least in 1986- had the smallest Human Resources department, with
402 persons handling the affairs of almost 100,000 employees, i.e. a ratio of 1:250
(Ferrocarriles, 1990).
Thus, there are sufficient reasons to conclude that the employee's perception was right and
that the company's orientation could be characterised as one of little concem for their
employees. As a matter of fact, it could be reasonably argued if this was an 'brientation" at
all. Considering the absence of clearly formulated policies, most probably it was not the result
of a purposive laissez-faire policy but the combined byproduct of managerial negligence and
inaptitude.
The second orientation found by Sethia and von Glinow deals with the organisations' concern
about the employees' performance. It refers to the organisation's expectations that its
tos
members will give their best on their jobs and make full use of their individual talents.
According to the survey, people experience a strong pressure to complete their duty (mean -
2,3). This perception contradicts available data and information about Ferrocarriles' reality
(e.g. the high absenteeism and extremely low quantity of actually performed working hours).
The disregard for the employees' productivity is further evidenced by the lack of any tie
between performance and payment (there have been regulations that specifically forbid to
bind productivity to payment, FIEL, 1989) and the lack of a high level policy regarding
further education (when training was provided, it was done ritualistically or -for the
engineers- by the union).
As mentioned before, this apparent contradiction is resolved if the alterations caused by the
collective layoffs, the personnel transfers and continuous reshuffling of groups are taken into
consideration. Hence the perceived job pressure is of circumstantial nature and does not
display its true nature. Consequently, the unit could be characterised, -at least until
deregulation- as having also a low concern for performance. A culture with a low score on
both dimensions is defined by Sethia and von Glinow as "apathetic". Of course, because of
the interdependence between culture and individual involvement, the viability of a unit with
such a culture is difficult. When the contract between an organisation and its members takes
place on an extremely low level, the resulting practices are the often mentioned lackadaisical
approaches to the job or aloof attitudes regarding the customers.
The secondary data obtained strongly suggest that Ferrocarriles scores low on both
orientations and that these scores were by no means circumstantiaL The fact that pernicious
practices have become firmly entrenched and no serious effort was started to remove them.
was only possible because of the protected environment in which this monopoly subsisted.
6.4.2 Detachment
In line with what employees perceive as a lack of concern for people and their welfare on part
of the company, roughly SOo~o of the respondents consider their private lives as their own
business. Only one-tenth feels that the organisation's norms cover their behaviour at home as
well as on the job. The combined analysis of this two questions enhances the aforementioned
conclusions regarding the unit's (low) concern for their members. It reveals a situation of
detachment from the organisation. Not having previous data, the direction of such a trend can
only be guessed. However, taking into account the ongoing process, it seems plausible that
the employees are trying to dissolve any ties with the company they are working for. This trait
has important consequences for the organisational climate. However, in as far as it influences
the perceptions of the organisational practices, it also constitutes a cultural matter.
6.4.3 Feeling like an orphan
To our surprise, in this company and its more than centenarian history, neither a common nor
a local (subcultural) hero was found. One of the main reasons resides in the absence of
leadership continuity, the only exception to this lack being the tenure of J.C. de Marchi. This
former President was recalled by many of our interviewees as a man who moulded the
company in a particular, albeit transitory way. This "particular" way can best be described as
an authoritarian leadership (de Marchi was an army general designated as head in 1967 by the
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de facto government of general J.C. Onganía, who seized power a year before). Interestingly,
though while he was in charge of the company attendance was strictly controlled and
punishments were harsh, his tenure is fondly recalled. Frequently the interviewees
summarised their impression about this particular period declaring that "we're sons of rigour"
(somos hijos del rigor), a saying meaning that they only work well if enough pressure is
exercised from above.
Also conspicuously missing were countercultural heroes. In spite of Ferrocarriles long-
standing history of strong unionism, no union official was mentioned as having an influence
upon the member's behaviour or views. Instead, there were persistent rumours about the co-
optation of the actual leaders by the future owners of the unit. As is often the case in
analogous situations, the union leaders were considered traitors and their purportedly lack of
resistancc ~lefincd as a sell-out.
The ]ack of leaders and rapid succession of short presidencies has been summarised with
particular pointedness by an interviewee, who asserted that "The company had many
husbands, but we're still orphans".
6.5 Unhappy transitions: Ferrocarriles' glory, decay, and agony
Many railway historians (Cuccorese, 1984; Roccatagliata, 1987) and most of our interviewees
coincide in setting the begin of the Argentinean railway system's decay at abottt the time of
nationalisation. In other words, if at all, Ferrocarriles is granted only one day of glory, namely
the day of its creation. Figures and stories abound that underscore the perception that from
then on Ferrocarriles declined. Though some of these have been mentioned in the preceding
chapters, they will be briefly highlighted since the constitute the foundation of often heard
myths about Ferrocarriles decay and agony.
At the beginning of the century the network had a length of approximately 16500 km. By
1948, it grew to some 42500 km. In the five years that followed nationalisation, a mere
l 500 km were added. Since then, the length was reduced; by 1982, 10000 km of track had
been deleted.
In 1948, Ferrocarriles employed some 173000 persons. Ten years later, the company
reached its maximum with nearly a quarter million members. Since then, and almost
without exception, this figure has been reduced; when deregulation began, only 68000
were still working for the whole system.
Around 1940, the railway system hauled 750~0 of all the cargo transported; 50 years later,
its market share fall to less than l00~0 (FIEL, 1989).
The level of subsidy needed to cover the company's deficit increased steadily; during the
last decade, the company was loosing more than 2 million dollars a day.
These figures and other stories permeated all levels of the organisation and induced a
concoction of feelings ranging from despair to outrage in most of the company's agents. They
generated in many individuals a sense of plain impotence.
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6.6 Summary
It is evident that Ferrocarriles' culture was severely debilitated by the time the deregulatory
process began. However, it seems likely that the changes introduced as a consequenee of the
decision to privatise further fragmented the remaining cultural elements, leading to the
absence of common understandings revealed by the quantitative survey. The operated changes
were performed by Ferrocarriles' (and later FeMeSA's) new authorities in order to make the
units into which Ferrocarriles was partitioned attractive to prospective bidders. The main
instrument for that purpose was the dismissal -by a variety of ineans- of large numbers of
employees. Most common was the use of voluntary or early retirement schemes. Under the
latter, all workers 65 years or older were forced into retirement. Agents under that age that
opted for early retirement had to leave the company, but remained on the payroll for
additional 18 months and were given a lump-sum as indemnification. Combined, these two
measures reduced the number of employees by two thirds within the period 1990 - 1994.
These measures had obvious consequences for the organisation in general and the culture in
particular. With regard to the latter, it should be noted that the forced retirement eliminated
overnight years of accumulated experience and much of the company's collective memory.
The success (in tenns of dismissed personnel) of both schemes deeply affected some
particular areas. Highly professional units (as e.g., EDP, electricians or mechanics) that
counted with a strong external market, ended up understaffed. On the other hand, the
voluntary character of the second scheme added a certain degree of impredictability to the
process. As a consequence of both schemes, established groups either disappeared or were
divided into even smaller units. Other groups were divided in order to cover the 2nd. or 3rd.
shift. The general manpower shortage was compounded by its unbalanced allocation, forcing
the continuous reshuffling of groups and intraorganisational transfer of human resources.
As the privatisation process proceeded and some units were handed over to the private sector,
the remaining employees (that is, those below 65 that did not opt for voluntary retirement)
were reallocated in those units still in public hands. Thus for example, sizeable numbers of
employees from the suburban Roca and Sarmiento lines were employed by the unit here under
analysis. Since the Mitre line was the last suburban line to be transferred, it merged within
itself former employees from all of the six lines that composed the network.
According to Schein (1989), group and culture are two sides of the same coin. If groups are
dismembered, reshuffled, or merged with alien elements, and this over a prolonged period of
time, most of the company's common understandings will probably succumb. This even
more, if the inherited culture was infirm and fragmented. Leaving aside the reductions in
personnel suffered before 1989, suffice it to say that by the time deregulation started,
Ferrocarriles had a work force of over 93000. Three years later, it counted 51000. In April
1992, when FeMeSA was created, the Mitre line was 3500 man strong. This reduction was
accomplished by collective layoffs and -to a smaller extent- personell transfers to other public
units (v.g. 1500 agents to the federal IRS). By the time of the survey, the groups or gangs
formed by the 2000 remaining employees more often than not were composed by employees
that hardly knew each other. Amved at this point, it seems rather clear that the reason behind
the disparity in the answers is located in the shake-up caused by the severe rationalisation
attempts.
tos
~ This figures include an estimation of the levels of evasion (free riders) which before the concessions was
between 30 and 60 0~0, depending on the line and time.
'- Based on these facts and in order to prove the apparent lack of relation between the data obtained at FeMeSA
and the dimensions found by Hofstede et al., it was decided to run a reliability analysis. Therefore the mean
value of the more consistent sub-samples (i.e., those aggregated according to the occupation criteria) were
employed. As expected, the calculated ( Cronbach's) Alpha values were low, in two cases even negative, thus
violatinti reliability.
Cronbach's Alpha
factor P1 P2 P3 P4 PS P6
items 3,8,18 2,4,10 5,9,16 6,12,14 7,11,13 1,15,17
alpha 0.1182 -0.7342 0.2717 -0.6012 0.1848 0.0790
The attempt to replicate Hofstede et al. methodology within an organisation is debatable, since the results are
obviously not ecological in the sense that they have been calculated across different units. But neither are the
values here used been calculated across individuals (pancultural level). The values used in this analysis are
means of samples divided according to the "occupation" criteria, thus ensuring that responses stem from people
who actually have a common working experience. Since a) aggregate measures of these samples were employed.
b) small (or no) interaction existed between members of these samples, c) FeMeSA stems from a large
organisation (t100.000), and d) the high levels of heterogeneity detected, it was concluded that these (sub)
samples could be understood as culturally different units and thus enable an analysis at the ecological level.
However, the Alpha scores obtained preclude us from interpreting FeMeSA's cultural reality using Hofstede et
aL (1990) dimensions. Consequently, it was decided not to employ the formulas generated by Hofstede et al. and
obtain FeMeSA's scores for each dimension.
3 In order to be able to perform an analysis of variance it was necessary to proof whether all distributions ~vere
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ó ó 0 ó ó ó ó 0 0 0 0 0- o 0 0 0 0
VAR3 ~~ N~~~~ N O~ N O N O N N O Vl












V~n M ~. J h O~ cG ~O ~ o 09 00 0o h V O O~O~ h 00 O~ O~O ~D 00 ~ e{ O N V'~ v7 N N I~ N
O O Ó Ó O O O O O O~--~ O Ó O O O O O
~O O~ v1 ~D Vl M~O M O O Q~ V N Q~ ~ V1 V1 NV -~n in V O~ - N O~ O 7.- V oo O O O~n
Ó O Ó Ó Ó Ó Ó O O- O Ó O O O O O O
~D [~ O~ M vl h~n O O O~ 00 ~O ~n vi ~O .--. O~M -~O ~D ~O i~ M V O O~ 7 O~O ,ni V M M~.O
O O O O O O O C--~ O O O O O O O O O
~D O M O N O~ 00 O O M 00 N f~ 00 h v'1 O Nr o0 00 0~ .-. M o0 o v, N oo -, h~n ~c ~o rn N
Ó Ó Ó Ó Ó Ó Ó-- o o O ó Ó Ó Ó Ó o Ó
rn N vi h M h o 0o vi .o v~ -- -- N M M h-~.o h v-; oo ~ M o 0o M-~ ~ o, v h h.c ~v
ó d d ó ó ó-- Ó o ó 0 0 0 0 o c o 0
v N M M o0 o h c h M h h N-- h o~ o.h-~n h M o M r, c' c, ~c v ~n o0 0 0 0-
ó ó ó ó ó -- ó ó 0 0 0 0 0 0 ó ó ó ó
~` O~ vl O o0 M N v1 v'1 ~ oG N 7 O~ ir, M~ 7
O M O M O M V-- ~ a O- f~ 7~, v'. O~O
O Ó Ó Ó- O O Ó O O O O O O O O O O
~ R T O vl M I~ O M~D - 00 ~O v1 M O~ ~O 0000 ~o h o M h oo a~a vi c r~ oo h~.-~ v~c o
Ó ó Ó- Ó Ó ó ó ó ó 0 0 ó ó ó 0 ó ó
M O O~ O~ M v1 M O~ ~n M cf O ~1 ~7 00 vl I~~O d; O t~ O in ~1 00 ~O v~ 00 N~D ao v~ ~ oo -
Ó Ó- O O O O O O O O O O Ó Ó O O Ó
v1 O M ~f -~ N N O h Q. v1 O~ G~ ~:J v.7 Q~ ~D Vr
h O~ ~O M- h o0 r.-~ f~ M: r. O N N K'i I~
O - O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O
O~n .-.. oo - V O~ ~O ~D o0 V O~ ~1 v1 O oo ~O M~
O 1~ ~D oo O t~ ~O 1~ M 7 O~ vi ~n vi -. O V~
~-- O O Ó Ó O O O O Ó O O O O O O O O
O-- N M, Cj V~ ~ h 00
N M V Vl ~:J h OC O~
















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































7. Trenes de Buenos Aires
7.1 Introduction:
a frequently postponed start
Following the structure of the previous chapter, an outline of Trenes de Buenos Aires'
organisational development will be presented first. Attention will be focused on those facts
and figures essential for the understanding of the cultural reorientation.
As mentioned in chapter 2, the metropolitan railway system was divided into seven different
lines. On December 23, 1992, the winner of the bidding contest for each of the lines was
announced and operations supposed to start in August 1993. On the ls` of January ]994
Metrovías started to operate the first line (plus the subway). After five additional months, the
exploitation of four other lines were given over to private companies. The remaining two lines
(Mitre and Sarmiento), had in principle been pre-adjudicated to the Metrovías consortium.
However, legal struggles between Metrovías, FeMeSA and the Railway Restructuring Unit,
and among the shareholders of the consortium themselves, forced the transfer's postponement
on four different occasions. Repeatedly during 1994, the parties involved exchanged mutual
accusations: the government cited discrepancies among Metrovías' shareholders as the main
cause for the delay. Metrovías countered asking for further details on some modifications the
govemment wanted to introduce to the original business proposal (a rescheduling of the
investment program). In return, Metrovías asked for a less strict application of penalties (at
that time Metrovías was charged ~0.5 m. for deficiencies in the delivery of its subway
services) and the re-valuation of cars and locs which, after two additional years under public
exploitation, had depreciated. In the beginning of 1995 the Transport Secretary and the
Railway Restructuring Unit stated a clear menace and threatened to start a new bidding
process. After some weeks elapsed and new shareholders entered Metrovías, the company was
renamed and Trenes de Buenos Aires (TBA) founded. On May 27, 1995 TBA started
operating the two remaining suburban lines. In the end, only by July 1995 (almost two years
after the cargo lines) the metropolitan railway system was completely transferred to private
management.
7.2 Trenes de Buenos Aires
TBA's shareholders are Cometrans (an group of well-known, private bus companies from
Buenos Aires), Morrison Knudsen (rolling material constructor and refurbisher), both holding
42 0~0 of the shares. Burlington Northern, an American railway operator that is responsible for
the technical operation, owns the remaining 16 0~0 (McCaffrey, 1994). Under the (revised)
terms of concession, TBA wil] operate 188 suburban kilometres of the Mitre line and 175
suburban kilometres from the Sarmiento line, both for a period of 20 years (instead of the
originally intended 10), renewable in perpetuity for additional 10 year periods. TBA's Mitre
tracks run from downtown Buenos Aires to the north, parallel to the de la Plata river. It covers
a densely populated area that comprises those suburbs with the highest income level. While
the population of the Buenos Aires Federal District (Capital Federal) remained stable for the
last 40 years at 3 million inhabitants, Great Buenos Aires, counting some 8 m. inhabitants, is
growing at a yearly rate of 100.000 persons (INDEC, 1991). In partícular, the northern part of
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Buenos Aires is expanding rapidly: new industries and factories are being located there, which
in turn attract people to settle in the area.
7.3 Transferred resources
Ferrocarriles handed over to TBA for exploitation 363 kms [188 kms belonging to the Mitre
line] of tracks, the buildings and infrastructure belonging to around 97 [57] stations, 470 [227]
electrical cars and nearly 50 [22] locs (CNRT, 1997). On the other hand, TBA promised to
invest, during the first 15 years of its concession, 5450 m.
Unlike the situation of the cargo lines, the tracks received by TBA from FEMESA were in
acceptable condition. Though track maintenance had also been deferred, no substantial efforts
had to be made to upgrade them. On the contrary, rolling material was in extremely poor
condition due to the complete lack of investment in rehabilitation and periodical overhauls.
TBA received from FeMeSA "old Toshiba emus built in 1962 [that are] very far from being in
good shape,... they share the same tracks with British emus built in 1930. The non-powered
passenger coaches date from the 60s and 70s. They were rebuilt in the 1980s, but they have
been allowed to deteriorate so that many now have to be rebuilt for a second time, while the
worst will have to be scrapped" (Pipan, 1994).
Signalling also had to be modernised. At both the Sarmiento and Mitre lines mechanical
signalling were still in use. TBA planned to re-signal these lines in order to increase the
number of trains per hour. With regard to the communication systems, TBA installed track-to-
train radios on all its units. At the outset, and until the system was installed, it provided a
mobile phone to each conductor.
7.4 Human resources
Shortly before the time of the transfer, FeMeSA counted some 4000 agents. Contrary to the
conditions set up for the cargo lines, passenger camers had no obligation to take on staff from
the ranks of FeMeSA or FA. However, since it would not have been possible to make the
railway work without some skilled and experienced employees (such as, e.g., train crew or
switch operators), TBA took over some 850 former FeMeSA agents. As indicated in Table 7-
1, TBA started operations with roughly 3100 employees, thus only 27 0~o were former public
agents. Here again, there was a sharp contrast when compared to the ex-ante situation: taking
the Mitre and Sarmiento lines together, in 1988 they employed some 9500 agents - more than
three times the current figure. TBA committed considerable efforts in the selection
procedures. They started by asking FeMeSA's personnel department for a list of potential
candidates that met specific conditions. These requirements varied according to the position,
but in general aimed at screening out all employees with records of strong unionism, high
absenteeism, health problems, advanced age, and a general "negative" attitude towards thejob
and company. Out came a list of nearly 2000 candidates which have been interviewed at





1993 1994 1995 1996
Suburban system Public (FeMeSA) 7200 5600 4500 -
Private lines 4400 5300 5800 9695
Mitre line Public 3500 2020 1990 -
Private (TBA) - - 3100 2900
' Suburban passenger lines (CNRT, 1995, 1996; 1997)
' Data for Suburban system "93, '94 and ' 95 are approximations
As a consequence of TBA's policy to mainly recruit what they considered to be
"uncontaminated" employees from both FEMESA and outside, the demographics of the
company's population changed radically. At the time of the survey, TBA's population was on
average 34 years old, a reduction of almost ten years when compared to this same figure at
FA. The educational level has also been increased as a consequence ofTBA's decision only to
hire individuals that had finished secondary school.
7.4.1 Further education and development
In accordance with TBA's attitude towards its employees, the HR department invested
considerable means and efforts to enhance the abilities of the company's personnel. These
efforts started even before operations began: over 700 future employees were given a 4 hour
introductory course. Between March and December 1995 over 5500 employees finished one
(or more) of the thirteen courses offered, totalling more than 100.000 man-hours. Main targets
of the educational effort have been to ensure the safety of operations and to induce a customer
orientation (to the Traffic and Marketing Departments went 45 resp. 20 o~o of the man-hours).
In addition, for all those employees affected by the introduction of technologies that required
additional skills (e.g., signalling equipment, radio operation, etc.), specific courses were
given.
7.4.2 Unionism and Labour agreements
TBA decided to recognise all unions. Besides the workers associations inherited from
FeMeSA ( Unión Ferroviaria l UF, La Fraternindad ~ LF, and Asociación Senaleros de FA I
ASFA), the company now deals with two new ones, mainly formed by employees directly
affected to diverse service activities: Unión de Personal de Servicios (UPS) and Personal de
Maestranza (PdeM). With each of these unions the company negotiated a separate labour
agreement. Out of such agreements remain some 450 employees, most of them belonging to
the organisation's upper echelons. As in most former SOEs, union membership strongly
decreased.
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The labour agreements closed by TBA (as in all other transferred railway lines), were
significantly more flexible and easier to apply. The agreements of LF and ASFA have three
resp. four categories, each comprising a single position. The Convención Colectiva de Trabajo
(CCT) worked out with the UF has seven categories, each comprising on average 9 positions.
Although more specific than other UF agreements, it falls far from the almost 500 positions
listed while the Mitre line was a public enterprise. TBA also introduced in all the agreements
signed the so-called principles of functional flexibility and polivalence (Principio de
polivalencia y flexibilidad funcional). These principles imply the possibility to assign
employees -whenever necessary- tasks which are not his or her own (Walter, 1994). The
principles of functional flexibility and polivalence, a common practice in the private sector,
were expressly forbidden at Ferrocarriles as well as most other SOEs. However, this policy
deleted almost all of the prerogatives stemming from their condition as public agents, the
result of many years of unstable top management and strong unions.
The introduction of the principles of functiona] flexibility and polivalence implies more than
just more freedom for management to deploy employees. It constitutes a radical departure
from the production concept that prevailed at Ferrocarriles Argentinos (and all other public
enterprises), where work organisation strongly resembled the Taylorist production concept
(tpc). Its inherent rigidities' were compounded by FA's unions dogmatic attitude towards job
classification. Fruytier (1994: 20) defined an analytical opposite to the tpc, labelled "new
production concept" (npc). In broad tenns, while the tpc tends to divide tasks, the npc only
divides labour as far as minimally required. The npc confronts changing requirements by
increasing the horizontal and vertical integration of tasks and jobs. On a workplace leve] this
implies horizontal and vertical job enlargement. Horizontal job enlargement means that more
tasks (including maintenance and quality control) are incorporated into the same position.
Vertical integration on the other hand implies that tasks formerly performed by a higher level
are now being done by some lower level position, thus granting more degrees of autonomy
and control. In short, with its emphasis on integrating instead of dividing tasks and jobs, the
npc brings functional flexibility to the workplace, allowing to better adjust to shifting
production requirements.
7.4.3 Remuneration
The changes implemented in the job categories and the introduction of the flexibility principle
makes any comparison with the previous situation difficult. Furthermore, at FA there was a
wide gap between registered and actually performed working hours. Thus, any comparison
would leave out of consideration the concealed fact that whereas FA's agents generally
worked less than the stipulated amount of time, compliance is strictly controlled at TBA.
The structure of salaries and wages has been extremely simplified at TBA. For those working
under a labour agreement, remuneration is composed of a basic salary and a supplement (vale
alimentario) worth 20 0~0 of the basic salary. In addition, the CCT stipulates a bonus for
seniority, lunch money and a reduced number of particular items for a few specific positions
(as, e.g., cashiers and linesmen). When compared with market income levels, TBA's wages
and salaries in general are slightly above average. This is a consequence of the HR
Department's policy to attract (and retain) qualified agents.
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Another interesting and distinctive trait of the remuneration scales TBA worked out with the
respective unions, concerns salary amplitude and differentials. In general terms, as shown tn
Table 7-2, the TBA salary scale shows "increasing increases", that is, relative larger increases




Position' basic salary increase (o~o)
Peon Taller 458 -
Ayudante ~ auxiliar 488 6
Medio oficial 540 11
Oficial C ~ calificado 608 13
Oficial B I especializado 694 14
Oficial multiple 808 14
Oficial A ~ principal 923 14
' Based on UF CCTs; positions show a complete career within the mechanical areas. (CCT UF, 199~: TBA
1995)
Especial attention has been given by TBA to build a consistent career ladder, which could be
used for the entire time of the concession, without the need to "stretch" it. The passenger
carrier has also placed importance to the absolute remuneration in order to avoid agents
eschewing higher positions. Surprisingly, they were no items linking salary to gains in
productivity or a concept binding overall worker performance with increases in remuneration.
Nevertheless, at the time of our survey TBA was starting to design an employee performance
appraisal system.
7.5 Business reorientation: customer service
One of he first accomplishments of TBA's management was to substitute the until then
prevalent term "users" (usuarios) by the word "customer" (cliente). But it went much further,
underpinning this semantic change with concrete measures and evidence.
Immediately after the transfer an extensive refurbishing program started. After its first year of
operations, over 90 trains were rebuilt, incorporating new seats, illumination systems, and
skid-proof floors. Less visible for passengers were the upgrading of engines and brake
systems. Simultaneously, the conditions of track and signalling were ímproved. As
demonstrated in Table 7-3, the combined effort resulted in a significant decrease in the
number of deleted and cancelled trains.
Similar advances have been reached regarding the number of cancelled trains: after reaching
the two digits level during FeMeSA's operation (Galeazzi, 1996), it dropped under TBA to






1993 1994 1995 1996
Suburban system Public (FeMeSA) 23 23 28
Private lines - 9 6




' Late trains (~5') I programmed trains (FeMeSA; CNRT, 1997b)
6
4
The Commercial Department reports directly to the company's CEO and, with some 500
employees (22 "~o of TBA's workforce), it is the second largest unit. Also depending from this
Department are two Customer Assistance Centres (CAP) located strategically at the lines'
termini. Furthermore, as mentioned above, TBA has invested considerable educational efforts
in stressing the importance of the customer and the service provided. Courses dealing about
these topics amounted to more than 20.000 man-hours during TBA's first six months of
operations.
Operative indicators
TBA's operational efforts lead to positive results imtnediately. The following Tables
summarise the most important figures in this respect.
Table 7-4
Total transported passengers TBA
Transported passengers (Pass. 106)
1993 1994 1995 1996
Suburban system Public (FeMeSA) 212 183 44 -
Private lines - 62 302 413
Total 212 245 346 413
Mitre line Public 34 38 17 -
Private (TBA) - 36 70




Transported Passengers - Kilometres
Transported passenger kilometres (Pass.-Kms ]0")
1993 1994 1995 1996
Suburban system Public (FeMeSA) 4.2 3.5 0.9 -
Private lines - 1.4 6.1 9.2
Total 4.2 4.9 7.0 9.2









As can be recognised from the preceding tables, overall productivity swiftly increased, on
average by a factor of 2. According to some internal sources and outside observers (CNR"I',
1997b) per-agent productivity grew even stronger and at a more rapid pace.' However, the
lack of reliable information concerning the number of employees belonging to the different
railway operators that conformed the metropolitan system makes any agent prodttctivity
calculations useless. This notwithstanding, the tumaround that followed the transfer in Jtme
1995 is clearly visible, as well as the emergence of higher levels of efficiency.
7.6 A cultural diagnosis
In April 1996, ten months after the transfer to the private sector, Hofstede's OCM was
administered at TBA. Out of a total population of 2900 employees, 235 participated in the
written survey and delivered useful questionnaires. Roughly a third of the respondents (98
questionnaires) belonged to the 850 former FeMeSA agents that had been hired by the private
operators.
Following the analytical steps performed in the ex-ante study, TBA's data will first be
explored by means of a boxplot.' Readily observable in Table 7- 6 are -when compared with
FeMeSA- the lower levels of dispersion: the interquartile range of fourteen (out of ]8)
questions were substantially smaller. This trend is corroborated by the actual figures: as can
be observed in the Addendum at the end of this chapter, the overall dispersion was
significantly reduced, from 6- 1.4 for the ex-ante measurement to 6- 1.14 at TBA.
Noteworthy too, the boxes did not simply shrink: with only one exception (Q11) the graph
shows -often substantial- shifts in the mean value of each question.
With regard to the dispersion of the individual answers, here too this measure will be used as
a mean to discover subcultural units. The need to look for specific subuníts is foremost
derived from the fact that roughly a fourth of TBA's staff had previously been working at the
SOE. Thus, to trace shifts in the perceptions of the former public agents, corresponding
subsamples have to be analysed separately (e.g., engineers, switch operators).
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Table 7-6
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However, other groups also had a previously gained common working experience, either at
diverse other private companies or as part of a task-force constituted ad-hoc for the bidding
process. (e.g., parts of management).
In principle the sample was divided according to the same criteria used for FeMeSA. The
different subsamples nevertheless were adapted to the new environment. The critería
employed and the resulting subsamples are listed in Table 7-7. At TBA it was possible to
divide the sample according to hierarchy; thus the criterion Echelons" was added. High



















Former public Former public agents
All other TBA employees
Former FeMeSA Former FeMe5A agents
All other TBA employees
Union membership La Fraternidad

























13 1 nivel 2- 5
29 2 nivel 9- 12
19 3 nivel 15 - 18
174 4 (categorías)
76 2 (6 first-job employees
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32 1 7 years or less
138 2 8 to 12 years or less







31 4 Integral Clean
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tiers 9 to 12. Lower managers stands for members of tiers 15 - 18, thus including (non-
salaried) higher level supervisors. Concerning union membership, subsamples were only built
for those unions that existed at FeMeSA; the fourth category includes all fortner FeMeSA
employees that explicitly left their respective union. For obvious reasons the seniority
criterion has been left out ofanalysis. Given our particular interest in the cultural development
of the former FeMeSA agents, diverse subsamples were built according to the organisation
where TBA's employees had worked before being hired. The criterion "public agents"
comprises two groups, one including all TBA employees with a public sector backgrottnd
(Mitre line, Sanniento line, and other public units), the other group consisting of individuals
that had previously worked in a private company or were independent (mostly running their
own business). The criterion "former FeMeSA" contrasts those employees admitted from the
two former suburban lines (taken together) with all other TBA agents, making no distinction
of their previous working experience.
7.6.1 Comparing samples
In this case too, the Levene test was employed to detect whether significant differences among
samples do exist. The results show (see Table7-8) that the dispersion of no subsample differs
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' an asterisk means that the dispersion of two groups are significandy differeni ai the p 5 O.OSlevel.
Though, as mentioned above, the dispersion of no subsample differs significantly on all
items, some pattems emerge when looking at the actual scores. These patterns will be
analysed in detail in Table 7-9, that shows the dispersion and variance over all 18 items for
each of the subsamples generated by a specific criterion (columns m6 and m(s)'). Starting
from the premise that a strong culture is a homogeneous one (Hofstede, 1990: 302), that is, a
culture with low degrees of dispersion, we compared the average dispersion obtained by each
subsample. Strong cohesion is found for examp(e within the top echelon (higher management
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- 0.92), and members of the two profession - specific unions (both La Fraternidad, for the
engineers, and Asociación de Senaleros (ASFA), for the switch operators, score 0.95).
Cultural cohesion is strongest among members of the Legal and the Government relations
departments (m6 - 0.77 resp. 0.84). The explanation for such unusually low scores is easy to
find: both departments are rather small, most members of both units have been working
together even before the company started its operations, and, finally, almost without exception
the departments' employees are lawyers, thus also sharing a common professional outlook.
The opposite situation is best exemplified by the subsample "Cleansing personnel", scoring
m6 - 1.26. Respondents of this group belong to "Integral Clean", a semi-extemal workforce
hired exclusively for cleansing duties.
In addition, this kind of analysis allows to estimate if a specific group has retained (when
compared to some previous situation) a high degree of cohesion, or lost its common views.
Results from the "previous employer" criterion show for example that the former FeMeSA
agents retained some cultural elements (m6 - 1.05), but that a common previous working
experience in either the public or private sector does not seem to influence the current
collective outlook (m6 - 1.16 resp. 1.14).
As mentioned before, the sample was divided following diverse criteria in order to detect
subcultural units. The resulting subsamples show disparate dispersion levels over the 18
items. The question then is, which criteria to select in order to make reasonable judgements
about the true nature of the organisational culture.
Some criteria are more useful than other, and we assume that the criterion that minimises
overall dispersion is the most suitable to explain the cultural reality of any organisation. [t
would be erroneous to draw conclusions about the culture of an organisation on the basis of an
unsuitable aggregation criterion. An unsuitable aggregation criterion will generate culturally
heterogeneous subsamples showing high levels of dispersion. A useful criterion on the
contrary, will build culturally homogenous subsamples. This difference is clearly observable
if for example the criteria "age" and "occupation" are compared. Though in principle "age"
could divide the sample into homogeneous groups (think ofa school), it is highly unlikely that
this will take place in a company. Similarly, "gender" does not seem to be a promising
criterion in this respect.
On the other hand, criteria such as e.g., "occupation" or "union membership", since dividing
the sample following potential lines of personal interactions, could therefore yield more
homogeneous subsamples. TBA's data forward some evidence to these assertions. From Table
7-8 can be inferred that "occupation", a criterion dividing the sample into groups according to
the respondent's concrete task, shows far more significantly different subsamples than "age"
or "gender".
On the last column of Table 7-9, the averages of all the subsamples formed by a single
criterion are again averaged (column S,'). This latter value can be considered as a(somewhat)














Subsamples n m6 m(s') S,'
total sample 235 1.14
high management 13 0.92 0.98
middle mgmt. 29 1.08 1.22
lower management 19 1.08 1.20
salaried 174 1.10 1.37 I.32
Mitre line 76 1.06
Sarmiento line 22 1.05 1.17
Public sector 53 1.16 ].36
Private sector 64 1.14 1.33
Independent 12 1.14 1.35 1.26
La Fratemidad 23 0.95 0.93
Asoc. Senaleros 17 0.95 I.O1
Union Ferroviaria 19 1.15 1.40
disaffiliated 39 1.08 1.20
others 139 1.15 1.34 1.24
Primary school 32 1.19 1.45
Secondary school 138 1.13 1.32
Tertiary education 63 1.09 1.23 1.31
39 or less 79 l.l l 1.25
40 - 49 97 1.13 1.31
50 or more 57 1.13 1.33 1.28
Engineers 25 0.96 0.95
Switch operators 25 1.02 1.09
Electricians 20 1.12 1.33
Cleansing personnel 31 1.26 1.62
Guards 24 1. I 1 1.30
Security 29 1.14 1.34
Administrative 18 1.04 1.11
High management 13 0.92 0.98
Middle mgmt. 29 1.08 1.22
Lower management 19 1.OS 1.20 I.25
male 218 1.13 1.32
female 14 1.08 1.23 1.30
(1) S,' is an index of the average variance for unequally large groups, where S,''-(1IN-J)'[S,' (n,-1) t S,' (n,-
1) }...f S~'' (n~-1)]. (Diehl and Kohr, 1993~107).
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reveals some tendencies. In general, lower scores correspond to criteria that "make sense"
from a from a cultural perspective, i.e., those classifications that reflect the possibility of past
or present interactions and hence of a common working socialisation. Thus for example, the
criterion "occupation" shows a S,' - 1.045. Education or gender, on the contrary, present s,'
values above 1.30 and thus low cohesion. This is not running against expectations, since the
"common programming" that takes place in the group within the organisation is basically
unrelated to each agent's age or basic education.
In summary: low S,' scores seem to be the consequence of a common working socialisation,
give an idea of the criterion's intemal logic, and finally allow to reject the less useful criteria.
Based on these elements we conclude that for an organisational setting characterised by high
levels of heterogeneity, this procedure is a valid mean to approach an organisation's culture.
7.6.2 Comparing samples:
a new try
Turning back to our main research questions, the mean value scored by the different groups
will now be analysed. Given the presence of skewed responses and the violated homogeneity
of variance assumption here too the Kruskal-Wallis (resp. the Mann-Whitney) test was
employed as non-parametric altemative to the one-way Anova. The results obtained (using
similar categories as above) are shown in the following table.
Table 7-10
Comparison of ineans TBA
Comparison of ineans'











. . . . . . .
t M ~ w ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~
' An asterisk meaning that two or more groups are significantly different at the p 5 O.OSlevel.
A comparison with FeMeSA shows that also at TBA, no subsample differs significantly on all
18 items from another subsample. Contrary to the ex-ante situation, there are far more groups
showing significantly different means. Noteworthy is that these groups are unevenly
distributed among the diverse criteria and questions. In principle, significant differences
appear between the groups formed by those criteria that had a low S,'-. To determine the
specific groups and eventually find a reason for these differences the Scheffé test was




Comparison of ineans'- (Significant pairs)
criterion question (specific subsamples)
echelons 3 (4~1); 11 (3x4).
previous work 4 (4s2,3) (Sx3); 6 (Sx3); ]0 (3x4,5) (2~4); 11 (Ss2); 13 (3s4,5) 15 (3~4,5,6) (2x4,5); 16
experience (3x5) (2s5); 17 (3x4).
union 5 (3~1); 12 (2x3,5); 13 (lx2).
occupation 2(ls3) (3m5); 4(1~7) (3~4,5,6,7); 5(1sA,5,6); 6(1~6); 13 (lx2); 15 (7x1,5); 18 (2s8).
education 7 (1 s2); 1 I(1 x2,3 ).
age 4 (1~3); 10 (lx3); 11 (1x2,3); 13 (lx3); IS (1~2).
gender
' Scheffe test: listed between brackets are the subsamples significantly different at the p 5 0.05 level.
Leaving aside those criteria where similar means appear to prevail, a closer look will be
thrown upon the groups built based on the previous working experience and the current
occupation. Conceming the ]atter it is interesting to note that in six questions the engineers
scored significantly different means when compared to one or more of the other occupations.
Though here too, the similarities by far outweigh the differences, it could indicate that as a
group, the engineers retained some of their alleged peculiarities. Far stronger is the evidence
indicating the existence of significant differences among those stemming from the Satmiento
line and those who prior to join TBA had worked in private enterprises. Both subsamples
differ in many items from the other groups and among themselves in questions 4, 6, 10, 13, 15
and 16.
That previously private employees have significantly different views from their colleagues
with a background within the public sector is particularly interesting. The issue could reflect
the disparity of views fostered as a consequence of having gained previous working
experience in a private resp. bureaucratic environment. The issue might seem worth deeper
analysis, but it should be noted that if such differences between public and private
environments exist, they also had to appear between those stemming from the private sector
and those others that worked at the Mitre line or within other units of the public sector. By the
same token, significant differences should appear when comparing former public agents with
their colleagues stemming from private organisations: they do so, but only in a limited
manner.
Interestingly, the contrast between former FeMeSA agents and their colleagues reveals
significant differences on 12 questions. This indicates that those TBA employees that were
"inherited" by TBA can to a large extent still be differentiated from the rest. On the other
hand, the preceding elaboration points out that these differences are not rooted in their
common experience as public agents but within the cultural specificity of the suburban
passenger lines. In other words, their distinctiveness has less to do with their previous
experience within a state-owned-enterprise but is, a-priori, more related to unique cultural
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traits fostered by the two metropolitan railway lines. The observed differences could imply
that specific cultural traits of FeMeSA regained consistency, at least to the extent required to
be differentiable from the rest on particular issues.
7.6.3 Shifts in organisational practices
After having analysed TBA's culture at both the organisational level and several subsections,
the remaining part of the chapter will trace shifts in the organisational practices between
FeMeSA and TBA. Therefore comparisons will be drawn at different aggregation levels
between both companies.
In a first step, the overall culture of both companies is contrasted through a comparison of the
respective samples. Since roughly a third of TBA's employees previously worked for
FeMeSA, a separate analysis of former FeMeSA agents is conducted in a second step. As
noted previously, this subsample was the one that showed statistically significant differences
on the largest number of questions. This analysis will contrast former FeMeSA employees
with their colleagues at TBA and the total FeMeSA sample.
Finally, two sets of specific matched subsamples will be compared. The first set includes
groups of TBA employees mostly or exclusively composed by former public agents: this is
the case for the engineers, switch operators and electricians. These samples will be contrasted
against the analogous groups of the former SOE. Samples of administrative personnel and of
managers constitute the second set. For this latter set, samples of TBA and FeMeSA are
functionally equivalent but completely unrelated, i.e., none of the TBA respondents belonged
to FeMeSA.
As revealed by Table 7-12, significant differences in the mean score of most questions appear
when former FeMeSA agents are contrasted against their colleagues at TBA. This section will
analyse the situation of all former FeMeSA agents in comparison with TBA and their prior
enterprise. This analysis will be conducted at the level of the complete sample. Only then, in
the following section, the development of specific subsamples of former FeMeSA agents
within TBA will be studied.
Readily observable from the first column of Table 7-12 is the shift in the consistency in the
responses: two thirds of the questions show highly significant differences in their dispersion.
Turning to the actual scores found in the Addendum, it is possible to recognise that the level
of dispersion has diminished on all questions. Interestingly, the shift towards higher response
homogeneity was even stronger among the fonner FeMeSA agents (column 3 of Table 7-12).
This finding allows to conclude that after less than a year time, the company succeeded in
reducing the state of cultural anomia in which the former public agents were left by their
previous employer.
The reduction in variability was not even along all questions. The three largest differences in
dispersion correspond to questions 7(from 1.3 to 0.7), 16 (from 1.5 to 0.9), and 15 (from 1.5
to 1.0). Noteworthy, these items asked for the employees' perception about cost- and time-
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' Dispersion: Levene test (k - p 5 0.05 level, kk - p S 0.01 level)
' Mean: Mann-Whimey U test (k - p S 0.05 level, kk - p ~ 0.01 level)
The previous comments induces to analyse in detail the mean score obtained for the different
questions. As evidenced by the results from the Mann-Whitney test in column 2 of Table 7-
12, there is a considerable degree of cultural disparity between both companies' samples.
However, the changes are mainly rooted in the incorporation of new personnel: there only
have been significant changes in the perceptions of former FeMeSA agents in seven questions
(see column 4). The contrast between the former public agents and their colleagues at TBA
(last two columns of Table 7-12) reveal that there is little difference in the degree of
consistency, but considerable disparity in the perceptions as such.
At a company level, highly significant changes (that is, at the p ~ 0.01 level) in the mean
scores can be detected in an interesting subset of items. Following their numerical ordering,
the mean ofquestion 1 shifted by more than one point towards the left pole (see Questionnaire
in the Appendix). In other words, the employees perceive that more pressure is now exerted to
comply with the customers' wishes (and hence less to follow procedures). The cost- and time-
consciousness (question 7) also increased by more than one point, reaching an extremely high
score of 1.7. The mean values of questions 9 and 10 are difficult to interpret, since their score
shifted towards the centre (2.9 resp. 3.0). In addition, both questions reveal the largest degrees
of dispersion. Regarding punctuality, far more employees now perceive that meetings start on
time (from 3.7 to 2.6), a fact in line with question 7 and the impression we gained during our
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stay at the company. A further significant shift has been detected at item 16; people at TBA
perceive that the company is more inclined to use universalistic instead of particularistic
criteria in the hiring process. Finally, there is a stronger believe at TBA that each day brings
something new and is different from the preceding ones.
Leaving aside the items that shifted towards the central value, the interpretation of those
questions that show highly significant changes is unmistakable: they reflect those practices
that shifted dramatically and were often underlined by management as those issues where a
radical departure from Ferrocarriles' practices were taking place. The first such issue relates to
the importance of the customer vis-à-vis the relevance of procedures. The message that
customers deserve the highest priority has constantly been repeated and included in the
briefing each prospective employee had to go through in order to enter the selection
procedure. The same message was also inculcated through the forced use of the term "cliente"
(customer) as a substitute for "usuarios" (users), the concept until then prevalent. Much of the
rhetoric employed by management was based on the common prejudices about the public
sector in general, in particular concerning its disregard for the customer. Nevertheless, their
messages have been substantiated by concrete and highly visible actions: at both terminals
attractive "customer centres" (CAP) were installed; timeliness was given high priority, as well
as the appearance ofcars, stations and front-line personnel.
Similarly, the issue of cost- and time-consciousness has constantly been raised in both
management's discourse and practice. Of paramount importance in this respect was the fact
that employees were compelled to work the full eight hours (and sometimes, particularly
during the initial phase, even longer). In addition, and contrary to common practice at
Ferrocarriles, there were no idle times, since materials and tools were delivered on time.
Particularly in the productive areas, experienced (middle) managers had a clear vision of what
needed to be done in terms of cost-containment corrections. During both informal meetings as
well as formal collective training continuous attempts were made to raise the employees' level
of understanding of the far reaching purposes and consequences of the cost control efforts.
The aforementioned managers also had the ability to easily translate their visions into
practice, in part -as mentioned in the interviews - because they incubated these thoughts over
many years of public administration. In this respect, the experience at TBA confirms the
assumption formulated by Tumer (1998: 6) that "The leader I manager must convince the
members of the organisation to transcend their self-interests ... by constantly focusing
attention on the importance of cost-control to the overall mission and goals of the institution".
Highly significant shifts have also been detected regarding the employee's perception about
the selection criteria. Here again, management's practice and discourse are very clear and
point in the same direction. As mentioned before, FeMeSA agents had to pass several
examinations in order to be hired by TBA. Moreover, the term "meritocracy" was frequently
employed in the introductory briefings as well as in diverse courses. This obvíously stands in
sharp contrast with the hiring practices at Ferrocarriles, where the prime criterion was the
existence of family links.
Customer orientation, cost- and time-consciousness, and the employment of universalistic
hiring procedures: these issues represent those areas where the existing literature points out
the main differences between a bureaucratic and a market - oriented organisational
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environment (Gordon, 1985). In summary, TBA's practices shifted away from the regulation
mentality and towards a culture imbued by a"competitive frame of mind" (Brooke Tunstall,
1985: 53). Not coincidentally, former FeMeSA employees have significantly shifted their
perceptíons in exactly all those questions that show highly signíficant shifts when contrasting
at the level of the whole sample, i.e., questions 1,7,9,10,13,16, and 18. In other words, the
former public agents have adapted to the new working conditions and circumstances.
Nevertheless, as stated before, they can still be differentiated from the rest of TBA's
population. This fact induces to analyse in further detail what precisely these dissimilarities
are.
7.6.4 Comparing the observed shifts
Remarkably, on most of the previously mentioned ítems (i.e., those questions were TBA
obtained highly significant different means when compared to FeMeSA), the former public
employees scored closer to the "market-oriented" pole. The question about time- and cost-
consciousness (item 7) is illustrative in this respect. This perception shifted from 2.6 (at
FeMeSA) to 1.7 at TBA. But while the former agents scored 1.5, their colleagues averaged
2.0 on the same question. Analogous, the mean score for question 10 shifted from 4.2
(company only interested in employee's task) to 3.0 (company interested in employee's
welfare) at TBA: in this case, former FeMeSA employees altered their perception by almost 2
points, averaging 2.5; the mean value for the other employees was roughly 3.3. Similar
patterns can be detected in all the above-mentioned 7 questions. In other words, on these
specific items the former FeMeSA agents "outstrip" their colleagues with other professional
backgrounds. The roots of these -in most cases significant- dissimilarities can be traced back
to the employee's previous working experiences and are linked to the disparate perceptions
raised in different individuals by one and the same fact. For those agents that experienced the
bureaucratic nightmare at Ferrocarriles, even small improvements suffice to change their
perception. In other words, after years of scarcity, the "marginal" appreciation of specific
practices seems to be relatively higher.
In short, former FeMeSA agents perceive their working environment as being customer-
oriented, strongly time- and cost-conscious, and rather punctual. They further perceive that the
company takes responsibility for their welfare and strongly adhere to the belief that
competence is the only criterion in hiring.
Next to the aforementioned, there are other perceived practices in which significant
differences can be detected among the fotmer FeMeSA agents and their colleagues at TBA.
As revealed by the last column of Table 7-12, statistically significant differences are present
in two-thirds of the questions. Thus for example, they have a stronger believe than the rest
that in their working environment people think far ahead, give their utmost for the company
(m - 4.4), and that they talk seriously about the organisation and their duties. At the same
time, these employees are somewhat more inclined to endorse that procedures are more
important than results.
In summary: the transfer to private hands has generated significant changes in the
organisational practíces and views of the company's members. Worth noting are a) the
sensible increase in the homogeneity of the responses; b) the (often highly significant) shift of
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the mean scores towards values that could be considered to be in line with the competitive
market the company is now embedded in; c) for most items -and in particular for a set of
critical questions- fornier FeMeSA agents perceive these shifts with stronger intensity than
their colleagues with other professional backgrounds.
7.6.5 Specific subsamples of former FeMeSA agents
As mentioned above, this section will analyse specific subsets of fornier FeMeSA agents. In a
first step those groups will be contrasted that have been assumed by the private
concessionaires because of their specific knowledge. This is the case for the engineers, switch
operators and electricians.
Table 7-13
Former FeMeSA employees at TBA
Former FeMeSA employees
occupations sample total former former former former
Mitre Sarmiento FeMeSA FeMeSA o~o
conductors 25 20 5 25 ]00
switch operators 25 19 2 21 84
electricians 20 8 7 I S 75
inspectors 24 19 2 21 87
managers 61 10 5 15 25
cleansing personnel 31 - 1 1 3
other 49 - -
total 235 76 22 98 41
After that, functionally equivalent subsamples of administrative staff and managers will be
contrasted. Atrived at this point it is important to specify where the former FeMeSA agents
are now working at TBA. In some occupations they make out the complete or a substantial
part of the subsample. According to our informant in the HR department, the percentages
shown in Table 7-13 roughly correspond to the proportions in the actual population.
As done before, the cultural transformation will mainly be performed by tracing the shifts in
the degrees of dispersion and by observing for which specific questions significant changes in
the mean score take place. It goes without saying that, given the large degrees of variance
present in the FeMeSA sample, the contrasting of ineans bears only limited significance.
Thus, longitudinal comparisons of inean scores will be used in a restrictive manner. Table 7-
14 lists the significant shifts in both dispersion and means for the subsamples mentioned
above; the actual scores can be found in the Addendum.
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Table 7-14
Contrasting forrner public employees at TBA
Contrasting means and dispersion' z
FeMeSA rl TBA
Engineers Switch operators Electricians Administrative Managers'
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' Levene test: '- p 5 0.05 level, "- p 5 0.01 level
' Mann-Whitney U tesC ~` - p S 0.05 level, "- p 5 0.01 level
3 Managers that previously worked for FeMeSA have been left out of analysis
In general terms, Table 7-14 supports the findings of the previous comparison: the responses
of three subsamples saw their dispersion significantly reduced in half the questions. However,
in two subsamples (switch operators and electricians) only a handful of questions changed
significantly their variance. In other words, the trend towards more response homogeneity is
less marked at the level of each professional subgroup than at the level of the whole sample.
In any case, though the dynamics of the different subsamples do vary, here too some specific
questions show significant reductions in variance in all subsamples. To some extent, they
overlap with the questions revealed as "critical" by the comparison done at the company level.
Regarding the shifts in the mean scores, the subsamples show greater disparity: while some
groups significantly altered their views on a large number of issues (e.g., engineers,
electricians), the perceptions of other subsamples remained fairly stable. In only four
questions significant shifts have been detected in the case of the switch operators. The reasons
for the response stability of this particular group are multiple, but are mainly rooted in their
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lack of interaction with new management and colleagues. This of course is a consequence of
the physical location of their working places and the low number of (new) colleagues with a
different background. TBA's management is aware of this problem and allotted during 1995-
'96 nearly 7500 man-hours of training to members of this profession.
7.7 Summary
In general, 10 months are considered to be a rather short time in ternis of cultural
transformations. And indeed, there are many issues that remained stable. Nevertheless, the
quantitative analysis revealed some cultural transformations, some as mere trends, but others
reaching statistical significance.
At the level of the whole company, it is interesting to note both the criteria that enable and
preclude the differentiation of subsamples. Thus for example, hierarchical level does not seem
to play a relevant role in the formation of the new culture. In contrast, the employee's current
occupation, as well as hislher professional background, seem to play a more relevant role in
the formation ofcommon understandings.
Noteworthy too is the fact that the only group that can be differentiated from the rest on a
large number of questions are the former FeMeSA employees. Considering that roughly a
third of TBA's employees were assumed from FeMeSA, this comes as no surprise. However,
if due attention is given to the state of cultural anomia present during the final stages of the
SOE (and reflected in the large degrees of dispersion), the existing contrast bears additional
meaning. It means, among other things, that as a group it regained some consistency.
Concerning the former agents' specific responses vis-à-vis the ones from their colleagues, it is
interesting to note that in those questions deemed critical they tended to "outstrip" the latter,
scoring nearer to the "market-oriented" pole. As mentioned above, such a behaviour might be
rooted in the former agents' bureaucratic experience and their stronger appreciation of the
changes introduced in the working environment.
Finally, it is necessary to point out that statistically significant changes only took place in a
limited number of items. These questions reflect those issues in which the new management -
based on common knowledge about SOE's- expected the largest deficiencies and thus centred
its efforts. The large shifts detected for these "critical" questions highlight the effectiveness of
the efforts conducted by the new managers in order to revert the previous situation.
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' For a detailed analysis of the rigidities of the tpc see also Sorge and Streeck ( 1987); Kem and Schumann
(1984).
' Employee productivity ratios indicate an increase of over 2.4; their value as indicators is weak since data
conceming the number of employees varies significantly among sources.
' In spite of the results obtained at FeMeSA, we tried to detect whether Hofstede et aL ( 1990) practices
dimensions could be revealed in this sample. Therefore the average score of specific subsamples (in this case
too, using "occupation" as criteria) have been analysed. To start with, the correlation coefficient matrix
substantially differs from the one calculated for FeMeSA. The absolute number of significant and h(ghly
significant correlations increased, a clear indication of the greater links among items. However, the evidence
supporting Hofstede's dimensions is rather weak. Out of the 18 expected correlations, onty nvo (items 10 8c 04
and 1(i anc9 0~) are si~,nifi~,tnth~ eorrel~ted Iat the p~ 0-0~ le~~rll- These t~e~ul(s not~~~itll~tand(n!~. it n~, decidr:l
'~7 b.~[ [I1C IfILIÍ?1~1t~~ iii IPë ~il~. ~ ~
(Cronbach's) Alpha values
factor P1 P2 P3 P4 PS P6
items 3-8-18 2-4-]0 5-9-16 6-12-14 7-11-13 1-1~-]7
Alpha (FeMeSA) 0.1182 -0.7342 0.2717 -1.6012 0.1848 0.0790
Alpha (TBA) 0.5713 -0.4504 -2.0504 -1.5546 -0.3~79 0.2661
The extremely low (in four cases even negative) Alpha scores obtained strongly suggest not to employ
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8. Nuevo Central Argentino
8.1 Introduction
This chapter will draw an outline of NCA's organisational development. The main interest is
to present the data required to grasp both the origin and consequences of the cultural
reorientation. The first part of the chapter deals with the freight carriers in general and with
NCA's relative position when compared to other cargo lines. We will then take a closer look
at NCA's organisationa] and strategic reorientation and present diverse operative and
productivity indicators that evidence these changes. Whenever possible, these figures are
contrasted with the ex-ante situation. The second part of the chapter discusses the shifts of this
line's organisational culture.
As mentioned in chapter 2, FA was first divided into three "businesses". The first calls for
tender -intended at the freight sector- were issued in late 1990. Approximately a year later, in
November 1991, the first private cargo line was awarded to Ferroexpreso Pampeano SA
(FEPSA). By October 1993 five of the six former railway divisions of FA have been
privatised.
Before going on, a word of caution must be expressed: in the following lines, several
comparisons will be made between the ex-ante and the ex-post situations. The corresponding
indices or ratios have, however, only limited value. Though painstaking efforts have been
done to cross-check scores and figures, data -foremost of the FeMeSA period- vary
substantially between sources. These differences can be traced to -at least- three sources: a)
blurred boundaries among FA's six original lines; b) high inflation rates and c) use of
different exchange rates for the conversion of Argentinean Australes into U.S. dollars. As a
consequence of these shortcomings, in general comparisons will be drawn against the
situation before 1989. This allows not only to skip the period where data is more flawed but
has the additional advantage that we are comparing against the period in which the traditional
FA culture has been formed.
8.2 The Nuevo Central Argentino
On December 22, 1992, the second transfer of a public line took place: the major part of the
former Mitre line was granted as a concession for a period of 30 years -with an option for ten
additional years- to a consortium of 5 companies: Aceitera General Deheza (food industry),
Banco Francés del Rio de la Plata (banking), International Finance Corporation (World Bank),
Román S.A.C. (transport) and the Asociación de Cooperativas Argentinas Coop. Ltda.. As
required by the terms of concession, the consortium is backed by a foreign group responsible
for the technical operation. All the group's foreign members are American companies
specialised in the development and operation of private railways: Montana Rail Link,
Anacostia 8t Pacific Company Inc., and RBC Associates, Inc.
The NCA network connects Buenos Aires with three central (Buenos Aires, Córdoba and
Santa Fé) and two north-westem provinces of Argentina (Santiago del Estero, Tucumán). The
azea covered includes Argentina's three largest industrial centres (Buenos Aires, Córdoba and
Rosario, the latter two having each more than 1 m. inhabitants) and rich agricultural and
14 ~?
mineralogical zones. The main products transported are grains, vegetable oils, fruits, sugar,
stone, concrete, petroleum, sand, minerals, iron and steel.
Early misfortunes hampered NCA's start up. Originally planned to begin operations on
December lst, difficulties in completing agreements with the government imposed a three
week delay. These difficulties were compounded by the fact that NCA was not able to gain
control over all facilíties, as former public employees refused to accept NCA's control for
almost a month. In the words of one of the American managers, "Thus, takeover of the
property was more like a military campaign than a corporate transition" (McCaffrey, 1994:
65).
8.3 Transferred resources
Under the terms of concession, Ferrocarriles handed over for exploitation some 4500 km of
tracks, the buildings and infrastructure belonging to around 300 stations, 90 locs and more
than 5300 wagons. On the other hand, NCA promised to invest, during the first 15 years of its
concession, 5450 m.
8.3.1 Tracks
Of the 5480 kms. of track that formerly belonged to the Mitre line as a whole, NCA received
4512 kms. The remaining Mitre tracks were exploited by FeMeSA's suburban operations (] 88
kms.) or were handed over in December 1992 to the BAP line (780 kms.). The conditions of
NCA's tracks constituted no exception and were in poor condition. The company estimated
that it had to invest some ~53 m. during the first three years to upgrade them. Though NCA
made some progress in this respect, reducing deferred track maintenance in some 2700 kms.,
the company invested only 15 0~0 of the estimated amount during its first two years of
operation.
8.3.2 Rolling material
The power fleet inherited from FA also was in poor state: most of the 63 diesel-electric
locomotives had to be upgraded in the company's own workshops near Rosario. According to
the Comisión Nacional de Regulación del Transporte (CNRT, 1997a), the regulatory body
that oversees the concessionaires, NCA refurbished more than 95 0~0 of its locs and wagons. It
is noteworthy that this upgrading of rolling material goes far beyond simple reparation tasks.
An interesting example in this respect is the equipment for multiple operation: FA never
operated locomotives in multiple as a consequence of trade union opposition, who did not
accept any reduction in footplate staff As a matter of fact, all locs had their multiple operation
equipment nullified or damaged to inutilisation. NCA started to reinstall the equipment, and it
is now possible to operate trains with up to 90 wagons hauled by two or more locs, but driven
by only one person. In addition, locs are being fitted with new mechanical and electrical
components that allow higher levels of efficiency and reliability. As a direct consequence of
these improvements, day-to-day availability of locs reached 80 0~0, thus between 20 and 50 0~0
higher than under public administration. Furthermore, cabooses have been eliminated and
replaced by end-of-train devices, thus additionally reducing train staff requirements.
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8.3.3 Communications
From the outset, NCA installed a new radio communication system that allows the immediate
communications of all trains with the centralised dispatching office in Rosario. It also
implemented a US-style track wanants dispatching system, eliminating the until then existing,
anachronical staff system inherited from the time of British administration. NCA also
implemented an IBM AS~400 based system to track all of its transportation system from car
ordering through delivery, release and empty retum. This system has been an integral part of
the transportation department's service and provided for smooth relations between its
customer service people and the marketing department.
8.3.4 Investments
One of the main criteria employed to evaluate the business propositions submitted for the
bidding contest was the amount of the planned investments. Of interest to the central
economic authorities was to expand the economy and provide new jobs (the combined
promised investment of all private concessionaires was estimated at ~2500 m.). For the
concessionaires, it was a mean to increase the number of transported units and the efficiency
levels. Finally, for railway employees, the future investments were perceived as a
commitment on part of the owners to the company's continuity.
Five years after the first line was transferred, the situation was radically different. On average,
the five cargo concessionnaires had effected less than half (42 0~0) the promised investments
(CNRT, 1997). No significant improvements in infrastructure have been done and, in general,
concessionaires preferred to improve rail conditions through maintenance (Kogan, 1995b).
After its third year of operation, NCA only invested 30 0~0 of the assumed 8 98 m.. According
to the private operators, the gap is a consequence of poor cost estimations ( they claim to have
renovated infrastructure for less money than originally assumed) and of revenues that fall
short from the original expectations. To avoid losses, the companies deferred the missing
investments. The government, fearing the economic and political costs of a closure, started to
bargain with each company. This issue ( and afterwards similar ones) started a wave of
negotiations between the parties involved that still continues.
8.4 Human resources
As indicated in Table 8-1, NCA started operations with roughly 937 employees. A vast
majority -more than 95 0~0 - were former Mitre line agents. The acceptance of such a large
number of former public agents was not the consequence of a company decision but of a
condition stipulated by the concession contract (that applied to all freight carriers). The
number of employees, on the other hand, was decided by the company, and was in sharp
contrast with the ex-ante situation: in 1988 some 14500 agents -those belonging to suburban
exploitation excluded- worked for the Mitre line (PNUD, 1988).
Contrary to the practices later followed by the commuter operators, that committed
considerable efforts in the selection process, procedures at NCA were rather simple:
prospective agents had to pass a medical examination and show no records of strong





1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996
Sector' 618 1813 4268 4035 3970 3920
NCA - 937 835 884 878 944
' Private cargo lines (CNRT, 1995, 1996; 1997)
This process was defined by one of our interviewees as a"weeding-out" and took place, as
shown in table 8-2, in other private cargo lines as well. During the next year the number of
NCA agents increased and stabilised at around 900 employees.
As a consequence of the contractual restriction and the company's own policies, the main
demographic traits of NCA's population differ from FA pattems: the mean age was reduced
by 5,5 years to around 38. Though specific data was not available, a steep increase in the
mean educational level of the new agents has been estimated by the head of the HR
department. To date, no significant training measures have been undertaken. Only for those
agents affected by the introduction of new technologies that required additional skills (e.g.,
radio operation, multiple locomotive operation, etc.), specific courses were given.
Thoroughly transformed, on the contrary, were the legal frameworks that regulated the
contractual links between employees and company. To start with, NCA decided to recognise
only two unions. The internal contradictions of APDFA, the association of managers, become
more evident after the privatisation. At NCA, a branch of APDFA never came into existence.
ASFA, the workers association of the switch operators, was not recognised by NCA and
forced to merge with LTF. In the end, only La Fratemidad (for train conductors) and the Union
Ferroviaria (LJF) survived.
However, their membership (and consequently their strength) has dwindled considerably.
While almost all public agents have been union members at FA, only around 60 0~0 of the 600
employees working under a UF labour agreement are still affiliated. Among the roughly 170
conductors, the trend towards deaffiliation is less pronounced: only 10 0~o have given up their
membership. The general trend towards deaffiliation is strong for the following three reasons:
a) the wide-spread conviction that the unions and its leaders were to a considerable extent
responsible for FA's economic misery and dissolution, b) the perception that union leaders did
little (or nothing) to prevent massive lay-offs, and c) the belief -now that the UF is entering
bids for the privatisation of railways- that the union has shifted its main interest away from the
railway-worker's condition. The stronger loyalty by the conductors towards their union is a
consequence of LF's tradition (even at FA) to concentrate in issues of direct relevance to its
constituency (e.g., courses and instruction).
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8.4.1 Changes in the labour agreements
As mentioned in the previous paragraph, significant changes took place in the legal
framework that regulates the contractual links between employees and company. Broadly
speaking, the labour agreements (CCT) were thinned out and lost much of their "weight",
speaking both physically as well as metaphorically. Instead of heavy manuals of over 200
pages, NCA has signed a"lean" labour agreement and printed it as a small brochure especially
designed to fit into the breast pocket of the employee's boiler suit.
As a first step, the multitude and diversity of job classifications have been reduced to a few
positions. While the labour agreement between FA and UF contained 19 job groups, each one
holding on average nearly 25 positions, the new CCT has four broad categories totalling 24
different job positions. As an example: whereas at FA's Traffic department they were six
different types of "auxiliares"', these have been merged into one position at NCA. Needless
to say, such measures reduced significantly the number of hierarchical levels present at FA.
And, simultaneously, they avoided the often heard comment at FA that "the problem over
here is that there are too many chiefs and only few indians". As at TBA, the main
transformation however was the introduction of the principles of functional flexibility and
polivalence.
8.4.2 Remuneration
The restructuring of the job categories changed radically the tasks and responsibilities of each
job position, again making any comparisons between the remuneration levels before and after
privatisation rather useless. Broadly speaking, for a majority of those working under the
conditions stipulated by the labour agreements salaries increased between 40 and 80 0~0.
However, as a consequence of the aforementioned strict observance of working time,
employees were finding it increasingly more difficult (or outright impossible) to moonlight,
an extremely common (and necessary) practice among FA's agents.
What remains clear is that also at NCA the salary structure has been extremely simplified.
Remunerations are now composed of only two concepts: a basic salary and an increase as
compensation for the introduction of the principles of functional flexibility and polivalence.
These two items subsume the nearly seventy five different increments, subsidies or bonuses'
paid by FA. As in the case of TBA, there were no items linking salary to gains in productivity,
a common feature in many other private sector companies. Neither is there a concept binding
overall worker performance with increases in remuneration. As a matter of fact, no employee
performance appraisal system has been implemented.
There aze however, some noteworthy differences among NCA and TBA's remuneration
policies. To start with, employees earn more money at TBA than at NCA. Though the basic
salary levels are similar, TBA's "supplement" increases its salaries roughly 20 0~0. In addition,
NCA's "viático general" is only worth 50 "~o of TBA's "viático por refrigerio", its functional
equivalent. As a consequence, the general remuneration level for similar positions is always
higher at TBA. With regard to the amplitude and differentials, both scales show "increasing
increases", that is, relative larger increases near the top of the scale. However, TBA's
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Peon Taller 370
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' Based on UF CCTs; positions show a complete career within the mechanical areas. (CCT UF, 1995; TBA
1995)
In both cases, especial attention has been given to build a consistent career ladder, which
could be used for the entire time of the concession without the need to "stretch" it. In
summary, income levels at NCA were lower than at TBA, in part as a reflection of the lower
wage level of Rosario - at ]east when compared with Buenos Aires, where TBA is located.
8.4.3 Labour relations - an overview
It seems appropriate at this point to summarise the main shifts in the labour relations of the
unit here under scrutiny. It should be noted, however, that the changes in the working
conditions annotated in Table 8-3 also fully apply to TBA (and most of the privatised units
throughout the region).
Table 8-3
Shifts in labour relations
Before Privatisation
D Preferential salaries, additional benefits,
significant indirect salary component
After Privatisation
v Reduction or cut of additional benefits and
indirect salary
D Preference in recruitment to family members of
employees and unionised workers
D Internal labour market based on length of service
and particularistic criteria (e.g., union, political
affiliation)
~ Intemships, tlexible hirine arrancements,
universalistic selection criteria




Shifts in labour relations (cont.)
Before Privatisation
Reduced daily working hours; the "right" to work D
paid overtime; tayloristic production concept
After Privatisation
Flexible hours; the obligation to work (often
unpaid) overtime; "new" production concept
~ Labour stability (de facto tenure); overstaffing, ~
redundancy
D High level of union participation and membership `r
D Uniform union strategies based on claims and D
demands; antagonism
D Centralised bargaining; sector-wide agreements
Numerical flexibility; reduction through early
retirements, attrition or dismissal
Lower level of participation and membership
Diversified and more defensive strategies;
collaboration
Decentralised bargaining; unit-wide agreements
Note: adapted and revised from Corradetti (1999); ILO (1994)
8.5 Business reorientation: customer service
The most obvious departure from tradition concerns the customer approach. From the outset,
NCA set its headquarters in Rosario, a strategic move that brought it closer to its clients and to
the middle of its area of coverage (the former Mitre headquarters have always been in Buenos
Aires). NCA set up commercial representatives in all main points of the network, thus
ensuring extensive coverage and direct contact to clients. It also offered the possibility to sign
long term transport contracts, door-to-door services, storage facilities at the dispatch and
delivery points and integrated services (including the final distribution by trucks).
Furthermore, a Customer Service Department was organised that works every day of the year
and is able to deliver on-line, real time information to clients regarding the location and status
of each car in a given consignment. In addition, train crews were allowed to accept and handle
directly the bills of loading from the customers. Though Ferrocarriles had implemented some
measures in this direction (e.g., long term contracts since the 1980), its efforts have never
been as wide and aggressive.
8.5.1 Operative indicators
NCA's marketing and operational efforts have contributed to the enhancement of its customer
base and the reaching of considerable improvements in performance indices. Table 8-4
summarises the most important figures in this respect. The 2,8 m. Tn transported in NCA's
first year of operations are lower than the average tonnage transported by this line under
public administration (roughly 3,2 m. Tn) and fall far from the 4,2 m. Tn estimated by the
company ( mainly as a consequence of adverse meteorological conditions during early 1993 ).
From 1994 on, demand expanded well above the Mitre line's average yearly haulage. Even
though the gap between NCA's expected and actually transported tonnage is being reduced, it
still lies above 20 0~o after the company's fourth year of operations. Similar considerations can
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be formulated for the difference between NCA's expected and delivered amount of tonne-
kilometres: for 1996 this gap reaches 35 0~0. The main reasons for the disparity between plan
and reality lies in the fierce competition from freight vehicle companies. However, this
competition affects stronger those railway companies with short average distances of
transportation, since it is on long distances where the comparative advantages of the railways
are exploited. With an average transport distance of around 340 kms, NCA has the lowest




unit 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996
Sector' Tn(10') 2.065 7.004 12.036 13.835 15.359
NCA Tn(10') - 2.837 3.476 3.533 4.109
Sector' Tn-Km (10') 0.656 2.960 5.866 6.591 7.476
NCA Tn-Km (106) - 0.946 1. ] 90 1.165 I.398
Mean distance
NCA Km - 333 342 330 340
' Private cargo lines (CNRT, 1997a)
The three indicators analysed above constitute the main variables that influence the
company's income. All three of them have been overestimated. The explanation for this
disparity lies in a) overoptimistic demand projections ( that helped to win the concessions), b)
the aforementioned competition against freight vehicles, and c) competition among
neighbouring lines. As an obvious consequence, the revenue estimated by NCA in its bidding
proposal exceeds by far the actual income: in each of the company's four years of operations
real gross íncome was (slightly more than) half the amount expected (CNRT, 1997a). As
mentioned before, these miscalculations motivated NCA to postpone for an indefinite period
diverse steps of the original investment program.
8.5.2 Productivity indicators
The data available about employee productivity shows an unambiguous trend when compared
to the public era. A rather raw (but often used) index is the amount of employees per km of
track. If the figures presented in Table 8-S are contrasted with the same index from FA, sharp
increases in productivity can be noticed. On average, at FA's cargo services 2.31 agents were
employed per km of track. Over the last two decades prior to privatisation, the Mitre line
constantly had showed the largest number of agents per km. During 1986 (the lowest figure of
the series), the Mitre line (suburban employees excluded) scored around 2.75. In other words,
for the same 20 km, at the public Mitre line worked SS agents, while only 4 are being
employed by NCA.
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A second indicator of productivity indicator is the number of Tonne - Kilometres transported
per agent. Partly as a consequence of the decreasing number of agents employed by the sector,
this productivity measure is increasing. During 1996 agent productivity rose to an all-time
high of 1,907 (cargo lines) and 1,480 Tn-Kms. 106 I agent, a steep increase when compared to
Ferrocatriles' average of 0,1 and 0,086 Tn-Kms. 106 I agent for 1980 and 1990 respectively.
Table 8-5
Agent productivity
Cargo lines - Agent productivity
unit 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996
Sector' agent-km 0.1859 0.2024 0.1913 0.1882 0.1854
NCA agent-km - 0.1850 0.1959 0.1995 0.2092
Sector'' TU-agent' - - 1453 1660 1907
NCA TU-agent - 1132 1346 1326 1480
' Private cargo lines '' The index is computed only after all private companies operated for a complete year.
Figures for ' 92 (361) and ' 93 (693) are misleading because companies have not operated for a full year (see
Appendix 2).' expressed in Tn-Kms.10' I employees (CNRT, 1997a)
The commercial efforts conducted so far by NCA have paid off: the amount of transported
units are increasing. However, as a consequence of the above-mentioned competition against
and among other freight catriers, the income per transported Tn-Kms. is decreasing. After
taxes, NCA's first fiscal year resulted ín a net loss of some ~0.4 m. This trend was reverted
after its second and third year, in which it posted a profit of~1.5 m. resp. ~0.5 m.
Table 8-fi
Revenue NCA
Cargo lines - Revenue
unit 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996
Sector' USá ( l Ob) 19.8 75.4 141.9 I52.5 164.6
NCA USS (10') 26.2 31.5 30.8 31.5
Sector' USS-TU 0.0302 0.0247 0.0245 0.0239 0-0236
NCA USS-TU - 0.0277 0.0265 0.0265 0.0250
Ratio costs to revenues'
Sector' a~o na 1I5 102 99 na
NCA o~o - 98 89 94 na
' Private cargo lines ' Operative costs and genuine income only (CNRT, 1997a)
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NCA's overall financial perfotmance (and viability) is above average: only one cargo line (the
BAP, linking a strong customer base in Mendoza with Buenos Aires, with an average
transported distance above 900 kms.) has a better record. It is noteworthy that NCA has not
incurred heavy losses. That would surely have been the case if the company sticked to its
original investment program. However, management's swift reaction to stronger-than-
expected competition' led to the investment stop and some lay-offs, and thus prevented the
repetition of losses.
8.6 A cultural diagnosis
In May 1995, at about the same time organisational practices were surveyed at TBA, the
OCM was also administered at NCA. As mentioned before, together both companies formed
the public Mitre line and hence shared, according to some reports (PNUD, 1988; Silverleaf,
1994), various cultural traits. Nevertheless, a number of substantial differences among both
units arose after deregulation. The impact these differences have upon the company's culture
makes it necessary to enumerate them before going any further in the analysis.
Being a cargo line, NCA was handed over to private exploitation during the first rounds of the
deregulation process, in December 1992. Thus by the time ofour survey, while TBA was less
than a year old, NCA was already being managed outside the public sector for almost three
and a half years. A second differential trait of relevance concerns the composition of its
workforce. At TBA new personnel was introduced to the largest extent possible; only for
those positions were no outside experience was available former public agents were hired.
NCA took the opposite stance and filled all positions, leaving aside upper management, with
former Ferrocarriles agents. A further difference regards the company's size: with nearly 950
agents, NCA employs roughly a thírd of TBA's workforce. These disparities, in particularly
the first two, have an impact on the differential cultural development of NCA and TBA, and
require to be taken into special consideration when comparisons between both private
concessionaires are drawn.
Given the length of NCA's network ( over 4700 km) and, as a result, the accompanying
geographical distribution of its members, it was decided to restrict the sample to those
employees working in or around Rosario. The location includes NCA's headquarters and its
main shop ( in Villa Diego). Taken together, in Rosario work some 330 employees, over a
third of the company's work force. The statistical analysis of the 87 useful questionnaires will
start, as done previously, with an assessment of the resulting boxplot and its comparison with
TBA data.
The comparison of NCA's boxplot with the corresponding TBA graph reveals both a further
reduction in the degrees of dispersion and a relatively high degree of correspondence in the
employees' response patterns. The former trait can also be observed in the Addendum at the
end of this chapter: the average dispersion of the total sample was m6 - 1.03 (TBA ma -
1.14). Leaving for later the issue of response similarity among the companies surveyed, the
following section will analyse the fonnation ofsub-cultural entities.
1~2
Table 8-7
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8.6.1 Looking for subcultures
Before drawing comparisons with the other two units, NCA's data was examined to detect
sub-cultural trends or formations. Therefore the sample was partitioned into categories
analogous to those formed for FeMeSA and TBA (see Table 8-8). [n general, the response
pattems of the generated sub-samples do not diverge substantially one from another. As can
be observed from Tables 8-9 and 8-10, dispersion remains stable independently of the
stratification criteria employed. Moreover, the Addendum further endorses this assertion and
reveals that dispersion remains at relatively low degrees. This is not the case when the sub-
samples' mean scores are compared. Significant differences appear whenever criteria
reflecting hierarchical levels are taken into consideration. Thus, the largest number of
statistically significant differences is obtained when the upper two echelons, comprising both
management levels, are compared with all non-managerial employees. As can be observed
from Table 8-10, managers and non-managers differ on nine questions, namely items 1, 3, 4,
j5,
5, 9, 10, 11, 12 and 16. Among other issues the actual scores indicate that, when compared
with non-managers, those occupying the firs[ two levels are more inclined to believe that in























Other public unit 2
Private sector 7
Independent 1










4 Of operative workers
5 Shop and track
1 LF and UF only unions
2 recognised by NCA
3
1 (operate trains)
2 (tracks 8c signals)
3 (locs R wagons)
Primary school 27 1 7 years or less
Secondary school 47 2 8 to 13 years or less





Engineers 1 S 1
Stevedores 14 2
Mechanics 12 3
Track workers 13 4
Managers and adm. staff 33 S
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Those occupying the first two levels are also more inclined to believe that their colleagues feel
at ease in unfamiliar situations and that their private life is not being influenced by the
company's norms. Moreover, NCA's managers show a stronger belief in the fact that the
company is mainly interested in the employee's performance (and less in hisltter welfare), that
anyone can fit into the organisation and that competence is the only criterion applied in the
hiring process.
The distinctiveness of these two samples to some extent is also reflected in other comparisons.
but only as a consequence ofcriteria similarity. When those employees working under a
labour agreement are for example compared with their colleagues with an individual contract,
the observed differences are a consequence of the large percentage ofmanagers among the
latter sub-sample. The aforementioned distinctiveness is further underlined by the uniformity
in the perceptions of other specific groups. Among the non-managerial employees of NCA's
three main divisions, for example, no statistically significant difference in their mean values
can be detected at all (Table 8-9, column 3).
Table 8-9
Comparing subsamples ofNCA ( I)
rtem
Contrasting means and dispersion' 2 within NCA
by type of labour unionised vs. non- non - managers by
agreement unionised employees structural division





' Levene test: '- p S 0.05 level, "- p 5 0.01 level
' Mann-Whitney U test: '- p 5 0.05 level, "- p 5 0.01 level
Assuming the validity of the aforementioned characterisations of public bureaucracies and
aware of the descriptions of our interviewees we might conclude that these significant
differences are rooted in the disparate professional backgrounds of both groups. Nevertheless,
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not all managers have until now worked exclusively outside the public sector. All managers
but one (a former high-ranking FA officer) that belong to NCA's top echelon share a trait that
at the same time distinguishes them from the non-managers: a previous professional
experience outside Ferrocarriles, within the private sector. However, at the second managerial
level, the previous working experience is more heterogeneous: while roughly two-thirds
previously worked for Ferrocarriles, the other third is composed of former employees of other
public units or the private sector.
The issue here under scrutiny has far reaching consequences, because it implies that those
fotmer agents that now hold managerial positions have considerably shifted their perceptions
about the organisationa] practices. The magnitude of these changes is evidenced by the fact
that nowadays they seem to share more views with those other managers above or beside
them, than with their former colleagues working beneath.
Table 8-10
Comparing subsmples of NCA ( II )
Contrasting means and dispersion' z within NCA
by hierarchical levels managers vs. non- by occupation
managers




' Levene test: '- p 5 0.05 level, '" - p 5 0.01 level





Be it as a consequence ofproximity, the kind of task or other intervening factors, these former
agents together with those other managers stemming from the private sector now build a
culturally rather homogeneous unit whose views clearly diverge from the perceptions of the
non-managers. Good examples to substantiate this comment are those items in which the
score difference of the mean is highly significant and, at the same time, the scores lie in
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different halves of the scale. This is the case for items 4, 5, 9, 10 and 12. With regard to their
attitudes towards planning (question 5), each group tends to follow rather opposite
approaches. Needless to add, this difference is not rooted exclusively in the dissimilar
previous working environment. To some extent, the difference is also caused by disparities in
their tasks and their inherent degrees of responsibility. However, it should be noted that by
enhancing the workers' planning horizon, the job enlargement among non-managerial
positions will affect (but also be conditioned by) these scores. The observed difference in
question 9 indicates that while managers tend to regard private life as not being covered by
the organisation, non-managers adhere to the opposite statement. In addition, both groups
differ significantly (at the p ~ 0.01 level) on question 16, managers believing competence to
be the only criterion in hiring. Hofstede found the latter three questions to form a single
dimension that reflects the source of the employee's identity (Hofstede, 1991: l90).
Interestingly, all three items coincíde, suggesting that non-managers have a rather parochial
identity, while managers tend to identify with their profession.
At TBA, the comparison of upper management with the rest of the employees yielded just
three items on which the samples diverge significantly. The implications are clear: TBA's
management shares far more practices with the rest of the company (there is congruence on 15
items) than NCA's management does ( they diverge on half the questions). This contrast could
be a consequence of at least three developments: first, its origin could be traced back to the
quite opposite hiring policies and the consequently "imported" cultural elements. A second
possible explanation lies in the speed and strength with which management operated on
particular practices. Finally, as we will see at the end of this chapter, the perceptions of the
members of the upper echelons of both organisations are quite dissimilar, NCA's managers
holding in some cases even more extreme positions than TBA's power holders.
In brief, after over three years of existence, NCA's employees show reduced variability in the
perception of organisational practices. Nevertheless, the perceptions of those occupying
higher managerial positions together with those managers working beneath them can be
differentiated from all other respondents on half of the questions. A closer look at these
differences indicates that while managers at NCA tend to endorse practices that are
antithetical to a bureaucratic environment, non-managers still cherish cultural elements that
could be considered remnants of Ferrocarriles.
8.6.2 NCA's practices in comparison
In the remaining part of this chapter the practices prevalent at NCA will be contrasted against
those present at TBA. Though originally planned, a comparison with FeMeSA's scores will
not be conducted. The decision not to include such a comparison is based on the fact that the
analysis of FeMeSA demonstrated a state of cultural anomia. Since NCA was created less
than a year after the announcement of deregulation, its employees did not witness during their
last year at Ferrocaniles the group splitting, depletion, and mergers that characterised
FeMeSA's doom. As a consequence, they did not undergo the process of cultural destruction
that took place at those units privatised some years later. It thus seems likely that NCA
incorporated far more "public" cultural elements, since the company hired almost exclusively
former Ferrocarriles' agents, in some cases even complete working gangs. In brief, it would
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be etroneous to consider FeMeSA as a(theoretical) point of departure of NCA's culture and,
more generally, to compare NCA with FeMeSA.
In spite of the caveats mentioned at the beginning of this diagnosis, the comparison of the two
deregulated units forwards some interesting issues. As mentioned above, the variance in the
responses of the cargo company were rather small, in most cases even lower than those of
TBA. This fact does not run against expectations, since NCA employees had far more time to
build common understandings about their working environment. Consistent with this finding,
in those five questions where differences in the degree of dispersion between both companies
were statistically significant, NCA always scored lower.
Table 8-11
Comparing NCA with TBA
Contrasting means and dispersion between NCA and TBA
At company Former F.A. Engineers Administrative Managers
level agents employees
item disp.' mean' disp. mean disp. mean disp. mean disp. mean
O1 ~ ~
02 ~ ~
03 ~~ ~~ ~ ~~
04 ~~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~
OS sc~ sc~ ~ ~~
06 ~~ ~~ ~~ ~
07 ~~ ~ ~
08 ~~ ~~
09 sr ~~ ~~ ~ ~~
10 ~ ~
11 ~~ ~ ~ ~ ~
12
13 ~~ ~~ ~~ ~~ ~~ ~ ~~
14 ~~ ~~ ~
15 ~ ~~ ~ ~~
16 ~ ~ ~~
17 ~
18
' Levene test: ' - p 5 0.05 level, "- p 5 0.01 level
- Mann-Whitney U test: '- p 5 0.05 level, '~` - p 5 0.01 level
With regard to their mean values, both units differ statistically on seven items; that is, both
companies score similar values in roughly two thirds of the questions. The analogous
comparison between TBA and FeMeSA forwarded eleven items in which both units differed
significantly. But before all three companies are put in perspective, it is useful to observe in
ts8
greater detail the aforementioned differences between both private enterprises. A closer look
at the mean values scored on these specific questions (03, 04, 05, 09, 13, 14, and 15) reveals
that in comparison to TBA, people at NCA are more inclined to feel uncomfortable in
unfamiliar situations, to plan on short tenn, to believe that newcomers need a long time to feel
at home in the company, and to keep meeting times rather loosely. On the other hand, people
at TBA adhere with stronger emphasis than their colleagues in Rosario to the belief that the
company's nonns do not cover the employee's behaviour at home, that in their working
environment people do not have difficulties in accepting risks, and that where they work
results are more important than procedures.
If these perceptions are confronted, it can be concluded that NCA is more risk - avoiding,
looks less far into the future, is less punctual, more closed to outsiders, and finally more
process oriented than TBA. Not incidentally, the practices present at NCA recall some traits
found in common characterisations of public bureaucracies. These perceptions do not imply
that NCA is a bureaucratic environment; they only point out that vis-à-vis TBA, some
practices typical for a public administration seem to be more entrenched.
The presence of the above-mentioned differences should not preclude from recognising that
both units have far more in common than not. Of utmost relevance is the fact that in most of
those questions deemed as "critical" (e.g., customer orientation, cost - consciousness, job
competence as main selection criterion), both private companies reveal similar scores. Not
incidentally, significant differences in the mean value of precisely those critical questions are
present when TBA is compared with the fonner public enterprise.
In summary: at the level of the whole sample, both private companies score rather similar
results. NCA, probably as a consequence of its longer existence, presents lower levels of
variance in the responses. TBA on the other hand, seems to have changed more radically its
perceptions; residua of what could be considered as "public" practices can be detected at
NCA. Leaving for later the analysis of the sources of these differences and remnants, a closer
look will now be thrown upon the differences among specific sub-samples of employees of
both units.
8.6.3 Contrasting specific sub-samples
For several reasons, a number of specific sub-samples that were present at FeMeSA (and to
some extent at TBA) are no longer available at NCA. In most of the cases, this is a
consequence of the abolishment ofjob classifications and the introduction of the principles of
functional polivalence. For the issue here under scrutiny, this fact has two main implications.
Foremost, it means that some comparisons can not be made, simply because the jobs were
deleted and no longer exist. On the other hand, both job reclassification and the principle of
functional polivalence have profound consequences on the professional identity of most
employees, since the distinctiveness of their tasks vanished.
NCA's engineers provide a good example of the above-mentioned assertions. At NCA the
position of switch operator was deleted; their tasks are now performed by the engineers
themselves. Similarly, other duties (e.g., minor grease and maintenance activities, interaction
with customers) are now the responsibility of each driver. As a consequence of these
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transformations, role descriptions become less defined, and so does the professional self-
perception and esteem of these employees.
As shown in Table 8-11, on only four questions do the engineers diverge significantly from
their colleagues. This stands in some contrast to the situation of the drivers at TBA, where
they still hold some prerogatives and professional esteem, and clearly deviates from the
situation at Ferrocarriles, where engineers were considered as members of a higher order.
8.6.4 Fomler Ferrocan-iles agents at TBA and NCA
In spite of the aforementioned substantial differences among both private operators, it seems
necessary to compare the perceptions of their fomzer public agents: though building the
majority at NCA, they only make up a small percentage at TBA. Hence, the comparison at the
level of the complete samples could conceal relevant infonnation about differences in the
development ofboth groups.
Concerning the dispersion in their answers, the comparison of fonner public agents shows a
similar pattern to the comparison at the level of the complete sample: on almost all items,
NCA's former public agents score lower degrees of variance in their responses. The only
significant exception concerns the issue of cost-awareness: on question 7, while TBA scores a
very low 6- 0.76, NCA's standard deviation exceeds one. The comparison of inean values
shows that in principle, both sub-samples differ on the same questions where the companies
as a whole diverged. Interestingly, NCA's former public agents are more inclined to rate their
current work environment as closed and secretive, probably a consequence of transferring
complete work-groups from Ferrocarriles. On the other hand, TBA's former public agents
have a stronger belief that competence is the only criterion in hiring. Particularly this latter
difference is readily explainable, since, as mentioned before, employees that entered TBA
from FeMeSA had to undergo thorough scrutiny.
A noteworthy exception constitutes question 15 (importance of procedures ~ results): it is the
only item in which both samples (at company level) diverge, but the sub-samples of former
public agents do not show a significant difference. On the same question, however, the former
FeMeSA agents differ from their colleagues at TBA, which score a higher mean value. In
other words, those previously working for the SOE still show stronger adherence to the belief
that "organisational procedures are more important than results".
8.6.5 Managers at TBA and NCA
The other sub-sample worth further analysis is management. The members of the upper
echelons of both companies diverge on a number of relevant issues. Regarding the variance in
their responses, significant differences are present in over a third of the questions. However,
no specific trend is observable: no subgroup reveals consistently lower (higher) degrees of
variance in their perceptions. Tuming to the mean value scores of these two groups, a clear
bias emerges. Four of the seven questions in which TBA and NCA managers significantly
diverge expose rather clearly the degree of bureaucratic practices in an organisation (O1, 02,
07 and, albeit to a lesser extent, question 16). It is precisely in these four questions that NCA
managers score nearer to the "non-bureaucratic" pole of the respective item. Thus, there is a
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stronger perception among NCA managers that major emphasis is given to meet customer
needs, that strong pressure ís exerted to finishing one's task, that people in their working
environment are aware of costs, and that competence is the only criterion in hiring. It should
be noted, however, that on these four questions (as in most others), managers of both private
companies score on the same half of the scale. [n other words, the differences are more a
matter of "shades" than of "colour".
8.7 Summary
In summary, the practices at the cargo line have reached a considerable degree of consistency.
Nevertheless, the mean scores draw a cleavage line: the responses of managers and non-
managers differ on half the questions. Noteworthy in this respect is the response similarity
among managers, independently of their previous working experience. In any case, the
members of NCA's upper echelons, in line with their peers at TBA, mostly adhere to practices
that match the needs of an organisation embedded in a competitive business environment.
Those not belonging to management, on the contrary, still cling to some practices that could
be considered remnants of the public past. In this regard it is important to note that, leaving
aside two lower level employees, all non-managers stem from Ferrocarriles. ln order to be
able to determine if the professional background or other intervening factors were the source
of the detected differences and shifts, the next chapter will put in comparative perspective the
three units surveyed.
' Auxiliar de cabecera, Especial A, Especial B, de la, de 2da, de 3ra and finally Auxiliar ayudante (UF.
Convencion Colectiva de Trabajo 21l75, 1986).
' Bonificaciones, Adicionales, Retribuciones especiales and Subvenciones ( arts. 33 ssgs. CCT UF 21l75 1986)
' This swift reaction can also be partially understand as a consequence of the awareness that figures from the









































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Here arrived, it is necessary to compare the cultural transition ofboth private operators and to
integrate their experiences. It is precisely at this point where the advantages of the quasi-
experimental design should bear fruit. However, two issues complicate the use of this
methodological perspective. In first place, and as mentioned before, the data obtained do not
reflect the dimensions found by Hofstede et aL (1990) in their study. The low reliability
scores prevented us from using in an irrestrictive way their model.
On the other hand, the search for a new factorial solution that somehow corresponded to the
formulated hypothesis failed (see Notes 6-2 and 7-2). As a consequence, the integration of the
results hitherto obtained will mostly be performed reverting to the scores on the individual
items. More specifically, the analysis will be based on the percentages of respondents that
scored near to the respective poles and their shifts on the scale. Given the aforementioned low
reliability scores, it would be erroneous to employ the triads of items found by Hofstede et al.
(1990: 302). Therefore, the items employed in the analysis of each particular hypothesis were
selected if their wording reflected unambiguously the essence of the issue under scrutiny. In a
second step those other items that show a significant (or highly significant) correlation with
one (or more) of the previously selected questions were also included.
The second difficulty confronted resides in the fact that though FeMeSA's high dispersion
levels can plausibly be taken to reflect the true nature of the company's culture (i.e., its
fragmentation), they also reduce accordingly the significance of the respective mean values.
Because of this reduced certainty, it is unavoidable to trace back FeMeSA's roots and include
Ferrocarriles in the analysis. In any case, the analysis had to be extended into the past:
FeMeSA's new denomination and legal status notwithstanding, it cannot be understood as an
independent cultural entity. Unfortunately, no systematic cultural research has been conducted
at Ferrocamles, let alone a quantitative measurement. This absence makes it difficult to posit
about the company's main traits with a reasonable degree of certainty.
Two studies, however, have at least marginally approached the problem (Tesoro, 1996;
Silverleaf, 1994). And, in addition, much material is present that allows to infer about
Ferrocarriles' former cultural identity. On the basis of this material it can be concluded that
depending on the particular line and point in time, three cultural layers seem to have
coexisted: the aforementioned line identity, a bureaucratic culture, and a hard-ware oriented.
engineering tradition. In the following sections the cultural reality of the private operators wil]
be contrasted not only against FeMeSA but also, and particularly whenever the reduced
significance generates doubts, against this background.
9.2 Hypothesis 1
The privatisation of a SOE will induce a shift from a concern with means
towards a concem with ends
16~
This dichotomic pair is well known in organisational theory. In the case under analysis it
implied a shift from a purely normative approach towards a results~riented management
system. And indeed, there is considerable evidence suggesting the occunence of such a
transformation at both NCA and TBA. This evidence can be divided into two main bundles:
those factors reducing the relevance of ineans and those others leading to an increasing
importance of results.
The importance attached to this process by the incoming management teams cannot be
overestimated. As mentioned before, their views on SOE's and about Ferrocarriles in
particular was dyed by common prejudices about the public sector in general. Great care was
thus invested in the elimination of procedural hindrances to efficient behaviour and the
implementation of results oriented systems.
Concerning the reduction of bureaucratic procedures it is noteworthy that, once the units left
the public sector, a large number of mandatory administrative procedures no longer had to be
performed. Examples of such burdensome legal requirements were mentioned in chapter five
and originated in the fact that as a public transport agency, Ferrocarriles was nested within
multiple jurisdictions. Moreover, the private operators were free to design their own
administrative and decisional systems. A first step in this direction was the substitution of the
"legajo" (literally a"bundle" or "faggot", an obsolete administrative information system) by
more modern, EDP-supported decision and control systems. On the other hand, the structural
reduction of hierarchical levels and decentralisation shortened, reduced or eliminated many of
the even previously redundant administrative circuits and flows.
Even more important than the reduction of the relative importance of ineans was the increased
awareness of the accomplishments of ineaningful ends. Of relevance in this respect was the
introduction of a wide anay of activity indicators and ratios. Most of them were already
known at Ferrocamles, but there the generated data was either left unprocessed or, more
commonly, processed and archived.
At TBA, the most prominent among these indices were the regularity ratios (índices de
regularidad), a series of three indicators about deleted or belated trains. The vitality of these
indices resides in the fact that following the original contract, only if these indices exceed a
certain level, price increases may be granted. On the other hand, if the number of deleted or
belated trains was higher than what was agreed upon, the government through the National
Railway Commission (later the National Commission of Transport Regulation, CNRT) could
reduce the level of subsidy granted. Various other productivity indicators and parameters for
purely intemal issues were either developed or re-activated. In contrast to FeMeSA and
Ferrocarriles, the information these indices delivered was constantly updated and employed
for the routine as well as strategic decision making process.
The use of general statistics and performance indicators gained particular relevance during the
initial phase of both companies. Beyond their more common use as managerial instruments,
such indicators provided clear, easy to understand standards for employees. Immediately after
the transfer to private management, expectations were far from clear; people had to reorient
themselves, and indicators proved to be a valuable instrument in this respect. TBA's
employees were confronted with new tasks, tools, and job requirements. At t;~e same time,
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they were granted by (mostly) unknown managers additional power and independence. This
notwithstanding, some employees perceived even less degrees of freedom. They were afraid
to act and generate negative responses in higher echelons. Management's underlining of the
content and use of indicators provided the necessary information about where to look for
concrete requirements. In other words, by means of indicators employees get to know the
"ground on which they are walking" (Pfiffner and Sherwood, 1961) and thereby reduce
inaction (and anxiety levels). Moreover, the activity indicators proved to be an inexpensive
and powerful instrument to demonstrate that a new era had started and to buy employees into
this new project. TBA (as well as NCA) scores were frequently compared with the
corresponding FeMeSA (or Ferrocarriles) figures; the dramatic increases were frequently
cited as evidence of a cleavage and generated a sense of pride in all employees, but
particularly among former public employees. The introduction of customer satisfaction
measurements not only allowed to detect weak spots in the company's strategy, but indicated
clearly to all involved the ultimate aims of management. In their interviews, all former public
employees agreed on the value of this indicator; they pointed out their usefulness as a mirror
of "the otherwise rather fuzzy concept of customer satisfaction". And, one might add, it fitted
well their "engineering" tradition, more inclined to accept "hard" figures than concepts. To a
large extent, the statistical data confirms the evidence collected through other means (see
Table 9-1). When compared with FeMeSA, employees at TBA perceive that in their current
working environment, greater efforts are being done and that there is far less routine.
Table 9-1
Percentage ofrespondents scoring 1 or 2 in questions 8 and 18
Percentage of respondents scoring 1 or 2
FeMeSA TBA NCA ~
c "a~ á'v I
~a
-m t, uc~ vÊ ~a
~- ~c u y~~ ó ~~ á ~ ~w á
f- F ci~ :v .o u. F- in :v .o ~
people make teast effort people put in maximal
19 9 5 2 12 effort
each day brings new each day is pretty much
challenges 38 60 s' S8 53 54 the same
' computed at the level of the total sample; ` indicates a significant difference with the FeMeSA sample; ' only
former FeMeSA employees;' indicates a significant difference with the TBA sample
We might conclude that in general terms, the indices provided useful standards that allowed
to re-direct efforts in a consistent and meaningful manner. But, even more important and
beyond the more immediate uses of these indicators, their combined messages established the
importance of results in the mind of the employees, thus confirming this first hypothesis.
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9.3 Hypothesis 2
The privatisation of a SOE will induce a change in the source from where
the employees derive their identity: from being centred on the organisation
towards being centred on the particular job.
Three clusters of evidence support the change in the source of the employees' identity.
Following a chronological order, those factors were linked to Ferrocarriles' dissolution, to the
hindrances to the development of a new parochial identity, and finally to those factors that
fostered the development of professional identities.
The first cluster bundles those factors that generated a strong organisational identity at
Ferrocarriles and are, as a consequence of its dissolution, no longer present. Among other
reasons, the national railways revealed a parochial culture because its employees viewed as
their own some of the company's formal strategic aims. Examples of such -often cited- aims
were the geographical and political unity of the country, the development of remote regional
economies, or Ferrocarriles' function as a"School of the Nation", providing apprenticeships
for the less educated. To some extent, the identification with the company was also fostered
by a sense of pride in Ferrocarriles, its large workshops and network and, last but not least. a
sense ofbelonging to the "big railway family".
However, the strategic aims were never reached; during deregulation, all facilities were either
sold, handed over or scrapped; the railway family ceased to exist. In summary, the first
reasons suggesting a change in the source of identity is the disappearance of the source itself
and the impossibility to transfer the emotions associated with it.
On the other hand, a number of issues will probably hinder the development of a similar
parochial attitude in the near future. In the first place, and in sharp contrast to Ferrocarriles'
high degree ofvertical integration, all private operators and TBA in particular are outsourcing
a wide scope of their activities. As a consequence, there is frequent interaction between TBA
agents and members of other organizations. Roughly a third of the people working for TBA
on its premises belong to other companies, as e.g., those affected to cleansing duties (t300),
security (f500), or locs and wagons maintenance (t250).
Moreover, the development of strong links with the organisation is also hindered by the
absence of a long-term perspective. In contrast to the de-facto tenure offered at Ferrocarriles,
private operators have not committed themselves to a no-lay-off policy. As a matter of fact,
both companies continued to reduce their work force long after starting operations.
While these two clusters complicate the resurgence of an organisational identity, a number of
factors foster a professional identification. In the first place, a considerable number of
professions know -perhaps for the first time- a real labour market. During the public era,
Ferrocarriles acted as a virtual monopsony for many of the special tasks it harboured (e.g.,
engineers, switch operators, locs maintenance). Although restricted in size because of the
general economic conditions and technical incompatibilities, this market is at present growing
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and used frequently as a reference for salary related decisions. TBA's employees also keep an
eye on this new market. These days, agents that occupy a redundant position or that do not
perform according to expectations will not be transferred internally (as was the case in
Ferrocarriles) but find themselves in those labour markets. Hence, the interest is shifted away
from the organisation and towards (mostly) one's own profession.
A further basis for the development of a professional identification was the fact that the
selection criteria were mainly based on the professional expertise and specific knowledge.
This is particularly relevant for former public agents, mostly hired by the former SOE on the
basis of particularistic criteria.
The collected quantitative evidence is not conclusive with regard to the postulated shifts in
perception. The percentage of individuals believing that job competence is the only selection
criteria almost doubled, reaching 58 0~0 ( see Table 9-2). Among the fornier public agents this
perception is particularly clear: less than 5 0~o believe that in hiring, the company takes
particularistic criteria into account ( see Addendum 9-1). Question 9(asking about the extent
in which the company covers the behaviour at work as well as at home) in both companies
runs counter to the hypothesised shift: far more employees now believe that the company's
notms influence their behaviour both at work and home (FeMeSA - 640~0; TBA - 40 0~~; NCA
- 16 oro).
Table 9-2
Percentage of respondents scoring 1 or 2 in questions 9 and 16
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company covers
private life own business 64 40 " 47 16 ' I S behaviour at home
job competence only
hiring criterion 35 58 " 71 56 53 particularistic criteria
' computed at the level of the total sample; ` indicates a significant difference with the FeMeSA sample; ' only
former FeMeSA employees,' indicates a significant difference with the TBA sample
A probable explanation for this apparent contradiction might be found in the slow but
pervasive process of dissociation that public employees underwent during Ferrocarriles agony
and the demanding conditions of the new environments. At Ferrocarriles agents had to work
an average of five hours, and were to some extent allowed to accommodate their work
schedules. The company provided a small income, which in most of the cases had to be
supplemented by a second job. Thus, Ferrocarriles relative influence on the agent's everyday
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life was minimal. This state of affairs changed radically once working for the pnvate
operators: they had to work for at least eight hours, were not allowed to moonlight and
severely sanctioned if they did not show up for work. As a consequence, the position
occupied at TBA or NCA regained the centrality it lost at the SOE. It seems plausible that this
regained centrality induced many former agents to believe that the company's norms also
influence their behaviour at home. This line of thinking is further underpinned by the fact that
at NCA only 16 0~o believe that the private life is unrelated to the company and that such low
scores are mainly present among former agents at TBA.
Finally, the resurgence of occupational identities can also be detected observing the degree in
which the members of the different professions diverge. In this respect it is interesting to note
some dissimilarities that emerge after applying the same criterion (in this case "occupation")
at FeMeSA and TBA. The groups formed ex-post differed significantly on two thirds of the
items, at FeMeSA on half the questions. This implies that some professions gained a clearer,
distinguishable profile.
'fhe selected items draw an ambiguous picture. However, if with regard to the influence the
organisation exerts on the employees' private life the particular circumstances at FeMeSA are
taken into account, it is possible to conclude that a shift in the perceptions in the hypothesised
direction might be taking place. The analysis of variance further substantiates this finding. It
shows that the previous, organisation ~entred views gave place to professional identities.
This notwithstanding, the collected evidence is not conclusive and does not confirm beyond
doubt the postulated hypothesis.
9.4 Hypothesis 3
The prívatisation of a SOE will induce a shift from a concem for people
towards a concern for completing the job.
The rationale backing this hypothesis is clear and unambiguous: the so-called "social
conquests" gained over many years of sometimes intense union struggle formed a work
environment that provided large benefits for Ferrocarriles' employees. It was well known that
most of these benefits would disappear once private management started operating the
companies. And, as described earlier, the remaining fotmer public agents were stripped from
most of their prerogatives.
Working time started to be checked and absenteeism harshly punished. Performance was
measured and people were held accountable against previously defined targets. At
Ferrocamles, stories about engineers leaving a cargo train somewhere between stations
because their working time was over abounded. Such stories now belong to the past.
Engineers are obliged to reach the terminal, even if it implies working overtime. Similar
norms apply to other jobs as well. The importance of completing one's task is frequently
being underlined by managers and supervisors alike.
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As shown in Table 9-3, this contrast is not reflected statistically. In both private companies
the number of employees that believe that in their working environment strong pressure is
exerted to finish the tasks and that little concern is given to personal problems is above 60 0~0.
This percentage is only slightly above the corresponding FeMeSA figure (58 0~0), implying
that no radical departure from previous practices took place. If the validity of the infomiation
about the practices prevalent at Ferrocarriles (see, e.g., Silberleaf, 1994; Knechtel, 1993) is
assumed, the score similarity can only be attributed to the demanding conditions at FeMeSA.
As mentioned in chapter five, staff reduction forced agents to frequently work overtime while
income levels remained unaltered.
Table 9-3
Percentage ofrespondents scoring 1 or 2 in questions 2 and 10
Percentage of respondents scoring 1 or 2
FeMeSA TBA NCA
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pressure exerted to finish personal problems taken
task 58 61 67 68 67 into account
organisation takes organisation only
responsibility welfare 14 36 " 51 38 43 interested in work
' computed at the level of the total sample; ' indicates a significant difference with the FeMeSA sample; ' only
former FeMeSA employees;' indicates a significant difference with the TBA sample
From the comparison of the ratings about the degree of responsibility for the employee's
welfare, an interesting phenomenon emerges. While only 14 0~0 of the respondents at FeMeSA
endorsed that the SOE was taking direct responsibility for their welfare, this figure surpassed
35 0~o at both TBA and NCA. Furthermore, this perception was even stronger among former
Ferrocarriles agents (51 and 43 0~o at TBA respectively NCA).
On the other side, 80 0~0 of the agents agreed that FeMeSA was solely interested in their work
(see Addendum at the end of this chapter). This is not surprising, since the company barely
offered what was required by law. After the transfer this perception is far less common at
TBA (33 0~0) and NCA (220~0) in general, and among former public agents ín particular (20
resp. 16 0~0). Here again, what seems to play a decisive role is the collective experience at
FeMeSA.
The flexibility regarding individual needs and requirements, common at Ferrocarriles,
disappeared at FeMeSA. Of course, neither was the possibility to e.g., adjust its own work
schedule, or not to show up for a few days (both important features for moonlighters)
available at the private units. But, and in sharp contrast to the ex-ante situation, a number of
l~l
new practices were implemented. As a result of these policies, particularly former public
agents started to believe that management had a genuine interest in their advancement and
concems.
Of paramount importance in this respect were the large sums invested in task-specific
educational activities. In less than a year, every agent at TBA has at least visited one of the
many courses offered; in total, more than 120.000 man-hours of instruction have been
completed. At NCA, some managers and supervisors have visited and been trained at the
facilities of their American technical partners in the United States. The fact that even middle
level supervisors have been sent abroad is a landmark that has been cited over and over again.
To gauge the attached importance, one has to be aware that the cost of such a trip exceeds
three or four times their monthly income. Also frequently mentioned in our interviews is the
fact that for the first time now managers "walk the firm" ( caminan la empresa), a local version
of the MBWA practice. In highly positive terms many of the interviewees indicated that
during this trips, "those higher-up" ( los de arriba) have shown real interest in the difficulties
and concems of those working at the front line.
In summary, the statistics obtained refute the third hypothesis. No significant shift towards a
stronger task orientation has been detected. On the contrary, the new policies followed (e.g..
MBWA, education) are widely perceived as a clear demonstration that management cares
about human resources. Thus, while the task orientation remains basically the same, there is a
trend that even runs counter to the postulated direction.
Moreover, the lack of conelation between both items indicates that the perceived strong
efforts to finish the tasks are seen as being reconcilable with an earnest concern for the
employee. In summary, and in accordance with Hofstede et al. remarks about the lack of
general applicability of their model (1990: 313), for this sample a strong task orientation does
not seem to be incompatible with an equally strong employee orientation.
9.5 Hypothesis 4
The privatisation of a SOE will induce a shift in the orientation towards
clients: from "user" to "customer".
In the old days, leaving aside a few ill-conceived and ill-fated attempts to prioritise the
customers, in general precedence was given to engineering or normative considerations. The
customer - in Ferrocarriles' terms a"user" - and his or her needs were often left out of the
analysis. As mentioned during the interviews, the prevalent idea at Ferrocarriles and FeMeSA
was "to run trains" ( correr trenes).
Those who took over were ex[remely aware of this state of affairs, as it had been a central
argument of those who for years tried to deregulate this as well as other markets.
Consequently, in both private companies employees were confronted with a"customer first"
message at the very beginning of the selection procedure; in addition, rhetoric was backed-up
with concrete deeds. In subsequent training programs implemented at TBA, the concept was
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analysed in detail: concrete situations and model responses were provided and exercised.
Ticket expenditure time was significantly reduced, delays and cancellations reached
unprecedent low levels, and customer service centres installed. In the same vein, the cargo
company moved its HQ to the centre of its market and fully decentralised its commercial
activities: train guards and engineers were allowed to accept load directly at the stations.
As evidenced by the statistical analysis, the perceptions shifted accordingly (see Table 9-4):
instead of less than a third, now over half the sample (at both NCA and TBA) believes that
major emphasis is set on meeting customer needs (item 1). Accordingly, significantly fewer
agents perceive that strong pressure is exerted to observe norms and procedures (FeMeSA 52
o~o, TBA 17 0~0, NCA 14 0~0). This shift clearly reflects the reorientation encouraged by both
management teams.
A highly significant correlation has been detected between the first and last item of the
questionnaire: those who perceive that major emphasis is exerted in meeting customer needs
also believe that each day brings with it new challenges. This perception, expressed by less
than 40 0~0 of the respondents at FeMeSA, is now being shared by more than 60 0~o at TBA.
Table 9-4
Percentage ofrespondents scoring 1 or 2 in questions 1, 15 and 17
Percentage of respondents scoring 1 or 2 ~
FeMeSA TBA NCA



























emphasis meeting emphasis correct
customer needs 32 52 '" 52 54 47 following procedures
procedures more results more important
important than results 33 31 49 39 '" 44 than procedures
strict ethic and honesty pragmatic with regard to ~
standards 43 53 ' 66 51 53 ethic and honesty I
' computed at the level of the total sample; ` indicates a significant difference with the FeMeSA sample; ' only
former FeMeSA employees;' indicates a significant difference with the TBA sample
The changes in the customer focus notwithstanding, the agents' perception about the
importance of the legality of their actions is not changing at a comparable pace. Broadly
speaking, a third of the respondents in all three units believe that procedures are more
important than results (FeMeSA 33 0~0, TBA 31 0~0, NCA 39 0~0). This perception seems to be
particularly entrenched among former Ferrocarriles agents (TBA 49 0~0, NCA 44 0~0).
Concerning the other pole of the pair ( see Addendum), it is worth of inention that while half
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the sample at FeMeSA expressed priority to results over procedures, at TBA and NCA only
41 0~o resp. 21 0~o shared this perception. Particularly former public agents rated the importance
of results (as opposed to procedures) very low ( TBA 23 0~0, NCA 16 0~0).
A similar situation is revealed in matters of business ethics and honesty. The number of
agents that believes that in their working environment ethical standards are followed strictly
increases ex-post (FeMeSA 43 0~0, TBA 530~0, NCA 51 0~0). On the other side, the number of
individuals that perceive daily practices as pragmatic sharply decreases (FeMeSA 37 0~0, TBA
18 oro, NCA 20 oro).
In other words, the statistica] evidence suggests two trends: one indicating that higher priority
is given to the customer, and a second trend revealing an increase in the importance granted to
procedures and dogmatic attitudes. In general, these trends are considered to be incompatible:
a legalistic orientation runs counter to the "customer first" notion.
The observed contradiction may eventually be resolved restoring to previous practices or
developing a less normative attitude. For the time being it seems clear that while the customer
orientation has reached most of the minds, the legalistic approach is still present -and to some
extent gaining strength. The roots of the first trend can be found in the constant "preaching of
the customer gospel" and the customer oriented systems and facilities implemented. Far less
efforts were conducted to eradicate legalistic practices. No steps were undertaken showing
how to deal in a flexible way with those norms that remained in place or have been introduced
after the transfer.
The consequences of this deficiency are particularly eamest because, as seen before, a
sizeable number of employees still perceive that the correct following of procedures is of
major importance. Many of them were afraid not to fully comply with the rules. According to
our interviewees, agents were not fully convinced about management's intentions. Whether
management "really meant it" or not was still doubted. Since the risks involved in
transgressing the procedures were uncertain, agents were inclined to follow them. This the
more so, since both companies fired some employees during their initial phase and job
opportunities at that time were extremely rare. Moreover, the stories narrated or published in
the in-house organ frequently glorified courageous acts of specific individuals. These agents
acted pro-actively or far beyond what is required by the norms, but never trespass them. After
more than 10 resp. 40 months of existence, management did not demonstrate that they would
approve the behaviour of someone who, trying to reach an official goal, deviated from what
was prescribed.
In summary: management succeeded in generating an awareness about the customer. As
revealed by our interviews, wide agreement existed about the need to respond to their
expectations. New, customer-friendly practices are continuously being learnt and
implemented. In that respect, the postulated hypothesis can be confirmed. Nevertheless, much
still has to be done to overcome the prevalent legalistic orientation.
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9.6 Hypothesis 5
The privatisation of a SOE will induce a change in the amount of internal
structuring: from loose control towards tight control.
There is plenty of evidence confirming the trend towards tighter control at TBA. Both
relevant items show a significant shift towards tighter control. While roughly half the
respondents believed that people at FeMeSA were cost-conscious, almost 80 0~o endorsed this
statement after deregulation. Similarly, a quarter more agents believed at TBA that meetings
were starting on time. On the other hand, while roughly 35 a~o of the respondents at FeMeSA
believed that in their company "no one thinks of costs", ex-post this figure decreased to
around 5 percent (see Addendum 9-1).
Table 9-5
Percentage of respondents scoring 1 or 2 in questions 7, 11 and 13
Percentage of respondents scoring 1 or 2
FeMeSA TBA NCA
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everyone aware costs of no one thinks of costs of
material and time 54 78 " 88 76 75 time or materials
we make many jokes we always speak seriously
about the company 19 15 8 20 21
meeting times are kept meeting times only kept
puncniallv
~
19 44 " 56 10 " 41 approxima[ely
' computed at the level of the total sample; ` indicates a significant difference with the FeMeSA sample;' only
former FeMeSA employees;' indicates a significant difference with the TBA sample
It is worth mention that only in the case of this hypothesis the three items that build the PS
dimension in Hofstede et al.'s study (1990) do also show (highly) significant correlations in
the sample here under study. Also of interest is the fact that item 9(private life own business ~
organisation covers behaviour at home) is highly correlated with the perception about
timeliness (item 13).
The quantitative data was widely supported by all of our interviewees at TBA and NCA.
There was absolute consensus with regard to the increase in work intensity at all levels.
Employees in directly productive areas for example refer to he fact that tools and spare parts
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are readily available, whereas their absence was a frequent reason for idle times at
Ferrocarriles. On the other hand, and based on the introduced regime of labour flexibility,
they can easily been reassigned tasks wherever additional resources are needed. Moreover,
attendance is strictly controlled and absenteeism severely punished.
A noteworthy modification with respect to the possibility to exercise control were the
modifications introduced in the architectural design of the main administrative offices. Soon
after taking over, TBA's management re-united previously dispersed administrative units in
several large office rooms at headquarters, a 2-storey high, classic building built by the
English administrators around 1910. During the public period these main office rooms of
about 25 by 10 meters had been subdivided into tiny compartments. The size and type of wall
of these cubicles varied, strictly following implicit hierarchical rules. Thus for example, while
the head of the office was allowed to have brick or hardboard walls, lower level employees
delimited their personal fiefdom with simple shelves which were subsequently filled with
folders or wallpapered with posters. As a result, most employees in such areas had their
"own" "office", hardly accessible for outsiders and difficult to control by supervisors. The
architectural disarray of these constructions clearly reflected the locally prevalent power
relations, the often mentioned lack of transparency and, in a last analysis, the bureaucratic
reality of Ferrocarriles. It almost goes without saying that one of the first decisions taken by
the new operators was to tear down all these partitions, regaining space and the possibility to
supervise. Leaving aside higher management, supervisors and subordinates now share the
same room. Plain desks have been arranged in geometric pattems that allow for close control.
Similar arrangements were also implemented at NCA's new office buildings in Villa Diego
near Rosario. There however, hierarchical differences were stronger underlined by space
divisions. At TBA middle managers shared offices with their immediate subordinates; at
NCA they occupied an office of their own. NCA's upper management remained rather
isolated, working concentrated in a rather difficult to access, separate wing of the building.
There were many other, more explicit and direct messages suggesting tighter control.
Argentinean SOE's and Ferrocarriles in particular were perceived as approaching work
lackadaisically. Consequently, the new operators were very outspoken about a radical change
in this respect. Management flanked their words with concrete systems: time-clocks were re-
installed, financial and production standards re-introduced, employees started to be held
accountable against previously defined targets. Results were measured and feedback provided
as soon as available. In order to validate this fifth hypothesis it is necessary to acknowledge
the dissimilar trends that with regard to the issue of control show both units. In this respect it
is possible to observe that shifts in the predicted direction take place at TBA, but not as strong
at the cazgo unit. We might conclude that while the statistical results widely confitm the
hypothesis here under scrutiny for the suburban passenger line, they are not conclusive with
respect to NCA.
9.7 Hypothesis 6
The privatisation of a SOE will induce a change in the consistency of the
culture: from homogeneity towards heterogeneity.
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The literature provided a reasonable overview of Ferrocarriles' culture. The former SOE has
summarily been described as highly routinised, a paradigmatic public bureaucracy. Long
entrenched practices were prevalent, local customs were passed from one generation to the
next (often in a nearly biological sense of the term). The archival evidence collected strongly
suggested that at FA and hence at FeMeSA one could find a rather consistent and
homogeneous set ofcultural practices.
As a consequence of the substitution of the old power holders by new managers and the
concurrent modification of the main external variables (market position, legal frame and
funding), a noticeable transformation of the cultural reality was expected. New practices
would be introduced, the relative importance of older ones shifted, some might even
disappear. In other words, it was expected that the overall degree of cultural diversity would
increase.
According to the quantitative analysis, the situation at FeMeSA runs counter to expectations:
far from being homogeneous, the culture was fragmented to a point where it is difficult to
speak of "culture" anymore, at least if defined as "common programming" or "shared
perceptions".
On the other hand, almost a year after the transfer, at TBA the overall cultural picture was
rather homogeneous: the average dispersion was significantly reduced. The NCA, after 40
months of private operation (thus four times longer that TBA at the time of the survey)
reached even higher degrees of cohesion. In both ex post cases the overall dispersion reaches
a degree present in the most heterogeneous groups of the samples surveyed by Hofstede et al.
(1990). They nevertheless allow to conclude that homogeneity has increased, at least to a
level where it is plausible to talk about "shared" perceptions.
In summary, the statistical analysis clearly disconfirms hypothesis 6. Even more: the obtained
dispersion scores indicate that far from leading to cultural heterogeneity, (new) management's
main arguments have been successfully transmitted and practices are starting to cluster around
them.
The validation process forwarded that members in both units, vis-à-vis FeMeSA, perceive a
stronger results orientation, a greater professional awareness, and that management's interest
shifted away from a purely job-related interest. In addition, though a legalistic approach is
still observable, the importance of the customer has gained relevance. Finally, it has been
demonstrated that in general, the degree of cohesiveness has increased, allowing to talk now
about a "common programming".
Less marked are the differences among both private operators. Nonetheless, they reveal some
interesting peculiarities. In the first place, NCA shows less overall diversity in the responses,
probably as a consequence of its longer common experience. More important seems to be the
fact that almost without exception, in those questions where there is a significant difference
between NCA and TBA, the scores of the cargo line always fall on the "bureaucratic" pole of
the item.
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With this information in mind it is interesting to contrast the former public agents working at
TBA and NCA. Both groups are approximately of equal size. But while at NCA they formed
a vast majority, at TBA they constituted a third of the staff As indicated in the respective
chapters, both subsamples can be distinguished on a statistically significant level on more
than half the items from their colleagues with other professional experiences.
Those former public agents working for the suburban line have widely adopted the main
views proposed by management. As a matter of fact, the statistical evidence suggests that they
hold, particularly for the so-called critical items, even more radical positions than their
colleagues with a private sector background. Those former agents now working for NCA
responded in a more consistent manner, but tended to adhere with less strength to the same
items.
As can be observed in the Addendum at the end of this chapter, both subsamples diverge on a
statistically significant level on roughly half the items. Almost without exception they score
on the same half of the continuum, indicating that the differences are more a question of
shades than of matter. Among other issues, TBA's former public agents perceive their
working environment as less risk averse, as having a longer planning horizon and as less
secretive, more open to outsiders. NCA's former public agents perceive their working
environment as less punctual (59 0~o vs. 17 0~o at TBA) and less hospitable to new colleagues
(27 0~o vs. 53 oro at TBA).
The scores thus indicate that though more consistent in their responses, the former agents at
NCA have not changed their perceptions to the same extent as the former agents now working
at TBA. And, given the absolute position of the mean value, it is possible to recognise some
remnants ofprevious public practices.
It is of course noteworthy that although it is four times as old, far more public practices are
lingering on at NCA than at the suburban line. About the reasons for this lag only educated
speculations can be formulated. A first reason might lie in the dissimilar experiences NCA
and TBA went trough during the period of deregulation. As mentioned before, NCA was
transferred only a few months after the announcement of Ferrocarriles' privatisation plans.
During that period some agents were (early-) retired; but the bulk of the reductions were
accomplished by the new operators. Thus, the working groups remained basically unaltered
until NCA's start. The suburban Mitre line on the other hand was the last to shift from public
to private hands. More than four years span from early 1991 (when plans to privatise
Ferrocarriles were announced) to actual transfer (end of May ] 995). Over the whole period
FeMeSA staff was firmly reduced (from 13000 to less than 2100). Groups were constantly
formed and disbanded, partly to cover voids or requirements, to some extent to incorporate
colleagues from other (suburban) lines already transferred. This constant reshuffling of groups
explains the lack of common cultural programming at the time of our measurement at
FeMeSA (June 1994). Those hired by NCA did not witness such degrees of cultural
commotion. It thus can plausibly be expect that more cultural elements have been transferred
basically unmodified.
A second source of NCA's lag might lie in the disparate staffing policies followed by both
private operators. As has been mentioned, NCA hired almost exclusively fornier public
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agents. TBA on the contrary only did so in those cases were it was necessary because of the
absence of an extemal market (e.g., engineers, switch operators). Partly as a consequence of
the aforementioned first source, working groups at NCA had a common history; groups at
TBA on the contrary not only lack this common history but in most cases include colleagues
wíth a non-Fen-ocarriles background. The implications are clear: at NCA the likelihood of the
introduction ot ~~lien cultural elements was far lower than at TBA.
There are two elements that could further foster this lag. Firstly, the selection procedures were
much tighter at TBA than at NCA. This might bear on the perceptions about the formation of
a professional meritocracy in the case of TBA. Secondly, the interactions among higher level
officers and low-level employees are far less frequent at the cargo that at the suburban line.
This fact certainly slowed down the pace of the cultural transformation.
9.8 Concluding remarks
It should be noted that neither at TBA nor at NCA an explicit cultural program w-as
implemented. However, management in both companies was aware of the concept and its
implications. It was clear to them that by installing certain systems or norms, specific
"messages" were being sent out to the employees. Nevertheless, such messages were never
explicitly intended or reinforced in a systematic or planned manner. And, once discovered as
an even useful by-product, they were not highlighted or exploited. In other words,
management was acting "blindly" in cultural terms.
With specific regard to the more visible cultural elements, little was done to remove previous
components. To some extent, this can be adscribed to their lack of awareness of the
significance attached by former public employees to specific elements. But, as mentioned
before, the cultural negligence at Ferrocarriles and later at FeMeSA did not engender many
such symbols. On the other hand, the process of group reshuffling and division either deleted
them or left them void of any significance.
Once operating, two elements of identification were introduced in both companies: new
"institutional" colours on locs and wagons and a new logo. Deeper consequences had the
introduction of what in both companies was termed (heavily borrowing from the then ongoing
political debate) as "new discourse". With variations in emphasis and shades, at TBA and
NCA this new discourse included the following four key elements: meritocracy, efficiency,
control and customer orientation. The reason for the selection of these four issues was rooted
in the perception management (and the public opinion in general) had on where the main
weaknesses and (simu]taneously) differential traits between public and private sector were to
be found. Accordingly, the content of each of these terms was handled rather loosely.
Broadly speaking, they were defined as the antonym of what were considered to be the until
then prevalent practices. Thus for example, "meritocracy" was simply defined as ]ack of
nepotism, "amiguismo", clannishness or related behaviours. Moreover, such meritocratic
means were only employed for the hiring decision. By the time of our survey, HR officials at
TBA "started thinking about the introduction of some sort" of systematic appraisal and
advancement procedures. At NCA, visited forty months after the start of operations, no plans
at all were made in that respect.
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However vaguely defined, these four issues were frequently mentioned at gatherings and
courses as key elements of the new organisational reality. Conspicuously missing from that
list is the issue of the "bottom liné ' or any overt reference to the obviously pre-eminent profit
orientation of the companies. When asked about this absence, responses were ambiguous, but
strongly suggested two reasons. In first place, to mention profit as an ultimate goal was
strongly rejected during public times and would probably run counter to Ferrocarriles'
tradition. Railway activity always pursued "higher ends", as e.g., the country's geopolitical
integration, to serve the community or to help less advantaged groups. For decades, the noUon
of profitability was excluded from organisational discourse and practice, by politicians as well
as unionists, those groups that provided Ferrocarriles' power holders. Any profit obtained was
gained through the exploitation of the public or the employees, so the saying went, and thus
had to be avoided. On the other hand, to mention a profit orientation as the most important
goal runs counter to a wider cultural value present in Argentine society (and other Latin
American nations as well).
As a result of the validation process it seems clear that in both privately operated carriers a
results and a customer orientation are firmly embedded and that their employees (though with
less strength at NCA) developed habits that correspond to a new awareness about the costs of
time and materials. Contrary to the statistical proof, the evidence collected through other
means clearly indicates that a shift towards a more professional identity is taking place.
Finally, the process refuted the alleged shift away from a concern for people and towards a
concern exclusively centered around the job ( and its underlying dichotomy). According to the
answers at both companies, the perceived job orientation does not seem to be at odds with a
high degree of responsibility for the employees welfare on management's part. Broadly
speaking, the integration of the three cases forwarded clear evidence pointing towards what
could be considered a cultural turnaround. Though some bureaucratic residues are still
present, as well as remnants of past professional identities and practices, the overall
transformation towards efficiency and market is clearly visible. [n the following ( and last)
































1 major emphasis is exerted 32 52 't 52 54 47 major emphasis is exerted
in meeting customer needs on correctly following
or anisational rocedures
2 strong pressure is exerted 58 61 67 68 67 personal problems are
to finish tasks; personal taken into account; the
problems of colleagues are tasks is of secondary
of seconda im ortance im ortance
3 people feel uncomfortable 58 46 ' 44 64 '~` 69 people feel comfortable in
in unfamiliar situations; unfamiliar situations; they
they try to avoid to take have no difficulties in
risks acce tin risks
4 all important decisions are 55 50 34 38 ~` 31 all important decisions are
made by individuals made by groups or
committees
5 we do not think more than 51 37 ' 28 51 `~` 55 we think 3 or more years
a da ahead ahead
6 both the organisation and 48 63 ' 77 54 50 both the organisation and
its people are open and its people are closed and
clear to newcomers and secretive, even among
outsiders insiders
7 everyone is strongly aware 54 78 " 88 76 75 no one thinks of costs of
of the costs of time or time or materials
materials
8 people only make the least 19 9 5 2 12 people put in maximal
effort effort
9 a persons private life is 64 40 '~ 47 16 ' 43 the organisation's notms
regarded as his own co-ver the employee's
business behaviour at work as well
as at home
10 the organisation takes 14 36 " 51 38 43 the organisation is only
direct responsibility for the interested in the work
employee and his famíly's employees do
welfare
11 we make many jokes about 19 15 8 20 21 we always speak seriously
the company and our jobs about the company and our
~obs
' computed at [he level of the total sample; ` indicates a significant difference with the FeMeSA sample;



















~ F F cn G w w Fo v~ G ~.o. w
12 anyone would fit the 35 24 21 24 21 only very special people fit
or anisation into the or anisation
13 meeting times are kept 19 44 " S6 10 " 41 meeting times are only kept
unctuall a roximatel
14 new employees need more 31 21 19 38 " 37 new employees only need a
than a ear to feel at home few da s to feel at home
1S organisational procedures 33 31 49 39 " 44 results are more important
are more important than than following correct
results rocedures
16 job competence is the only 3S S8 " 71 S7 53 people of a certain family,
criterion in hiring; the social class or education
back-ground has no have bigger chances to be
influence hired
17 in matters of business 43 S3 ~` 66 S1 S3 regarding ethics and
ethics and honesty, we honesty we are pragmatic,
obey strict standards, even not dogmattc
if they run counter to short
term results
18 each de} brings new 38 60 " 58 S4 S4 each day is pretty much the
challenee, same
computed at the level of the total sample; indicates a significant difference with the FeMeSA sample;





















~~ ó ó á ó w a
F" E"" V1 Zl W W E"' V] ~ W~
1 major emphasis is exerted 52 17 ~' 18 14 16 major emphasis is exerted
in meeting customer needs on correctly following
or anisational rocedures
2 strong pressure is exerted ]7 7 4 1 1 personal problems are
to finish tasks; personal taken into account; the
problems of colleagues are tasks is of secondary
of seconda im ortance im ortance
3 people feel uncomfortable 28 21 ' 21 12 ~`~` 11 people feel comfortable in
in unfamiliar sítuations; unfamiliar situations; they
they try to avoid to take have no difficulties m
risks acce tin risks
4 all important decisions are 36 29 40 36 ' 41 all important decisions are
made by individuals made by groups or
committees
5 we do not think more than 26 41 ' S4 28 " 21 we think 3 or more years
a da ahead ahead
6 both the organisation and 38 23 ' 13 18 19 both the organisation and
its people are open and its people are closed and
clear to newcomers and secretive, even among
outsiders insiders
7 everyone is strongly aware 35 5 ~~` 2 6 7 no one thinks of costs of
of the costs of time or time or materials
materials
8 people only make the least 67 77 87 87 88 people put in maximal
effort effort
9 a persons private life is 19 33 " 28 54 ' S7 the organisation's norms
regarded as his own co-ver the employee's
business behaviour at work as well
as at home
10 the organisation takes 80 33 y' 20 22 16 the organisation is only
d'uect responsibility for the interested in the work
employee and his family's employees do
welfare
11 we make many jokes about 50 54 69 47 41 we always speak seriously
the company and our jobs about the company and our
obs
' computed at the level of the total sample; ` indicates a significant difference wíth the FeMeSA sample;












w ~ ~ ~: ~ éu
~
~ ~ Cw ~~ ~ ~w
~
Êa iH F ~~ w~ F ~ w~-
12 anyone would fit the 45 36 47 31 32 only very special people fit
or anisation into the or anisation
13 meeting times are kept 65 23 " 17 59 ~" 59 meeting times are only kept
unctuall a roximatel
14 new employees need more 50 52 53 31 " 27 new employees only need a
than a ear to feel at home few da s to feel at home
15 organisational procedures 52 41 23 21 "' 16 results are more ~mportantl
are more important than than following correct
results rocedures
16 job competence ís the only 50 10 '~` 4 5 3 people of a certain family,
criterion in hiring; the social class or education
back-ground has no have bigger chances to be
influence hired
17 in matters of business 37 18 " 11 21 17 regarding ethics and
ethics and honesty, we honesty we are pragmatic.
obey strict standards, even not dogmatic
if they run counter to short
term results
18 each day brings new 45 18 " 25 19 20 each day is pretty much the
challen es same
computed at the level of the total sample; - indicates a significant difference with the FeMeSA sample;




This fina] chapter will highlight the principal lessons that can be extracted in spite of the
aforementioned shortcomings. Special attention is given here to those elements that enabled a
relatively swift reorientation of the cultural practices. The chapter closes by pointing at a
number of research questions that on the basis of the knowledge gained and current
discussions in the field merit further investigation.
10.2 Relevant gains
There are three core issues for which relevant infotmation has been gained. To start with, lor
the first time encompassing cultural diagnoses were formulated for all four companics
involved in the study. Secondly, this information allowed to draw comparisons between thc
different units. Such lateral and longitudinal analysis provided the necessary input for the
detection of any trends at company level resulting from the change in ownership. Finally, this
same information allowed to compare sub-cultural formations and the construction of new
identities among those agents employed in the newly created companies. The following lines
summarise these findings, as they will provide the basis for the next section.
As mentioned before, this study provides comprehensive cultural portraits of the original state
owned enterprise as well as of the companies that evolved from it. As mentioned before, at
the time of Fetrocarriles' transformation into FeMeSA its culture was already severely
weakened as a consequence of a decade long debilitation. This cultural decay was caused by
the absence of leadership and common institutional perspectives, among other causes. This
notwithstanding, it was possible to trace some sub-cultural formations (e.g., switch operators)
and overarching themes (e.g., hardware orientation, engineering tradition, the glorification of
the past). In the four years that elapsed between the creation and liquidation of FeMeSA, the
culture was further debilitated. At the time of the transfer, and as a consequence of the
massive retirements, the continuous reshuffling of groups, and the introduction of new
members, an initially infirm and fragmented culture was completely destroyed.
Just ten months after starting operations, TBA's management succeeded in reaching a
reasonable degree of overall cultural consistency, and was particularly successful in changing
the common perceptions of those of its agents with a previous working experience at the
state-owned railway lines. As a matter of fact, and particularly for those items termed (and
issues deemed by management as) "critical", the former public agents scored nearer to the
"competitive" end of the respective items' scale.
In terms of the consistency of its common practices, the response homogeneity at NCA did
not differ significantly from the one surveyed at the passenger line, in spite of its longer
existence. Contrary to the situation at TBA, at the cargo line it was possible to detect a line of
cleavage between managerial and non - managerial levels. Non - managers scored far more
parochial; other bureaucratic elements have also been found among them.
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The culture of both private units can clearly be distinguished from the public organisation
they stem from. The most radical departure from previous perceptions was detected among
those concerning cost and time-consciousness, customer orientation and the use of
meritocratic criteria. Despite these similarities, NCA's culture when compared to the one
revealed at TBA seem to be less risk-friendly, timely, open and ends- and future oriented.
This implies that probably as a consequence of its different staffing policies, the cargo line
inherited far more practices from its public past, a bundle of unresolved issues it has some
difficulties coping with.
Put together, the traits succinctly listed above allow to elaborate on broader issues concerning
the construction and removal of common understandings among members of any given
organisation. On the basis of the evidence collected, the following section will discuss the
formation and destruction of cultural practices and analyse to what an extent a reduction in
the degree of "publicness" has an influence upon these two processes.
10.3 What lessons can be learned?
Beyond the more specific knowledge gained from each of the units surveyed and the
comparisons among them, there are three issues that derive from the previous discussions and
need to be addressed. Contrary to common practice but following the order in which these
issues emerged during the study, this section will ]ook at how cultures can be (re) moulded
and then (re) created. The section closes relating the "publicness" question to cultural shifts
when changing from public to private ownership.
10.3.1 Cultural destruction as an instrument
Though insight has been gained into a number of culture-related issues, the evidence
concerning the destruction of the previous organisational practices bears particular relevance.
Though it may be argued that the process of debilitation started long before deregulation, it
seems probable that the main shifts took place as a consequence of the continuous reshuffling,
depletion and new formation ofgroups of disparate origin.
On the other hand, though TBA started operating under private management more than three
years after NCA, at the time of the survey employees of both companies had similar cultural
profiles. This fact raises the question of the (relative) speed with which each company
adjusted to its new environment and allows two basic interpretations. A first assumption
would be that a year after its transfer NCA had reached its current cultural profile, and that it
remained basically unaltered since then. This implies that the bulk of the cultural adjustments
took place in the first year, and that only marginal adjustments take place afterwards. Since no
measurements were done during NCA's initial phase, this first assumption can not be left out
ofconsideration.
There are however strong arguments to counter it. It seems unlikely that NCA transfouned its
culture in such a short time span because of many obstacles and hindrances. To start with,
over 95 percent of NCA's staff has been transferred from FA directly (i.e., without closer
scrutiny and selection), bringing ~vith them century-old practices and entrenched habits. As
mentioned in chapter 8, employees opposed the transfer and hindered the seizure of the
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property by the new operators (McCaffrey, 1994: 65); in other words, employees were all but
receptive to innovations. TBA invested heavily during its first year in further education and
training; at NCA on the contrary, only few courses were offered. Finally, management at
NCA was rather isolated and interacted far less with members of the lower echelons than their
colleagues at TBA. In short, the likelihood that the cultural transformation of both companies
took place following a similar pattern and at the same speed is extremely low.
The second assumption implies that employees at TBA reached a similar cultural profile in
basically a fourth of the time needed by their colleagues at NCA. This relatively speaking
higher speed could be related to the fact that as new employees of TBA, the former public
agents formed a minority. Probable additiona] causes might be the stronger interaction of
TBA's management with the organisational base and the strength and consistency of the
formers' messages. Nevertheless, it seems highly likely that the higher speed of change was
also a consequence of the inherent weakness of the previous cultural order.
This fact bears particular relevance because in the cases here under scrutiny, many of the
practices prevalent until deregulation were not merely changed for any altemative common
understanding but for the exact opposite (e.g., an emphasis on means for an orientation
towards ends; a procedure for a customer orientation). Under circumstances in which the
culture is not merely shifted towards a stronger orientation on one or more dimensions but has
to perform a"U-turn" in its understandings, the destruction of the previous order
accomplishes half the task. As evidenced by the results obtained, it seems easier to build a
new culture from scratch than to remould it.
Briefly, though it is difficult to disentangle the relative weight of the different factors that
contributed to the velocity of change, it seems likely that the use of group reshuffling and
merger weakens the cultural fabric and thus facilitates the introduction of new shared
practices.
These facts raise the question weather the debilitation of an organisational culture could be
used as a purposive mean when management determines the need to transform a given set of
common understandings. In other words, could management use some of the means employed
by the administrators of FeMeSA (without being aware of the full range of their
consequences) to accelerate the cultural transformation of an organisation or of some specific
part of it?
There are several issues closely linked to the reshuffling and merger of groups as a cultural
instrument. Assuming a previous diagnosis that recommends the removal of certain
dysfunctional cultural elements, it has to be evaluated if such a group reshuffling is feasible
from both a technical and social perspective. Concerning the former, it is necessary to
evaluate if some knowledge - holder can be transferred without jeopardising output. From a
social point of view it is necessary to weight the advantages of such a relocation against some
eventual losses caused by the disruption of affective bindings. Equally important -at least in
public environments- is whether such transfers among groups are legally possible. At
Ferrocarriles (and other SOE's and public units as well) such transfers were hindered by
existing regulations and highly dependent on the unions' will.
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In summary, to merge and reshuffle groups as a means to accelerate the cultural transition
seems to constitute a viable path, particularly in those situations in which actual and proposed
model diverge radically and urgency plays a role. In any case, such a way of action can never
be an end in itself. If explicitly implemented, it has to be enhanced by other measures that
propose new orientations. The following lines will discuss the lessons that can be leamed in
that respect from the experiences here reviewed.
10.3.2 Publicness and transformation
Only as a consequence of the unavailability of government appropriations the units reflected
the priorities and signals sent by the market. Real managerial latitude was only gained after
the intricate legal webs were lifted and autonomy was only limited by common civil and
commercial law. It is no longer necessary to take decisions that run counter to efficiency
criteria since political influences have been practically eliminated. The breadth of impact of
the companies' goals has been diminished; the "public good" (bien publico) or "general
interest" are no longer valid decisional criteria. It was possible to substitute the anachronic
civil service merit system by principles of functional polivalence; the myriad of public
regulations by common private law.
On the basis of the evidence collected by this study, it seems clear that a requisite for the
possibility to turn around the culture was the reduction in the degrees of publicness. The
weakening of the previously existing practices facilitated the cultural turnaround; but only the
reduction in the degrees of publicness allowed to substantially reorient the shared
understandings. The extent to which the public character of these units has been shifted can be
readily detected if one realises that the above-mentioned examples correspond to the "dual"
factors mentioned in the introductory chapter. In summary, it is clear that only by stripping
off the public character from the former state-owned-enterprise it was pussible to achieve a
cultural reorientation.
10.3.3 Leadership is the manipulation of culture
In sometimes even subtle ways, those who lead a company (or any relevant area of an
organisation) modify its culture. The actions performed or examples provided by managers or
other visible figures are perceived and evaluated by the members of all groups within the
organisation. Once stabilised, their interpretations build those common understandings that in
the end form a specific culture. Ferrocamles' more recent history is illustrative in this respect,
since it provides at least two clear examples of the close link between leadership and culture.
The first one, though substantiating the main argument, is a"negative" example: lack of
leadership is followed by the loss of culture. Such a process was readily observable if the
consequences of the main features of Ferrocarriles' management are reviewed. The latter's
transitional character left the company (leaving aside the years of de Marchi's autocratic rule)
without long-term objectives and a clear message that permeated the whole unit.
For a long time, this void was filled by the orientations provided by the unions. They
represented not only the employees' interests but also continuity, and for both reasons most of
Ferrocarriles' agents tended to side with them. Views and attitudes provided by, particularly,
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the member-strong Unión Ferroviaria and the more radical La Fraternidad, fostered
dysfunctional practices. The power of Ferrocarriles' unions was uncontested, even during
times of authoritarian rule, when union activities were severely restricted. As mentioned by
Tesoro (1996) "before 1989 the unions - and not management - dictated the organisational
discourse".
The facts hitherto discussed indicate that the cultural void left by those at the top was filled by
the unions. This process certainly did not happen overnight but was a consequence of both
management's negligence or ineptitude and the unions interest to conquer additional power.
There is agreement among most of Ferrocarriles' analysts about the power held by the
employees' representatives before privatisation started. However, the most clear indicator of
the genuine monopoly the unions had on cultural matters is offered by the fact that once their
power started to erode, no other cultural currents gained significant consistency.
In summary: in the years between Fenocarriles' creation and the mid 70's, leadership shifted
away from management into the hands of the unions and their leaders. This process peaked in
1973 - 76, when Raíil Melgarejo, a union activist, was installed as FA"s president. During the
de - facto government 1976 - 1983, activism was forbidden, and the unions severely
debilitated. After democracy was reinstalled in 1983, and until Ferrocarriles dissolution, their
power remained weak. Be it as a consequence of the personal losses suffered under military
rule, or the fact that (national) elections were not won by their natural allies (i.e., the Peronist
party), the unions were not able to re-assume the leadership within Fenocarriles. It is
interesting to note that, as mentioned before, the void left (this time by the unions) was not
regained by management. The railway company's last ten years were characterised by the
complete absence of any visible leaders, be they official or countercultural ones. This lack
probably was a the root of the immense and increasing operational losses and started to
debilitate the until then prevalent common understandings.
The previous paragraphs allow to infer that if a strong counterculture is present, it will
appropriate the roles that management is not able to assume. As evidenced by this "negative"
example, if leadership is only provided in some sectors or not at all, no set of common
understandings is present and visible, and the cultural fabric starts to erode and weaken. This
study, nevertheless, also presented two "positive" examples, i.e., situations in which the
actions of managers of TBA and NCA fostered certain attitudes among the employees. In
addition, the disparate paths followed by both companies allowed to draw interesting
comparisons and to infer about the advantages and drawbacks of each of them.
Expressed succinctly, it seems that TBA reached a similar cultural transformation in a fourth
of the time needed by NCA through a different staffing policy, the believe in the advantages
of MBWA and a more active involvement of management in the daily activities of the
individual employees. Though sharing an even more competitive set of common
understandings, NCA's management modified far less, probably a consequence of the
incorporation of complete gangs and groups and its relative isolation.
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10.4 Effective turnaround leadership:
enabling factors
These differences notwithstanding, both private units shared a number of traits. To some
extent they staffed their ranks from the same source, use similar technologies, and have to do
business under a comparable lega] framework. Of importance however was the fact that
management at TBA and NCA, though aware of the concept of organisational culture, never
acted in a intentional or purposive manner regarding cultural issues. In spite of this, both
companies have done reasonably well in tuming around the practices prevalent under public
ownership. This section will highlight those factors that were conducive to an effective
change of the inherited attitudes and to the formation of a rather homogeneous set of
practices.
10.4.1 A single discourse
The prime reason for the success of the cultural turnaround was the existence, in each
company, of a single message (or "speech", in the words of our interviewees), shared
unquestioned by all higher management. The low degrees of dispersion within upper
hierarchical levels allow no misinterpretation. In addition, the relevance of sharing a sole
message is also evidenced (and statistically supported) by the fact that in precisely those
issues deemed as of relevance by management, the degrees of dispersion in most sub-units are
low, and the changes in attitude significant.
In other words, in those areas in which management confronts the company's staff with a
shared vision, attitudes will most likely be affected in the proposed direction and intensity.
10.4.2 Words and deeds
Also of relevance for the success of the turnaround was that in both companies, but
particularly at TBA, the "speech" were not just hollow phrases but words accompanied by
deeds. Frequently mentioned by the employees in that respect were the implementation of
customer centres, the thorough selection procedures (in the case of TBA), the behaviours that
were punished, or the fact that managers lived by their words and did not hesitate to work at
the front line in cases of emergency. In short, management transformed visions into practices
because they simply "walk the talk" (Vance, 1998: 8).
10.4.3 Feedback
A third element that contributed to the significant attitudinal changes was the feedback
obtained by all levels through the wide diffusion of a limited number of clear and easy to
understand performance indicators. Admittedly, the strong impact of such indicators was in
part due to the lack of their use by the previous, public managers. Their importance however
cannot be overestimated since the latter is the case in many SOE's in the underdeveloped
world and because of the positive reinforcement such indicators create.
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10.4.4 Win I win situation
Though highly relevant for the two cases here under scrutiny, the contribution towards an
effective change of the three elements hitherto discussed do not constitute a novelty. A further
element that contributed to reshape the culture was the employees' awareness that they were
acting in a"win I win situation". This kind of awareness, generated and frequently highlighted
by members of the upper echelons, intended to make employees realise that a) there is no way
back to the old traditions and b) those who do not accept the "new ways" will have to leave.
Particularly at the Personnel department officials were very outspoken about these fact;
prospective or current employees that complained about tight working schedules, too much
pressure or low wages received a short and blunt "There's a long queue [waiting for your job]
behind you" as an answer.
10.4.5 Environmental issues and Unionism
Another relevant factor that shaped the attitude towards change of the former public
employees was the general mood about deregulation processes. At least bits of information
about these globa] tendencies reached everyone - giving deeper hold to the perception that
their fate could not be warded off Similar consequences had the firm actions that the
Argentinean executive and legislative bodies were executing. Finally, the absence of strong
union leadership also facilitated the cultural transformation. Even more, the little union
activity registered was conducive to the management's aims.
10.5 New research directions
Any study that aims at uncovering cultural dynamics within organisations will necessarily
come in contact with diverse academic fields. This project also followed a multidisciplinary
approach; as a consequence, it also raises questions in different but related areas.
A first research issue which seems worth pursuing is mainly concemed with the forces that
motivate employees, and specifically former public agents, to radically alter their views and
understandings. It is noteworthy that even after long previous socialisation processes, they are
able to modify their behaviour (e.g., vis-à-vis the customers) immediately, and their views (as
demonstrated by the questionnaires and interviews) after only a very short time span. Is it
possible that to some extent these shifts may be explained by the need to bring in line actual
behaviour and beliefs? As noted before, such changes are partially supported by the lack of
other professional alternatives (a saturated job market!), the latter fact inducing employees to
accept very ]ow wages.
The issue raised here follows the studies conducted by Festinger (1957), Brehm and Cohen
(1962) and Bem (1967), and more recently reassumed by e.g., Gneezy and Rustichini (1998),
and implies the need felt by each employee to bring into consonance his or her views with the
behaviours they are following on a daily basis. Closer scrutiny of the conditions that force
such a change may help to further accelerate such cultural transitions.
A second promising line of research is related to the "publicness puzzle". As mentioned while
treating the methodological issues, this study tried to find an organisation that as a
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consequence of deregulation would be as disparate as possible from the original public unit.
The aim was to be able to detect and reveal a visible line of cleavage and large differences.
However, as mentioned by Bozeman, research should not focus its attention exclusively on
the binary (public - private) classification because of its limited utility for specific
environments (1987: I 10).
In a study about R 8c D laboratories Crow and Bozeman have developed dimensional
measures of publicness and privateness (Crow and Bozeman, 1998; Bozeman 1987). The
former is based on the percentage of the organisation's financial resources received from
government sources and can be high (76 - 100 0~0), moderate (26 - 75 0~0) or low (0 - 25 0~0).
This measure is taken as a proxy for political authority. The privateness measure is based on
the "expressed market orientation" of the organisation, i.e., on the influence the market has on
the development of products and services (Bozeman, 1987: 112). Though the use of other
categories is feasible, this measure also shows three levels (high, moderate, low). Out of the
combination of both measures a 3 by 3 typology emerges that covers a wide gamut of
situations, from units that are mainly funded by government and rather isolated from market
forces to completely independent and market oriented.
A research design like the one followed in this study could be applied in order to trace
cultural shifts when units change their relative position between neighbouring cells in the
aforementioned typology. Results from such a study could shed further light on the
differences between governmental and public units and about the link between publicness and
organisational effectiveness. And, needless to add, it would provide insights into more less
radical but morc common cultural transformations.
Finally, the impressive degree of anomia found at FeMeSA induced to take a systematic look
at the degrees of dispersion within and among organisational subunits.
This approach proved to be useful, as it allowed to discriminate among different aggregation
criteria. As mentioned before, it would be wrong to draw inferences about the cultural reality
of any given organisation on the basis of an unsuitable aggregation criteria. lt is important
therefore to look for criteria that build culturally homogeneous subsamples and thus minimise
overall dispersion. Further research is needed in order to determine whether this is a valid
procedure to approach an organisational culture - at least in settings characterised by high
levels of heterogeneity.
10.6 Summary
In summary, a first step towards an effective cultural reorientation is to evaluate the extent to
which the degrees of publicness have been reduced. A thorough revision of the normative
framework is needed in order to gauge the decisional latitude management counts with.
Secondly, if a diagnosis reveals the existence of pervasive cultural traits that run counter to
organisational needs or the orientations fostered by the upper levels, it could be of use to
reshuffle groups within (or even among) certain areas in order to debilitate the prevalent
cultural fabric. Though at a considerable personal toll, such a radical measure has proved to
accelerate the ulterior formation of new shared understandings. Finally, the experience at
NCA and particularly at TBA demonstrated that there is a wide array of actions that
management could further use in order to redirect common views. The intrinsic advantages of
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managing by wandering around, or of underpinning words with deeds have been largely
confirmed. Next to this more common advice, insight has been gained about the advantage -in
cultural terms- of putting through a consistent and uniformed discourse, limited to those few
key points that need to be addressed ímmediately. Equally fruitful was the outspoken and
frank communication among upper and lower echelons. Though sometimes even harsh, it
allowed former public agents as well as "newcomers" to quickly understand the (new) rules of
the game. One last element that also contributed greatly to redirect customs were the efforts
conducted in order to make explicit to the employees that they were facing a so-called "win-
win" situation. In short: on the basis of the experiences here reviewed, there is much the
management of privatised companies can do to effectively reorient inherited dysfimctional
practices.
Moreover, and beyond their direct managerial implications, the cases here reviewed advanced
some material concerning the "publicness" debate referred to in chapter 1. As might be
recalled, a number of voices question the validity of the public - private distinction and, by
extension, also the existence of a"public organisational culture" as a distinctive phenomenon.
The shifts operated through deregulation clearly indicate the influence of the so - called
"dual" factors as elements that while defining the public character of a certain unit, foster
specific cultural profiles. The emergence of the market as central institution and the
simultaneous reorientation towards the customer and the unavailability of public subsidies
and the concurrent shift towards efficiency: these are but two examples that reveal the close
interaction between public traits and organisational culture.
In short, this study has forwarded strong evidence about the existence of these "dual" factors
and their consequences upon the culture of an organisation. And thus, reasoning in an







~Por qué se hace esta encuesta?
El propósito es simple: la Universidad de Aquisgrán (Alemania)
ha decidido estudiar las dificultades a las que se ven expuestos los
miembros de organizaciones que transitan el camino de la privati-
zación. Los resultados que se obtengan de esta encuesta servirán para
conocer en forma más precisa la situación por la cual atraviesa la or-
ganización, desde el punto de vista de quienes trabajan en la misma.
Quienes propulsamos este estudio pretendemos, a partir del co-
nocimiento adquirido a través de la presente encuesta, reducir las si-
tuaciones de conflicto generadas durante los procesos de privatización.
La participación en la encuesta es voluntaria:
la decisión de Ilenar la encuesta queda en cada uno. Solo así podre-
mos contar con respuestas espontáneas y sinceras.
La encuesta es anónima:
no hay que frmar el formulario. La encuesta es procesada fuera de la
empresa por investigadores de la Universidad de Aquisgrán, los cua-
les no poseen vínculo alguno con la Empresa.
Esperamos poder contar con la opinión y participación de todos





La primera parte del formulario tiene por propósito conocer su opinión sobre ciertas prácticas
de la empresa. Está annado de tal manera que Ud. siempre va a encontrar dos afirmaciones de
sentido opuesto en los costados de la hoja y los námeros 1,2,3,4 y 5 entre las mismas.
Veamos un ejemplo:
En donde yo trabajo...
00 siempre se fuma I 1 2 3 4 5 I nunca se fuma
Si efectivamente en donde Ud. trabaja siempre se fuma, por favor senale el numero 1
marcando un círculo alrededor del mismo.
En donde yo trabajo...
00 siempre se fuma 1 2 3 4 5 nunca se fuma
Si, por el contrario, en donde Ud. trabaja no se fuma, marque por favor el numero 5. Cuando
en su opinión la verdad cae entremedio, marque el numero 4 0 2, de acuerdo a cuán cerca la
respuesta esté de uno de los extremos o el 3 si su opinión está justo en el medio.
Recuerde lo siguiente:
Lea con cuidado cada afirmación, frase o pregunta.
Por favor no deje ninguna pregunta sin responder.
Tenga presente que no hay respuestas buenas o malas, correctas o incorrectas.
Si se equivocó en un par, tache y marque de nuevo.
Ante cualquier duda, por favor pregunte al encuestador.
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Prácticas de la Empresa
Esta parte del formulario tiene por propósito conocer su opinión sobre ciertas prácticas de la
empresa. Por favor guíe sus respuestas en base a su experiencia diaria en la misma.
En donde yo trabajo...
Ol la mayor presión se 1
ejerce para complacer
los deseos de la clientela
2 3 4 5 la mayor presión se
ejerce para cumplir en
forma los procedimien-
tos
02 se ejerce fuerte presión 1
en llevar a cabo las ta-
reas; a los problemas
personales de los
colegas se les da poca
importancia
03 las personas no se sien- 1




04 todas las decisiones de 1
relevancia son tomadas
por personas en forma
individual
OS no pensamos más que en 1
un día por adelantado
06 la organización y sus 1
miembros son abiertos y
claros, tanto para los
nuevos miembros como
para terceros
07 cada uno es muy con- 1
ciente del costo del
tiempo y de los materia-
les
08 las personas hacen el 1
mínimo esfuerzo posible
2 3 4 5 los problemas de los
colegas siempre se
tienen en cuenta; la tarea
viene en segundo lugar
2 3 4 5 las personas se sienten a
gusto en situaciones
desconocidas; no tiene
dificultad en asumir ries-
gos
2 3 4 5 todas las decisiones de
relevancia son tomada
por grupos o comisiones
2 3 4 5 pensamos tres o más
anos por adelantado
2 3 4 5 la organización y las
personas son cerradas y
secretas, aun para los
propiostrabajadores
2 3 4 5 nadie piensa en el costo
del tiempo o de los ma-
teriales
2 3 4 5 cada uno da siempre lo
mejor de sí mismo
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En donde yo trabajo...
09 la vida privada de las
personas es visto como
una cosa ajena a la em-
presa
10 la empresa se hace di-
rectamente responsable
por el bienestar de los
trabajadores y sus fami-
lias
11 hacemos muchos chistes
sobre la organización y
nuestra tarea
12 cualquiera va bien con la
organización
13 las reuniones comienzan
siempre puntualmente
14 los trabajadores nuevos
necesitan más de un ano
para sentirse como en
casa
15 los procedimientos son
más importantes que los
resultados
16 la capacidad en la tarea
es el unico criterio
empleado para la incor-
poración de personal; su
procedencia no influye
la decisión
17 cumplimos con estrictas
normas éticas y de ho-
nestidad, aun cuando va-
yan en detrimento de los
resultados de corto plazo
18 cada día trae novedades
1 2 3 4 5 las normas de la organi-
zación atanen al
comportamiento de los
miembros tanto en el
trabajo como en casa
1 2 3 4 5 a la empresa unicamente
le interesa la tarea que el
empleado lleva a cabo
1 2 3 4 5 hablamos siempre en
forma seria sobre la or-
ganización y nuestra
tarea
1 2 3 4 5 unicamente personas
muy especiales van bien
conla organización
1 2 3 4 5 las reuniones no co-
mienzan siempe pun-
tualmente
1 2 3 4 5 los trabajadores nuevos
necesitan de un par de
días para sentirse como
en casa
1 2 3 4 5 los resultados son más
importantes que el ob-
servar el procedimiento
correcto
1 2 3 4 5 las personas que provie-
nen de determinada fa-
milia, clase social o
escuela poseen mayores
posibilidades de ser in-
corporadas
1 2 3 4 5 en lo que se refiere a
ética y honestidad, so-
mos muy pragmáticos,
no dogmáticos
1 2 3 4 5 todos los días se parecen
un poco
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20 ~Qué edad tiene Usted?
1 Menos de 20 anos
2 de 20 a 24 anos
3 de 25 a 29 anos
4 de 30 a 34 anos
5 de 35 a 39 anos
6 de 40 a 49 anos
7 de 50 a 59 anos
8 60 anos o más
21 ~Cuantos ados de estudios oficiales ha realizado?
(Comenzando por la escuela primaria, por favor cuente unicamente el numero de anos que
abarca oficialmente cada curso, aun en el caso que Ud. hubiera necesitado más o menos canti-
dad de ar~os; si ha participado en cursos a tiempo parcial o vespertinos, cuente el nnmero de
anos que hubiera abarcado el mismo curso a tiempo completo.)
anos
22 ~Qué clase de tarea realiza Usted en el NCA?
1 Un trabajo para el cual no se requiere normalmente más fonnación profesional que
la capacitación en el empleo (trabajo no-calificado o semi-calificado).
2 Un trabajo para el cual no se requiere normalmente de una formación profesional
superior (oficinista, mecanógrafo, secretario, administrativo, etc.).
3 Un trabajo para el cual se requieren normalmente hasta cuatro anos de formación
profesional (trabajador calificado, técnico, enfermera, etc.).
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4 Un trabajo para el cual se requiere normalmente de una formación profesional
universitaria ( contador, abogado, ingeniero, psicólogo, etc.). En su actividad Usted
no tiene a su cargo a otros empleados.
5 Un trabajo gerencial, por el cual tiene a su cargo uno o más subordinados de nivel
no-gerencial.
6 Un trabajo gerencial, por el cual tiene a su cargo uno o más subordinados de nivel
gerencial.
23 ~Hace cuantos anos que Usted trabaja para el NCA?
(Por favor indique en námeros la cantidad de anos)
anos
24 Previo al ingreso al NCA, ~qué experiencia laboral ha realizado?
1 ninguna experiencia, este es su primer empleo.
2 ha trabajado en Ferrocarriles Argentinos.
3 ha trabajado en otra empresa o ente del Estado
4 ha trabajado en relación de dependencia en el sector privado.
5 ha trabajado por cuenta propia.
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Samenvatting
Rond 1985 telde Ferrocarriles Argentinos, de Argentijnse nationale spoorwegmaatschappij,
ongeveer 100.000 werknemers, vervoerde gemiddeld 22 miljard transport units en maakte een
verlies van 2 miljoen dollar per dag. Tien jaar later, en na deregulering, werd op het Argen-
tijnse spoorwegnet twee keer zoveel vervoerd met minder dan een derde van de werknemers
en subsidies.
Dit kon worden bereikt door de introductie van nieuwe strategieën, productieprocessen en een
nieuw intern beleid. Alhoewel het moeilijk te metenis, was de ommekeer in de houding van
de werknemers die hun werk behielden en aan de slag konden bij de verschillende nieuwe
spoorwegbedrijven ook een belangrijke factor.
Dit onderzoek illustreert deze ommekeer door aan te tonen hoe de organisatorische structuur
van Ferrocariles Argentinos (FA), een overheidsbedrijf, werd omgevormd door de opdeling
van het bedrijf en de daaropvolgende privatisering. Deze case is een goed voorbeeld van hoe
een zwakke en slecht functionerende cultuur zich heroriënteerde naar een klantgerichte en
kostenreducerende cultuur.
De culturele aspecten van een dergelijke transformatie verdienden nader onderzoek vanwege
het manifest gebrek aan literatuur hierover bij privatiseringen. Het is opmerkelijk dat terwijl
de meerderheid van de literatuur over privatisering zich richtte op de strategische, financiële
of de macro-economische gevolgen van deregulering, er maar weinig aandacht werd gegeven
aan de "zachte" variabelen die betrokken zijn bij dergelijke processen. Het negeren van deze
aspecten is verrassend, omdat er sinds 1980 wereldwijd heel wat neoliberaal beleid werd
geïmplementeerd en ook gedurende deze periode het concept van organisatiecultuur een hot
item was binnen de organisatietheorie. Verder is het opmerkelijk omdat aan de basis van
bestaand materiaal en al uitgevoerd onderzoek, het aannemelijk was om te concluderen dat
een verandering in eigendom en marktvoorwaarden ten gevolge van privatisering, ook de
cultuur en daardoor het resultaat aanzienlijk zouden beïnvloeden.
De privatisering van elk overheidsbedrijf verandert ingrijpend de marktsituatie, het juridisch
kader waarin het bedrijf zich bevindt en, in het bijzonder, de financiële relatie met de
overheid. Publieke eenheden die een dereguleringsproces hebben ondergaan werken
(meestal) in een markt met volledige mededinging, verkrijgen leidinggevende speelruimte,
moeten vechten voor klanten en hun eigen inkomsten genereren. Zulke veranderingen
beïnvloeden de manier waarop een bedrijf werkt en vanzelfsprekend ook de cultuur die de
organisatie heeft.
En precies dit was de centrale doelstelling van dit onderzoek: het kwantitatief ineten van de
richting en de grootte van de culturele verschuivingen die plaatsvonden na de privatisering.
Met andere woorden, het was de bedoeling om de verschuivingen aan te tonen die
plaatsvonden in de arbeidsverhoudingen, opvattingen en waarden van de werknemers die
binnen de organisatie bleven, om verschuivingen aan te tonen die ]eidden tot een
competetieve manier van denken, weg van diepgewortelde bureaucratische patronen.
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Zulke bureaucratische patronen en hun culturele gevolgen worden beschreven in hoofdstuk l,
en geplaatst in het bredere kader van het heersende "publicness" debat. Aan de hand van het
oorspronkelijke werk van Rainey, Backoff en Levine (1976) worden een gereduceerd aantal
zogenaamde "dual factors" herkend. De rol van deze tweeledige factoren suggereert sterk om
hun ontwikkeling gedurende het dereguleringsproces te evalueren om zo inzicht te krijgen in
de culturele wijzigingen van een voormalig overheidsbedrijf naar een privébedrijf.
Voortgaand op het introducerend karakter van het eerste hoofdstuk, beschrijven de volgende
drie hoofdstukken de belangrijkste concepten en de methodologie gebruikt in dit onderzoek.
Na het illustreren van de veranderende houding tegenover publieke eigendom binnen het
Argentijnse spoorwegbeleid, beschrijft hoofdstuk 2 de doelen, de perspectieven en de
praktische altematieven van elke privatisering. Hoofdstuk 3 poogt het concept
"Organisatorische Cultuur" te definiëren en het te situeren ten aanzien van andere
gerelateerde gebieden van de organisatietheorie en -praktijk. In het tweede deel van dit
hoofdstuk worden de cultuur-gerelateerde concepten verduidelijkt die een relevante rol spelen
in dit onderzoek. Na de geaccumuleerde wetenschappelijke kennis en de empirische bewijzen
worden in hoofdstuk 4 een aantal hypotheses geformuleerd. In het tweede deel van dit
hoofdstuk wat tegelijk een eerste theoretische module afsluit, wordt het toegepaste quasi-
experimentele onderzoek kort besproken.
Het centrale deel van deze studie bestaat uit de volgende vier hoofdstukken. Elk hoofdstuk is
gewijd aan een van de bedrijven dat toebehoorde aan (of deel uitmaakte van, in het geval van
Ferrocarriles Argentinos) het Argentijnse nationale spoorwegsysteem. Na een grondige
beschrijvíng van de specifieke institutionele ontwikkelingen, bekijkt elk hoofdstuk hoe deze
ontwikkelingen een set van specifieke culturele praktijken tot stand brachten. Hoofdstuk 5
beschrijft gedetailleerd en chronologisch de problemen van Ferrocamles Argentinos. Het
volgende hoofdstuk is gewijd aan Ferrocarriles Metropolitanos ( FeMeSA), een organisatie
met een tijdelijk karakter, opgericht om als brug te functioneren tussen het verdwijnende FA
en de start van de nieuwe gedereguleerde bedrijven. Ondanks het tijdelijk karakter van de
bestudeerde organisatie, is hoofdstuk 6 niet alleen relevant vanwege het ex-ante onderzoek dat
plaatsvond bij FeMeSA, maar ook omdat diepgaande veranderingen plaatsvonden op een
moment van culturele anomie. Hoofdstuk 7 beschrijft het proces van culturele reconstructie
van Trenes de Buenos Aires (TBA), de metropolitane vervoersmaatschappij. Hoofdstuk 8,
het laatste hoofdstuk van het tweede deel, bespreekt het analoge proces van Nuevo Central
Argentino (NCA), de cargo-maatschappij die diende als controle-onderzoekseenheid.
De vier eerder besproken hoofdstukken geven tot op zekere hoogte een weergave van de
culturele dynamiek van het gehele proces. Hoofdstuk 9 gaat verder in op de geobserveerde
algemene trends van (her-)creatie van culturele elementen onder de voormalige FA
werknemers en hun nieuwe collega's. Tegelijkertijd wordt elke eerder opgestelde hypothese
onderzocht teneinde de validiteit ervan vast te stellen. Tenslotte vat hoofdstuk 10 de
belangrijkste bevindingen en de implicaties ervan voor de betrokken bedrijven samen.
De studie genereert zowel praktische als academische resultaten. Praktisch vormt de studie
een interessant voorbeeld voor management van aan de gang zijnde of toekomstige
privatiseringen. De inzichten uit dit onderzoek kunnen ook een toepassing vinden in
organisaties die, alhoewel behorend tot de private sector, aanzienlijk gereguleerd zijn en zich
z~8
trachten te verlossen van de negatieve culturele neveneffecten van deze regulering. Tenslotte
levert de gepresenteerde studie interessant materiaal op in verband met de culturele dynamiek
van turbulente organisatorische omgevingen en voor het publiek-private debat. Verder worden
een aantal zaken die relevant zijn voor zowel wetenschap als praktijk besproken. Het
hoofdstuk eindigt met een aantal onderzoeksvragen die gezien de inhoud van deze studie
interessant zijn voor verder onderzoek.
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